Lack of high-quality value per statistical life (VSL) studies in low- and middle-income countries have been recognized by scholars and analysts in the benefit-cost analysis field for decades. However, progress has been slow in addressing it. We estimated VSL in China using a stated-preference survey in the context of reducing mortality risks associated with COVID-19. The survey was administered in seven cities across China in 2022 with a purposive sampling approach, and consistency checks at different levels of stringency regarding willingness to pay (WTP) for mortality risk reductions of different magnitudes were used to screen respondents. The estimated VSL ranges from 8.0 million to 10.3 million Chinese Yuan, which is higher than previous estimates. Also previous studies found much higher VSL estimates from a subsample obtained with more stringent consistency check requiring that WTP be approximately proportional to the magnitude of mortality risk reduction, we did not find such a difference with our dataset. In addition, based on our anlaysis, respondents in first-tier cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou have higher VSL than those in second-tier cities such as Changchun, Chengdu, Wuhan and Xi’an; the VSL-age relationship shows a U-shaped pattern; and the collective experience of city lockdown has a negative impact on VSL. Other factors which were found to influence VSL include education, sector of work, health status, risk perception, behaviors (physical exercises, wearing face masks, getting vaccinated), knowledge, political identity, and trust in government.
JEL classification codes
I12, I18

This paper considers a risk-neutral insurer and a risk-averse individual who bargain over the terms of an insurance contract. Under asymmetric Nash bargaining, we show that the Pareto-optimal insurance contract always contains a straight deductible under linear transaction costs and that the deductible disappears if and only if the deadweight cost is zero, regardless of the insurer's bargaining power. We further find that the optimality of no insurance is consistent across all market structures. When the insured's risk preference exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, the optimal deductible and the insurer's expected loss decrease in the degree of the insured's risk aversion and thus increase in the insured's initial wealth. In addition, the effect of increasing the insurer's bargaining power on the optimal deductible is equivalent to a pure effect of reducing the initial wealth of the insured. Our results suggest that the well-documented preference for low deductibles could be the result of insurance bargaining.

We surveyed economists’ attitudes toward adjusting discount rates to the risk profile of public programs. Three-quarters of respondents recommend to use project-specific discount rates. For example, on average, respondents discount railway infrastructures more than hospitals and climate mitigation. But the degree of discount discrimination between distinct risk profiles of different projects is fairly limited in our sample given the differences in risk profiles for these projects. Economic experts thus penalize risky public projects far less than financial markets penalize private investments. We call this the ”discount premium puzzle”. Finally, among experts in favor of a single discount rate, there is no consensus on whether it should be based on the average cost of capital in the economy, the sovereign borrowing cost, or the Ramsey rule, which gives rise to disagreement over the level of the recommended discount rate.

In this paper, we study the willingness to pay for reductions in health risks within a framework of anticipated regret. We show that ex post information provision can be a relevant factor for regret theory to account for why people are sometimes so inclined to protect themself against certain types of health risks but not others. In particular, we find that under full resolution of uncertainty disproportionate aversion to large regrets exaggerates willingness to pay estimates. The effect induced by this notion of regret aversion can be interpreted as if regret-averse people overweight risk reductions due to prevention. However, as feedback over forgone acts is missing, the regret aversion effect disappears. Finally, we show that information avoidance induced by regret aversion can significantly bias our evaluation to prefer those health programs that completely eliminate a risk, i.e., the certainty effect.