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Our current choices regarding the fight against deforestation and climatic disorder, against the overexploitation of natural resources or the erosion of ecologic heritage, have effects which will last long after we disappear. Must we make immediate and major sacrifices for the well-being of our descendants? Speaking only about developed countries, they will anyway be better off than we are if the trend in growth observed for the last two centuries continues. Unless, as scientists and GIEC Experts who work on biodiversity and ecosystem services fear, we are approaching the natural limits which commit here and now our responsibility towards future generations. In a context where current choices have uneven distributed effects in time, how do we arbitrate between the present and future, between the interests of the various generations? One way of considering the problem is to incorporate some normative requirements into a criterion of inter-temporal social choice, and estimate the legitimacy of alternative futures according to their classification by this criterion. This approach results in a general message as important as it is frustrating: looking for the trajectories of management which avoid waste cannot usually be achieved without favouring certain generations. Therefore, the concern for our descendants can be summed up to one question: what are the desirable compromises between efficiency and impartiality? Discounting the utilities of every generation before adding them together is a possible answer. But such a criterion, for a long time applied by default, presents an all the more contestable discrimination against future generations, all the more so as alternatives exist. This note briefly presents the works of the scientists of the SAE2 department on two alternatives to discounting. Chichilnisky’s criterion and the mixed Bentham-Rawls (MBR) criterion are two possible answers to the efficiency-impartiality dilemma.
Nos choix présents en matière de lutte contre la déforestation et le dérèglement climatique, contre la surexploitation des ressources naturelles ou encore contre l’érosion du patrimoine écologique, ont des effets qui persisteront longtemps après notre disparition. Devons-nous pour autant consentir des sacrifices immédiats et importants pour le bien-être de nos descendants ? Ils seront de toutes façons mieux lotis que nous si, pour ne parler que des pays développés, la tendance à la croissance observée sur près de deux siècles se poursuit. A moins que, comme le craignent les experts du GIEC et les scientifiques qui travaillent sur la biodiversité et les services éco-systémiques, nous n’approchions de limites naturelles qui engagent dès à présent notre responsabilité vis-à-vis des générations futures. Dans un contexte où les choix actuels ont des effets inégalement distribués au cours du temps, comment arbitrer entre le présent et le futur, entre les intérêts des différentes générations ? Une façon d’envisager le problème est d’incorporer certaines exigences normatives dans un critère de choix social intertemporel, et d’apprécier la légitimité de futurs alternatifs selon le classement opéré par ce critère. Cette démarche aboutit à un message général aussi important que frustrant : rechercher les trajectoires d’exploitation qui évitent les gaspillages ne peut se faire en général sans privilégier certaines générations. La préoccupation pour nos descendants peut se résumer alors à une question : quels sont les compromis souhaitables entre efficacité et impartialité ? Actualiser les utilités de chaque génération avant d’en faire la somme est une réponse possible. Mais un tel critère, longtemps appliqué par défaut, pratique une discrimination à l’encontre des générations futures d’autant plus attaquable que des alternatives existent. Cette note présente brièvement les travaux des chercheurs du département SAE2 sur deux alternatives à l’actualisation. Le critère de Chichil
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether international income transfers can improve or worsen the global level of biodiversity and global social welfare by changing the relative contributions to biodiversity protection and to agricultural production. Because of the public good nature of biodiversity, Warr's neutrality theorem suggests that such transfers may have no effects at all (Warr, 1983). A model is developed, based on the simplifying assumption that northern countries have little biodiversity whereas southern countries are endowed with natural capital in the form of (generally unspoilt) biodiversity-rich land. Southern countries allocate optimally land and capital to two competing productive activities, agriculture and eco-tourism. When transfers are organized from the North to the South, we show that Warr's neutrality theorem collapses. Transfers can either reduce or increase the natural capital in the South, depending on some empirically verifiable hypotheses concerning the characteristics of the eco-tourism and agricultural production functions. In addition, we demonstrate that welfare improvements can be obtained even with reductions in the level of biodiversity.
In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.
Sustainable development must satisfy the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs. Although it looks at the economic, environmental and social aspects of sustainability, this article focuses specifically on an analysis of the concept in conjunction with the use and protection of natural resources. It shows how taking account of environmental goods, including the finite nature of certain natural resources, can change the way economists deal with the issues of growth, development and equity between generations. In this context, after a brief historical perspective on the concept of development, the paper shows how the potential for substitutability between natural and manufactured capital, for example in production technologies, lead to two paradigms, that of weak sustainability and that of strong sustainability. These two approaches are presented in an effort to explain how their merits can be mutually reinforcing.
No abstract is available for this item.
Faut-il s’inquiéter de l’érosion de la biodiversité ? Que peut-on y faire ? Un ensemble de travaux menés au sein de l’UMR LAMETA présentent la biodiversité comme une notion singulièrement complexe, dont la valeur ne se révèle correctement sur aucun marché. Les estimations partielles qu’on peut en faire par d’autres moyens montrent néanmoins son importance, mais sa protection n’est pas chose aisée. Parce que la biodiversité concerne largement des domaines privés, et aussi des Etats souverains pour lesquels la protection de la nature n’est pas (encore) une priorité, les approches règlementaires sont d’un secours limité. Il faut s’efforcer de mieux comprendre les forces sociales qui compromettent la biodiversité, et utiliser ces mêmes forces pour la préserver.
Connaître la valeur de la biodiversité permettrait des choix de préservation plus efficaces. Pour cela il est utile de disposer de précisions quantitatives et/ou qualitatives sur l’objet « biodiversité ». On résume ici plusieurs littératures (écologie, biologie, sciences politiques et économie) qui s’efforcent de définir et mesurer la diversité. L’originalité de cette note est d’expliciter les fondements axiomatiques des indicateurs. Si les bases théoriques sont parfois fragiles et demandent à être renforcées, les problèmes d’ordre pratiques constituent aussi un défi pour la recherche.
Should we worry about the erosion of biodiversity? What can be done? Several studies carried out within the joint research unit LAMETA present biodiversity as a rather complex notion, the value of which does not accurately appear on any market. However, the partial assessments that can be made through other means show its importance, but its preservation is no easy thing. Since biodiversity greatly concerns private properties and also sovereign States for which the protection of the nature is not (yet) a priority, the statutory approaches are of limited help. We must try to gain a better understanding of the social forces that compromise biodiversity and use these same forces to preserve it.
Knowing the value of biodiversity would enable more efficient preservation choices. For this purpose it is useful to have quantitative and/or qualitative information on the object “biodiversity”. We sum up here several literatures (ecology, biology, political sciences and economics) which attempt to define and measure biodiversity. The originality of this note is that it clarifies the axiomatic bases of the indicators. While theoretical bases are sometimes fragile and need to be confirmed, practical issues are also a challenge for research.