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Luchini
Publications
Under incomplete contracts, the mutual belief in reciprocity facilitates how traders create value through economic exchange. Creating such beliefs among strangers can be challenging even when they are allowed to communicate, because communication is cheap. In this paper, we first extend the literature showing that a truth-telling oath increases honesty to a sequential trust game with pre-play, fixed-form, and cheap-talk communication. Our results confirm that the oath creates more trust and cooperative behavior thanks to an improvement in communication; but we also show that the oath induces selection into communication — it makes people more wary of using communication, precisely because communication speaks louder under oath. We next designed additional treatments featuring mild and deterrent fines for deception to measure the monetary equivalent of the non-monetary incentives implemented by a truth-telling oath. We find that the oath is behaviorally equivalent to mild fines. The deterrent fine induces the highest level of cooperation. Altogether, these results confirm that allowing for interactions under oath within a trust game with communication creates significantly more economic value than the identical exchange institutions without the oath.
We provide a novel way to correct the effective reproduction number for the time-varying amount of tests, using the acceleration index (Baunez et al., 2021) as a simple measure of viral spread dynamics. Not correcting results in the reproduction number being a biased estimate of viral acceleration and we provide a formal decomposition of the resulting bias, involving the useful notions of test and infectivity intensities. When applied to French data for the COVID-19 pandemic (May 13, 2020—October 26, 2022), our decomposition shows that the reproduction number, when considered alone, characteristically underestimates the resurgence of the pandemic, compared to the acceleration index which accounts for the time-varying volume of tests. Because the acceleration index aggregates all relevant information and captures in real time the sizable time variation featured by viral circulation, it is a more parsimonious indicator to track the dynamics of an infectious disease outbreak in real time, compared to the equivalent alternative which would combine the reproduction number with the test and infectivity intensities.
Background
Meta-analyses have shown that preexisting mental disorders may increase serious Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outcomes, especially mortality. However, most studies were conducted during the first months of the pandemic, were inconclusive for several categories of mental disorders, and not fully controlled for potential confounders. Our study objectives were to assess independent associations between various categories of mental disorders and COVID-19-related mortality in a nationwide sample of COVID-19 inpatients discharged over 18 months and the potential role of salvage therapy triage to explain these associations.
Methods and findings:
We analysed a nationwide retrospective cohort of all adult inpatients discharged with symptomatic COVID-19 between February 24, 2020 and August 28, 2021 in mainland France. The primary exposure was preexisting mental disorders assessed from all discharge information recorded over the last 9 years (dementia, depression, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, alcohol use disorders, opioid use disorders, Down syndrome, other learning disabilities, and other disorder requiring psychiatric ward admission). The main outcomes were all-cause mortality and access to salvage therapy (intensive-care unit admission or life-saving respiratory support) assessed at 120 days after recorded COVID-19 diagnosis at hospital. Independent associations were analysed in multivariate logistic models. Of 465,750 inpatients with symptomatic COVID-19, 153,870 (33.0%) were recorded with a history of mental disorders. Almost all categories of mental disorders were independently associated with higher mortality risks (except opioid use disorders) and lower salvage therapy rates (except opioid use disorders and Down syndrome). After taking into account the mortality risk predicted at baseline from patient vulnerability (including older age and severe somatic comorbidities), excess mortality risks due to caseload surges in hospitals were +5.0% (95% confidence interval (CI), 4.7 to 5.2) in patients without mental disorders (for a predicted risk of 13.3% [95% CI, 13.2 to 13.4] at baseline) and significantly higher in patients with mental disorders (+9.3% [95% CI, 8.9 to 9.8] for a predicted risk of 21.2% [95% CI, 21.0 to 21.4] at baseline). In contrast, salvage therapy rates during caseload surges in hospitals were significantly higher than expected in patients without mental disorders (+4.2% [95% CI, 3.8 to 4.5]) and lower in patients with mental disorders (−4.1% [95% CI, −4.4; −3.7]) for predicted rates similar at baseline (18.8% [95% CI, 18.7-18.9] and 18.0% [95% CI, 17.9-18.2], respectively). The main limitations of our study point to the assessment of COVID-19-related mortality at 120 days and potential coding bias of medical information recorded in hospital claims data, although the main study findings were consistently reproduced in multiple sensitivity analyses.
Conclusions:
COVID-19 patients with mental disorders had lower odds of accessing salvage therapy, suggesting that life-saving measures at French hospitals were disproportionately denied to patients with mental disorders in this exceptional context.
