*This paper investigates the impact of a unique coercive male sterilization program in India on fertility and violence. This 10-month program launched in April 1976 targeted mostly husbands with more than 2 children and was heterogeneously implemented throughout India. Using difference-in-differences strategies with a geographical variation in coercion intensity across districts, we find that an increase of 1 percentage point in exposure to this program led to (i) a small positive impact on fertility, (ii) an increase in violent crime rates by 2% persistent until 2003. This effect is driven by rapes and murders, which increase respectively by 5% and 1%. We explore different mechanisms and we see that the increase in fertility is primarily led by couples who didn't have a son before 1976. Using the National Family Health Survey of 1999, we also find that districts with high coercion intensity correlate with higher levels of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), acceptance of IPV, lower bargaining power of women and lower contraception adoption.

**I develop a model to explore the interplay between formal insurance and informal risk-sharing networks. Agents face idiosyncratic shocks, which they mitigate by establishing risk-sharing links and opting for formal insurance. When forming a link, agents consider the sum of their utilities. My findings indicate that below the actuarial price, formal insurance eliminates the need for informal networks, leading to an empty network as the unique stable state. Above the actuarial price but still low, specific price thresholds shape stable networks’ structure. Importantly, I find that the size of the largest component in a risk-sharing network can be greater when insurance is priced above the actuarial price level but is still low, compared to a no-insurance scenario.