Trannoy
Alain Trannoy
Publications
This paper presents a general procedure for decomposing income inequality measures by income sources. The methods of decomposition proposed are based on the Shapley value and extensions of the Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games. In particular, we find that Owen’s value can find an interesting application in this context.We show that the axiomatization by the potential of Hart and Mas-Colell remains valid in the presence of the domain restriction of inequality indices. We also examine the properties of these decomposition rules and perform a comparison with Shorrocks’ decomposition rule properties. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013
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A droite comme à gauche, on veut non seulement augmenter les impôts mais changer la fiscalité pour sortir de la crise. En effet, la France peut difficilement échapper à une hausse globale des impôts pour résorber déficit et dette. Raison de plus pour s'inquiéter de l'équité et de l'efficacité du système fiscal. Equité parce que les Français accepteront difficilement de payer s'ils ont le sentiment que le système est injuste. Efficacité parce qu'un mauvais système fiscal peut avoir des effets négatifs sur la croissance, l'emploi et la compétitivité internationale. Il faut non seulement regarder les impôts un par un comme le font les politiques dans les débats, mais aussi examiner la cohérence globale du système, la cohérence entre instruments et objectifs. C'est ainsi que sont replacés en perspective les débats sur les niches fiscales, le quotient familial, la TVA sociale, la fusion entre l'IR et la CSG.
Introduction De l’extérieur, la discipline économique est encore vue comme très imposante par son apparatus théorique mais avec comme contrepartie une part limitée laissée à la vérification empirique. Cette image héritée du passé est assez largement obsolète, et ne correspond plus à l’activité réelle des économistes d’aujourd’hui et en particulier de la jeune génération. À la limite, pour nombre des économistes des années 1960, il pouvait sembler suffisant d’énoncer une proposition pour qu’el...
This paper examines the possible reform of the system of aid to dependent individuals (apa), a reform aimed at recovering the subsidies awarded from the individual?s bequest. We develop a theoretical model with a dependent parent and an offspring that can potentially act as informal carer. The parent decides how much formal aid to buy, while the offspring decides how much informal care to provide to her parent. The model is solved for three cases: no altruism, altruism from bequests (towards a surviving spouse or offspring), and altruism towards the parent. We show that recovering the subsidy from the bequest increases the amount of informal aid supplied by a non-altruist offspring, while the versions with altruism yield ambiguous results. Classification JEL : D11, D3
We provide a unified treatment of the two approaches pioneered by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982, 1987) [3,4] by resorting to compensation principles in the bivariate case. We treat the attributes of individual utility asymmetrically by assuming that one attribute can be used to compensate another. Our main result consists of two sufficient second-order stochastic dominance conditions. In the case where the compensated variable has a discrete distribution, the distribution of the compensating variable must satisfy a condition which degenerates to the Sequential Generalized Lorenz test for identical marginal distributions of the compensated variable. Furthermore, the distributions of the compensated variable must satisfy the Generalized Lorenz test.
We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both depending on productivity. Three average social criteria are distinguished—national, citizen and resident—according to the agents whose welfare matters. A curse of the middle-skilled occurs in the first-best, and it may be optimal to let some highly skilled leave the country under the resident criterion. In the second-best, under the Citizen and Resident criteria, preventing emigration of the highly skilled is not necessarily optimal because the interaction between the incentive-compatibility and participations constraints may cause countervailing incentives. In important cases, a Rawlsian policymaker should decrease top marginal tax rates to keep everyone at home. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
Disaggregation arises when broad categories like households budget units are divided into elementary units as individual income recipients. We study the preservation of stochastic dominance for every order beyond two after disaggregation: If we observe a dominance relation among household income distributions, it is also true at the individual level. We find necessary and sufficient conditions satisfied by the common sharing rule adopted by households to divide the cake among individuals. The sharing function, which maps the household income into the outcome of the disadvantaged individual, must have derivatives of the same sign as the utility function characterizing the stochastic order of interest. In addition, the household has to follow a compensating rule, meaning that at the margin the distribution should be in favor of the disadvantaged individual.
