Publications

What is the role of income polarization for explaining differentials in public funding of education? To answer this question, we provide a new theoretical modelling for the income distribution that can directly monitor income polarization. It leads to a new income polarization index where the middle class is represented by an interval. We implement this distribution in a political economy model with endogenous fertility and public/private educational choices. We show that when households vote on public schooling expenditures, polarization matters for explaining disparities in public education funding across communities. Using micro-data covering two groups of school districts, we find that both income polarization and income inequality affect public school funding with opposite signs whether there exist a Tax Limitation Expenditure (TLE) or not.

Lower tariffs typically raise productivity, production, and trade, increasing the benefits from building infrastructure. Infrastructure spending by governments should therefore increase after countries open up to trade. I test this hypothesis empirically using a trade reform in India and find that a 1 percentage point reduction in tariffs increased states’ infrastructure spending by 0.5% between 1991 and 2001. To understand the mechanisms behind my empirical findings, I develop and calibrate a multi-region model of international trade, private capital accumulation, and infrastructure spending, in which each government chooses such spending to maximize their state’s welfare. I find if governments choose infrastructure following the reform optimally, infrastructure would have increased by 60% on average. The actual increase, based on my empirical findings, was about 29%. Counterfactual exercises show that raising aggregate infrastructure towards its optimal following the trade reform will result in state GDP to increase by 7% points on average.

We expand the theory of politician quality in electoral democracies with citizen candidates by supposing that performance while in office sends a signal to the voters about the politician's valence. Individuals live two periods and decide to become candidates when young, trading off against type-specific private wages. The valence signal increases the reelection chances of high valence incumbents (screening mechanism of reelection), and thus their expected gain from running for office (self-selection mechanism). Since self-selection improves the average quality of challengers, voters become more demanding when evaluating the incumbent's performance. This complementarity between the self-selection and the screening mechanisms may lead to multiple equilibria. We show that more difficult and/or less variable political jobs increase the politicians' quality. Conversely, societies with more wage inequality have lower quality polities. We also show that incumbency advantage blurs the screening mechanism by giving incumbents an upper-hand in electoral competition and may wipe out the positive effect of the screening mechanism on the quality of the polity.

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence-generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer-review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.