Bramoullé

Publications

FavoritismJournal articleYann Bramoullé and Sanjeev Goyal, Journal of Development Economics, Volume 122, Issue C, pp. 16-27, 2016

Favoritism refers to the act of offering jobs, contracts and resources to members of one's own social group in preference to others who are outside the group. This paper examines the economic origins and the consequences of favoritism.

The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of NetworksBookYann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti and Brian Rogers (Eds.), 2016-04, 857 pages, Oxford University Press, 2016

The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the contributors to this volume devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formation, games played on networks, repeated games, and the interaction between linking and behavior is synthesized. A number of chapters are devoted to studying social process mediated by networks. Topics here include opinion formation, diffusion of information and disease, and learning. There are also chapters devoted to financial contagion and systemic risk, motivated in part by the recent financial crises. Another section discusses communities, with applications including social trust, favor exchange, and social collateral; the importance of communities for migration patterns; and the role that networks and communities play in the labor market. A prominent role of networks, from an economic perspective, is that they mediate trade. Several chapters cover bilateral trade in networks, strategic intermediation, and the role of networks in international trade. Contributions discuss as well the role of networks for organizations. On the one hand, one chapter discusses the role of networks for the performance of organizations, while two other chapters discuss managing networks of consumers and pricing in the presence of network-based spillovers. Finally, the authors discuss the internet as a network with attention to the issue of net neutrality. Contributors to this volume - Daron Acemoglu Sinan Aral Lori Beaman Francis Bloch Vincent Boucher Yann Bramoulle Emily Breza Antonio Cabrales Arun Chandrasekhar Thomas Chaney Syngjoo Choi Daniele Condorelli Wouter Dessein Marcin Dziubinski Nick Economides

Introduction to the HandbookBook chapterYann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti and Brian W. Rogers, In: Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Yann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti and Brian W. Rogers (Eds.), 2016-04, pp. 3-9, 2016

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Introduction to the HandbookBook chapterYann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti and Brian W. Rogers, In: Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Yann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti and Brian W. Rogers (Eds.), 2016-04, pp. 3-9, 2016

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Games Played on NetworksBook chapterYann Bramoullé and Rachel Kranton, In: Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Yann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti and Brian W. Rogers (Eds.), 2016-04, pp. Chap.5, 2016

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Games Played on NetworksBook chapterYann Bramoullé and Rachel Kranton, In: Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks, Yann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti and Brian W. Rogers (Eds.), 2016-04, pp. Chap.5, 2016

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Networks: a paradigm shift for economics?Book chapterAlan P. Kirman, In: The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks, Yann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti and Brian W. Rogers (Eds.), 2016-04, pp. 13-46(Chap.2), 2016

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Do Peers Affect Student Achievement ? Evidence from Canada Using Group Size VariationJournal articleVincent Boucher, Yann Bramoullé, Habiba Djebbari and Bernard Fortin, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp. 91-109, 2014

We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (Journal of Econometrics 2007; 140(2), 333–374) to estimate peer effects in a linear-in-means model when individuals interact in groups. Assumingsufficient group size variation, this approach allows to control for correlated effects at the group level and to solve the simultaneity (reflection) problem. We clarify the intuition behind identification of peer effects in the model. We investigate peer effects in student achievement in French, Science, Mathematics and History in secondary schools in the Province of Québec (Canada). We estimate the model using conditional maximum likelihood and instrumental variables methods. We find some evidence of peer effects. The endogenous peer effect is large and significant in Mathematics but imprecisely estimated in the other subjects. Some contextual peer effects are also significant. In particular, for most subjects, the average age of peers has a negative effect on own test score. Using calibrated Monte Carlo simulations, we find that high dispersion in group sizes helps with potential issues of weak identification. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Strategic Interaction and NetworksJournal articleYann Bramoullé, Rachel Kranton and Martin D'Amours, American Economic Review, Volume 104, Issue 3, pp. 898-930, 2014

Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools, and markets, the entire network determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the network amplifies agents' actions. The paper combines new tools—potential games, optimization, and spectral graph theory—to solve for all Nash and stable equilibria and applies the results to R&D, crime, and the econometrics of peer effects.

Network games under strategic complementaritiesJournal articleMohamed Belhaj, Yann Bramoullé and Frédéric Deroian, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 88, Issue C, pp. 310-319, 2014

We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for uniqueness, covering all concave as well as some non-concave best responses. We then study the relationship between position and action and identify situations where a more central agent always plays a higher action in equilibrium. We finally analyze comparative statics. We show that a shock may not propagate throughout the entire network and uncover a general pattern of decreasing interdependence.