Ludovic Renou
Queen Mary University
Information design in multi-stage games
Venue
IBD Salle 21
Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 21
AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille
Date(s)
Thursday, November 9 2017| 12:00pm to 1:15pm
Contact(s)
Ugo Bolletta: ugo.bolletta[at]univ-amu.fr
Mathieu Faure: mathieu.faure[at]univ-amu.fr
Abstract
We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals. We interpret our results as revelation principles. We apply our characterization to bilateral bargaining.