Michael Devereux

Séminaires thématiques
Macro and labor market seminar

Michael Devereux

University of British Columbia
Foreign Reserves Management and Original Sin
Co-écrit avec
Steve Pak Yeung Wu
Lieu

IBD Salle 15

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 15

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Vendredi 14 juin 2024| 12:30 - 13:30
Contact(s)

Marco Fongoni : marco.fongoni[at]univ-amu.fr
Francesco Gaudio : francesco-saverio.gaudio[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

Foreign reserves management changes the risk profile of a currency, there- fore influencing the pricing of sovereign debt, and the sovereign debt cur- rency portfolio. Empirically, inflation-targeters in emerging countries with higher foreign reserves feature an “original sin” dissipation: high local cur- rency share in the sovereign debt portfolio. We propose a quantitative model of optimal reserves management and sovereign currency portfolios. The op- timal reserves policy leans against the global wind so the exchange rate de- preciates less in global bad times, resulting in a lower premium charged by global investors and more local currency sovereign debt. We confirm these features empirically and via data-simulated regressions.