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Publications
Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.
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Governments across Europe are required to make decisions about how best to allocate scarce health care resources. There are legitimate arguments for eliciting societal vales in relation to health care resource allocation given the roles of the general public as payers and potential patients. However, relatively little is known about the views of the general public on general principles which could guide these decisions. In this paper we present five societal viewpoints on principles for health care resources allocation and develop a new approach, Q2S, designed to investigate the extent to which these views are held across a range of European countries. An online survey was developed, based on a previously completed study Q methodology, and delivered between November 2009 and February 2010 across nine countries to 33,515 respondents. The largest proportion of our respondents (44%), were found to most associate themselves with an egalitarian perspective. Differences in views were more strongly associated with countries than with socio-demographic characteristics. These results provide information which could be useful for decision makers in understanding the pluralistic context in which they are making health care resource allocation decisions and how different groups in society may respond to such decisions.
Dominance solvability is one of the most straightforward solution concepts in game theory. It is based on two principles: dominance (according to which players always use their dominant strategy) and iterated dominance (according to which players always ...
How is one’s cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability.
Sous l’impulsion, notamment, de l’essor de l’économie expérimentale, la littérature récente a mis en évidence un large éventail de situations dans lesquelles les incitations monétaires échouent à orienter les comportements dans le sens désiré. Ce constat conduit à rechercher des mécanismes institutionnels alternatifs, capables de se substituer aux incitations monétaires. Cet article propose une revue des travaux s’inspirant de la psychologie sociale de l’engagement afin de développer des mécanismes non monétaires susceptibles d’affecter les comportements. Ces travaux étudient une procédure d’engagement particulière : un serment à dire la vérité. Cette procédure a été appliquée avec succès (1) au problème du biais hypothétique dans la révélation des préférences pour les biens non marchands, (2) aux défauts de coordination, et (3) à la propension à dire la vérité. Pris ensemble, ces travaux confirment la capacité de mécanismes d’engagement à guider l’élaboration d’institutions non monétaires capables d’orienter efficacement les comportements économiques.
The log-normal distribution is convenient for modelling the income distribution, and it offers an analytical expression for most inequality indices that depends only on the shape parameter of the associated Lorenz curve. A decomposable inequality index can be implemented in the framework of a finite mixture of log-normal distributions so that overall inequality can be composed into within-subgroup components. Using a Bayesian approach and a Gibbs sampler, a Rao-Blackwellization can improve inference results on decomposable income inequality indices. The very nature of the economic question can provide prior information so as to distinguish between the income groups and construct an asymmetric prior density which can reduce label switching. Data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) (1979 to 1996) are used in an extended empirical application.
We extend the individual dynamic model of lifetime resource allocation to assess the monetary value given to the increase in survival probabilities for every member of a household induced by improved air quality. We interpret this monetary value as VPF (value of a prevented fatality), which can also be expressed as a flow of discounted VOLY (value of life years) lost, and account for potential altruism towards other household members. We use a French air pollution contingent valuation survey that provides a description of the life-length reduction implied by a change in air pollution exposure. By privatising the public commodity air pollution, we succeed in ruling out any form of altruism (towards others living today and towards future generations) except altruism towards one's family. We estimate a mean VOLY of € 2001 140,000, a 30% premium for VOLY in perfect health w.r.t. average expected health status, and a mean VPF of € 2001 1.45 million for the respondent, all context-specific. In addition, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between his/her age and VOLY/VPF, and significant benevolence only towards children under 18.
This study investigates whether a popular stated preference method, the choice experiment (CE), reliably measures individuals’ values for a good. We address this question using an induced value experiment. Our results indicate that CEs fail to elicit payoff maximizing choices. We find little evidence that increasing the salience of the choices or adding monetary incentives increase the proportion of payoff maximizing choices. This questions the increasing use of CE to value non-market goods for policy making.
In this paper, we propose a behavioral approach to determine the extent to which the consumer/citizen distinction affects interpretations of monetary values in stated preferences methods. We perform a field experiment dealing with air pollution, where some (randomly selected) subjects are given the opportunity to behave politically by signing a petition for environmental protection prior to stating their private preferences in a standard contingent valuation exercise. We show that signing has the potential to influence respondents' willingness to pay values. Results indicate that even market-like situations are not immune to citizen behavior.