Working papers
This paper analyzes how collateral quality shocks affect banks’ liquidity management and the risk-free rate. We develop a model where banks manage liquidity through near-cash assets and marketable securities subject to idiosyncratic and/or aggregate shocks. Collateral quality deterioration leads to non-monotonic changes in liquidity holdings: moderate declines reduce cash holdings via lower market returns, while severe declines cause precautionary hoarding and market freezes. Reduced collateral quality depresses the risk-free rate. Policy interventions, including liquidity regulation and negative interest rate policies can mitigate these effects. Our findings highlight the risks of collateral quality shocks and the importance of policy complementarities in addressing liquidity issues.
In this paper, we examine the possibility for a regulator to reduce policy costs by substituting a voluntary policy based on a legislative threat to an active harvest control. Specifically, we focus on fisheries where the regulator aims to maintain an optimal level of conservation through a voluntary agreement. To achieve this, we identify a mandatory regulation that can serve as a threat to ensure voluntary compliance and avoid regulation costs. However, threats differ from effective policies. To be enforceable, they must be validated through a legislative process, the outcome of which is uncertain and subject to objections. Consequently, we introduce of a random delay in its application and address issues of social acceptability. This threat rests upon two pillars: a moratorium with financial compensation followed by an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) mechanism, and a suitably chosen tax on harvesting capacity to deter deviations. We use data from the scallop fishery in the Bay of Saint-Brieuc (France) to illustrate this voluntary mechanism.