Publications
In this paper, we provide a better understanding of what drives sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to improve their governance. Using the most recent SWF governance scoreboard from Maire et al. (2021), we estimate a fractional response model to determine whether SWF governance disclosure norms are driven by the search for internal or external legitimacy. Overall, we find that SWFs have better governance when they originate from democratic countries with high-quality, national governance. Our results also show that SWFs tend to have better governance quality when they need to acquire external legitimacy vis-à-vis the target company and its government. In particular, we find that SWFs have an incentive to improve their governance when they are sufficiently internationalized, when the amount of foreign assets invested abroad is sufficiently large or when the amount of shares acquired in developed countries is significant. These findings demonstrate how SWFs may proactively build legitimacy in host countries when they need to adapt their foreign entry strategies. Our results have important implications for understanding the determinants of SWF governance in general.
We study whether fiscal policies, especially public debt, can help to curb the macroeconomic and health consequences of epidemics. Our approach is based on three main features: we introduce the dynamics of epidemics in an overlapping generations model to take into account that old people are more vulnerable; people are more easily infected when pollution is high; public spending in health care and public debt can be used to tackle the effects of epidemics. We show that fiscal policies can promote convergence to a stable disease-free steady state. When public policies are not able to permanently eradicate the epidemic, public debt, and income transfers could reduce the number of infected people and increase capital and GDP per capita. As a prerequisite, pollution intensity should not be too high. Finally, we define a household subsidy policy that eliminates income and welfare inequalities between healthy and infected individuals.
In this paper, we develop an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and calibrate it to the Swedish historical data in order to estimate the economic cost of the 1918-19 influenza pandemic. The model identifies survivors from younger cohorts as main benefactors of the windfall bequests following the influenza mortality shock. We also show that the general equilibrium effects of the pandemic reveal themselves over the wage channel rather than the interest rate, fertility or labor supply channels. Finally, we demonstrate that the influenza mortality shock becomes persistent, driving the aggregate variables to lower steady states which costs the economy 1.819% of the output loss over the next century.
Over the years, oil prices and financial stock markets have always had a complex relationship. This paper analyzes the interactions and co-movements between the oil market (WTI crude oil) and two major stock markets in Europe and the US (the Euro Stoxx 50 and the SP500) for the period from 1990 to 2023. For that, I use both the time-varying and the Markov copula models. The latter one represents an extension of the former one, where the constant term of the dynamic dependence parameter is driven by a hidden two-state first-order Markov chain. It is also called the dynamic regime-switching (RS) copula model. To estimate the model, I use the inference function for margins (IFM) method together with Kim’s filter for the Markov switching process. The marginals of the returns are modeled by the GARCH and GAS models. Empirical results show that the RS copula model seems adequate to measure and evaluate the time-varying and non-linear dependence structure. Two persistent regimes of high and low dependency have been detected. There was a jump in the co-movements of both pairs during high regimes associated with instability and crises. In addition, the extreme dependence between crude oil and US/European stock markets is time-varying but also asymmetric, as indicated by the SJC copula. The correlation in the lower tail is higher than that in the upper. Hence, oil and stock returns are more closely joined and tend to co-move more closely together in bullish periods than in bearish periods. Finally, the dependence between WTI crude oil and the SP500 stock index seems to be more affected by exogenous shocks and instability than the oil and European stock markets.
We study a simple model in which two vertically differentiated firms compete in prices and mass advertising on an initially uninformed market. Consumers differ in their preference for quality. There is an upper bound on prices since consumers cannot spend more on the good than a fixed amount (say, their income). Depending on this income and on the ratio between the advertising cost and quality differential (relative advertising cost), either there is no equilibrium in pure strategies or there exists one of the following three types: (1) an interior equilibrium, where both firms have positive natural markets and charge prices lower than the consumer’s income; (2) a constrained interior equilibrium, where both firms have positive natural markets, and the high-quality firm charges the consumer’s income or (3) a corner equilibrium, where the low-quality firm has no natural market selling only to uninformed customers. We show that no corner equilibrium exists in which the high-quality firm would have a null natural market. At an equilibrium (whenever there exists one), the high-quality firm always advertises more, charges a higher price and makes a higher profit than the low-quality one. As the relative advertising cost goes to infinity, prices become equal and the advertising intensities converge to zero as well as the profits. Finally, the advertising intensities are, at least globally, increasing with the quality differential. Finally, in all cases, as the advertising parameter cost increases unboundedly, both prices converge increasingly towards the consumer’s income.
This paper develops a search and matching framework in which workers are characterized by asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity and firms set wages by considering the effect that these can have on workers' effort and, therefore, on output. The cyclical response of effort to wage changes can considerably amplify shocks, independently of the cyclicality of the hiring wage, which becomes irrelevant for unemployment volatility, and firms' expectations of downward wage rigidity in existing jobs increases the volatility of job creation. The model is consistent with evidence on hiring and incumbents' wage cyclicality, and provides novel predictions on the dynamics of effort.
Recent papers use regression discontinuity designs (RDDs) based on age discontinuity to evaluate social assistance (SA) and unemployment insurance (UI) extension policies. Job search theory predicts that such designs generate biased estimates of the policy-relevant treatment effect. Owing to market frictions, people below the age threshold modify their search behavior in expectation of future eligibility. We use a job search model to quantify the biases on various datasets in the literature. The impacts of SA benefits on employment are underestimated, whereas those of UI extensions on nonemployment duration are overestimated. The article provides insights for RDD evaluations of age-discontinuous policies.
We expand the theory of politician quality in electoral democracies with citizen candidates by supposing that performance while in office sends a signal to the voters about the politician's valence. Individuals live two periods and decide to become candidates when young, trading off against type-specific private wages. The valence signal increases the reelection chances of high valence incumbents (screening mechanism of reelection), and thus their expected gain from running for office (self-selection mechanism). Since self-selection improves the average quality of challengers, voters become more demanding when evaluating the incumbent's performance. This complementarity between the self-selection and the screening mechanisms may lead to multiple equilibria. We show that more difficult and/or less variable political jobs increase the politicians' quality. Conversely, societies with more wage inequality have lower quality polities. We also show that incumbency advantage blurs the screening mechanism by giving incumbents an upper-hand in electoral competition and may wipe out the positive effect of the screening mechanism on the quality of the polity.
In the follow-up to the 1926 political and monetary crisis in France, a new government led by Raymond Poincaré attempted to restore monetary stability by restructuring public debt. A sinking fund was missioned to withdraw short-term public bills from money markets. This policy disorganized the largest Parisian banks of the time, as they relied on these bills to manage their liquidity. Without developed domestic money markets, no other asset could absorb the excess liquidity freed by the withdrawal of these bills, and these leading banks faced a low-rate environment. In search of yield, they expanded their activities abroad a few months before the 1929 crash. These findings renew our understanding of the expansion of France's banking sector in the 1920s. In addition, they shed new light on the role of public debt in financial stability in an open economy.
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