Public good games are at the core of many environmental challenges. In such social dilemmas, a large share of people endorse the norm of reciprocity. A growing literature complements this finding with the observation that many players exhibit a self-serving bias in reciprocation: “weak reciprocators” increase their contributions as a function of the effort level of the other players, but less than proportionally. In this paper, we build upon a growing literature on truth-telling to argue that weak reciprocity might be best conceived not as a preference, but rather as a symptom of an internal trade-off at the player level between (i) the truthful revelation of their private reciprocal preference, and (ii) the economic incentives they face (which foster free-riding). In truth-telling experiments, many players misrepresent private information when this is to their material benefit, but to a significantly lesser extent than what would be expected based on the profit-maximizing strategy. We apply this behavioral insight to strategic situations, and test whether the preference revelation properties of the classic voluntary contribution game can be improved by offering players the possibility to sign a classic truth-telling oath. Our results suggest that the honesty oath helps increase cooperation (by 33% in our experiment). Subjects under oath contribute in a way which is more consistent with (i) the contribution they expect from the other players and (ii) their normative views about the right contribution level. As a result, the distribution of social types elicited under oath differs from the one observed in the baseline: some free-riders, and many weak reciprocators, now behave as pure reciprocators.
It can be assumed that higher SARS-CoV-2 infection risk is associated with higher COVID-19 vaccination intentions, although evidence is scarce. In this large and representative survey of 6007 adults aged 18–64 years and residing in France, 8.1% (95% CI, 7.5–8.8) reported a prior SARS-CoV-2 infection in December 2020, with regional variations according to an East–West gradient (p < 0.0001). In participants without prior SARS-CoV-2 infection, COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy was substantial, including 41.3% (95% CI, 39.8–42.8) outright refusal of COVID-19 vaccination. Taking into account five characteristics of the first approved vaccines (efficacy, duration of immunity, safety, country of the vaccine manufacturer, and place of administration) as well as the initial setting of the mass vaccination campaign in France, COVID-19 vaccine acceptance would reach 43.6% (95% CI, 43.0–44.1) at best among working-age adults without prior SARS-CoV-2 infection. COVID-19 vaccine acceptance was primarily driven by vaccine characteristics, sociodemographic and attitudinal factors. Considering the region of residency as a proxy of the likelihood of getting infected, our study findings do not support the assumption that SARS-CoV-2 infection risk is associated with COVID-19 vaccine acceptance.
Does giving taxpayers a voice over the destination of tax revenues lead to more honest income declarations? Previous experiments have shown that giving participants the opportunity to select the organization that receives their tax funds tends to increase tax compliance. The aim of this paper is to assess whether this increase in compliance is induced by the sole fact of giving subjects a choice—a “direct democracy effect”. To that aim, we ask participants to a tax evasion game to choose, in a collective or individual choice setting, between two very similar organizations which provide the same social (ecological) benefits. We elicit compliance for both organizations before the choice is made so as to control for the counter-factual compliance decision. We find that democracy does not increase compliance, and even observe a slight negative effect—in particular for women. Our results confirm the existence of a commitment effect of democracy, leading to favor more the selected organization when it was actively chosen. The commitment effect of democracy is however not enough to overcome the decrease in the level of compliance. Thanks to response times data, we show that prior choice on similar options as compared to a purely random selection weakens the preference for honesty. One important field application of our results is that democracy in tax spending must offer real choices to tax payers to improve compliance.
Comment mesurer le plus finement possible l'accélération ou la décélération d'une épidémie ?
In a competitive business environment, dishonesty can pay. Self-interested executives and managers can have incentive to shade the truth for personal gain. In response, the business community has considered how to commit these executives and managers to a higher ethical standard. The MBA Oath and the Dutch Bankers Oath are examples of such a commitment device. The question we test herein is whether the oath can be used as an effective form of ethics management for future executives/managers—who for our experiment we recruited from a leading French business school—by actually improving their honesty. Using a classic Sender-Receiver strategic game experiment, we reinforce professional identity by pre-selecting the group to which Receivers belong. This allows us to determine whether taking the oath deters lying among future managers. Our results suggest “yes and no.” We observe that these future executives/managers who took a solemn honesty oath as a Sender were (a) significantly more likely to tell the truth when the lie was detrimental to the Receiver, but (b) were not more likely to tell the truth when the lie was mutually beneficial to both the Sender and Receiver. A joint product of our design is our ability to measure in-group bias in lying behavior in our population of subjects (comparing behavior of subjects in the same and different business schools). The experiment provides clear evidence of a lack of such bias.