No abstract is available for this item.

Les politiques d'achats publics ont souvent ete suspectees d'etre fortement biaisees en faveur des producteurs domestiques, et presentees de ce fait comme un outil deguise de protection commerciale. Cet article, centre sur l'analyse du commerce intra-europeen des annees soixante-dix et quatre-vingt, apporte la preuve necessaire que les achats publics ont effectivement eu un impact negatif sur les flux de commerce internationaux et permettent donc d'expliquer en partie l'importance des "effets-frontieres" entre les pays europeens.

Discriminatory government procurement may (but does not have to) interfere with international specialisation and trade flows. This paper offers a general introduction to the findings of the theoretical literature, provides some descriptive statistics on public procurement and gives a brief overview of regulatory initiatives at international level.

Public-sector purchases from private firms account for over 10 percent of GDP in most developed countries, and they are typically biased in favour of domestic suppliers. This paper explores the impact of discriminatory public procurement on the location of industries. Our main theoretical finding is that, in a setting with increasing returns and trade costs, home-biased procurement can override other determinants of industrial specialisation. Our empirical analysis underscores the significance of discriminatory procurement. Drawing on a cross-country, crossindustry data sample for the EU, we find that determinants of industry location such as factor endowments, market access and intermediate inputs are significant in sectors where public procurement is small, but they lose their significance in sectors where public procurement is important.