AMU - AMSE
5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
- Membres
- Kandil
Kandil
Feriel Kandil
Enseignant-Chercheur
,
Aix-Marseille Université
,
Faculté d'économie et de gestion (FEG)
Statut
Maître de conférences
Domaine(s) de recherche
Philosophie économique
Choix social
Thèse
2001
,
University of Paris-Nanterre
Téléchargement
Contact
feriel.kandil[at]univ-amu.fr
+33(0)4 13 55 25 55
Adresse
Îlot Bernard du Bois
Publications
The article explores Ricœur’s critical interpretation of Rawls’ theory of social justice. While Ricœur has a dialectical conception of justice (where the “good” encompasses the “just”), contrasting with Rawls’ procedural approach (where the just is defined independently of the good), Ricœur shows a strong interest in Rawls’ ideas. He situates Rawls’ project within one of the moments of the dialectic of the just: the moral moment. This dialectic arises from the aporetic nature of the just and manifests in ethical life as three paradoxes: political, legal, and socio-economic. While Rawls’ approach struggles with these paradoxes, they are the driving force of Ricœur’s approach to justice, highlighting its strength.
As Ricoeur acknowledges, the publication of Rawls’s book, A Theory of Justice(TJ), in 1971 was a major event in the area of contemporary political philoso-phy. Ricoeur offers important comments on Rawls’s approach to justice. These commentaries are mainly based on a close reading of this book. This article focuses on such commentaries. They are at the same time glowing and critical. Ricoeur expresses his support to Rawls for his illuminating study of justice, seen as a virtue of institutions.
...
The paper shows that, when dealing with social justice, it is necessary but not sufficient to consider the social evaluator as placed behind a veil of ignorance. Then, her judgements are conform to the moral principle of universalisation and thus are impartial. But the way such judgements should be modelled depends on the interpretation, whether utilitarian or Kantian, given to the universalisation principle. The article compares the utilitarian model of the impartial observer from Harsanyi with the Kantian model of the ignorant observer from Gajdos and Kandil. It defends the latter, which shows that, differently to what Rawls claimed, the maximin is not the unique rule of decision under ignorance. Classification JEL : B41, D60, D63
C’est par l’injuste que nous entrons dans le domaine de la justice, disait Ricœur. Or, partout, depuis Sidi Bouzid jusqu’à Wall Street, en passant par la place Tahrir et celle de la Puerta del Sol, ceux qui sont victimes de l’injustice crient leur souffrance. Plus que des attentes, ils manifestent des exigences de justice sociale. Mais la justice sociale est-elle possible ? Est-elle réalisable ? Les réponses des théories contemporaines de la justice sont insatisfaisantes. Ainsi que l’a montré Sen, elles se déchirent entre des approches idéales qui s’enferrent dans des considérations vaines sur la société parfaitement juste et des approches comparatives qui proposent une pluralité de critères d’évaluation sociale qui peuvent être contradictoires entre eux.Feriel Kandil se ressaisit de la question en portant l’éclairage sur les conditions de possibilité de la justice sociale, qui sont aussi ses conditions de réalisation. Pour ce faire, elle s’appuie sur les travaux de Paul Ricœur et d’Éric Weil. Une approche renouvelée de la justice est ainsi proposée, qui considère la justice sociale non pas seulement, à la manière de Rawls, comme une vertu des institutions, mais également comme une propriété de la bonne action publique, c’est-à-dire de celle qui contribue au bien-vivre ensemble dans des institutions justes.
Sen opposes two approaches to social justice. The transcendental one deals with the question of a just society. The comparative approach is about ordering social alternatives. According to Sen, such approaches are exclusive. I discuss the argument and show that the approaches are complementary. The transcendental (or ideal) approach is necessary but needs to be extended with a derivative and comparative approach. Conversely, the comparative approach is necessary but needs some transcendental foundations. The two approaches contribute to the elaboration of a synthetic approach to social justice. Under the latter, the ethical foundations of social evaluations are made explicit. Classification JEL : B41 D60 D63
We propose an extension of Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions over individuals. We obtain a characterization of the observer's preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a convex combination of Harsanyi's utilitarian and Rawls' egalitarian criteria. This representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals' utilities are cardinally measurable and fully comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls' and Harsanyi's positions.
