Marek Pycia
University of Zurich
Invariance and matching market outcomes
Lieu
IBD Amphi
Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre
AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille
Date(s)
Lundi 30 septembre 2019| 14:30 - 15:45
Contact(s)
Sarah Flèche : sarah.fleche[at]univ-amu.fr
Agnès Tomini : agnes.tomini[at]univ-amu.fr
Résumé
The selection of mechanisms to allocate school seats in public school districts can be highly contentious. At the same time the standard statistics of student outcomes calculated from districts’ data are very similar for many mechanisms. This paper explains this puzzle as being driven by the invariance properties of the standard outcome statistics, thus contributing to the debate on mechanism selection.
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