*Empirical research demonstrates that labor markets exposed to trade globalization witness lower employment and wages, an increase in protectionist parties' vote-share in EU, and a proclivity for protectionist voting on trade bills in the U.S. However, the relationship between trade integration and protectionism is nuanced. While redistribution policies can offset trade-related losses, the extent to which governments fairly distribute gains across groups shapes the outcome. This article argues that trade globalization amplifies demand for protection only in countries with low levels of intergroup redistribution. Notably, nations with fair redistribution policies do not experience a comparable backlash against trade globalization. To substantiate this argument, I present a formal theoretical model linking tax rates, political power, and protectionist demands. Empirical evidence supports the model's predictions, shedding light on the nuanced relationship between trade, politics, and redistribution.

**Engerman and Sokoloff conclude the North and South in the New World diverge because factor endowments had “profound and enduring impacts...on institutional and economic development” (Engerman and Sokoloff 1994). My research turns to a different part of the globe - Tsarist Russia - to identify more precisely which mechanisms allow factor endowments to interact with institutions in order to produce or reduce economic growth. Using the context of Late Tsarist agriculture I ask: what is the relationship between resources, institutions and economic growth? My paper studies how in regions with fertile soil peasants received unfavorable land allocations after the serf emancipation in 1861, influencing development. Using data I digitized from the Land Survey of 1905 and peasant statistics from the late 19th and early 20th century, I explore how soil quality impacted the allocation of useful land, household production and literacy rates.