Documents de travail

Résumé Based on the calibration of a simple model, we decompose the decline in the labor share into four structural components: task displacement, labor rents, capital rents, and labor-capital substitution effect. Our estimation suggests that task displacement and the switch of distributed rents from labor to capital are the main drivers of the labor share decline over the past three decades. On the other hand, the neoclassical substitution effect seems not to have a long term impact on the labor share.
Mots clés Productivity, Rate of return on capital, Markup, Capital rents, Labor rents, Automation, Task displacement, Labor share
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Résumé This paper analyzes how collateral quality shocks affect banks' liquidity management and the risk-free rate. We develop a model where banks manage liquidity through near-cash assets and marketable securities subject to idiosyncratic and/or aggregate shocks. Collateral quality deterioration leads to non-monotonic changes in liquidity holdings: moderate declines reduce cash holdings via lower market returns, while severe declines cause precautionary hoarding and market freezes. Reduced collateral quality depresses the risk-free rate. Policy interventions, including liquidity regulation and negative interest rate policies can mitigate these effects. Our findings highlight the risks of collateral quality shocks and the importance of policy complementarities in addressing liquidity issues.
Mots clés Cash-hoarding, Negative interest rate, Liquidity regulation, Collateral, Risk-free rate, Interbank market
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Résumé In this paper, we examine the possibility for a regulator to reduce policy costs by substituting a voluntary policy based on a legislative threat to an active harvest control. Specifically, we focus on fisheries where the regulator aims to maintain an optimal level of conservation through a voluntary agreement. To achieve this, we identify a mandatory regulation that can serve as a threat to ensure voluntary compliance and avoid regulation costs. However, threats differ from effective policies. To be enforceable, they must be validated through a legislative process, the outcome of which is uncertain and subject to objections. Consequently, we introduce of a random delay in its application and address issues of social acceptability. This threat rests upon two pillars: a moratorium with financial compensation followed by an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) mechanism, and a suitably chosen tax on harvesting capacity to deter deviations. We use data from the scallop fishery in the Bay of Saint-Brieuc (France) to illustrate this voluntary mechanism.
Mots clés Voluntary agreements, Fisheries, Conservation policies, Dynamic games
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