Maison de l'économie et de la gestion d'Aix
424 chemin du viaduc, CS80429
13097 Aix-en-Provence Cedex 2
- Membres
- Van Ypersele
Van Ypersele
Tanguy van Ypersele
Enseignant-Chercheur
,
Aix-Marseille Université
,
Faculté d'économie et de gestion (FEG)
Statut
Professeur des universités
Domaine(s) de recherche
Économie internationale et géographique
Économie publique
Thèse
1996
,
Université Catholique de Louvain
Contact
tanguy.vy[at]univ-amu.fr
+33(0)4 13 94 20 32
Adresse
MEGA
Publications
No abstract is available for this item.
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competition between regions over potential investors is then less direct, allowing them to realize greater benefits from external investors. The two polar cases of full and incomplete information about investors' needs are studied. In both cases, there is regional differentiation. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case but not in the latter. Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location market calls for some regulation because of the excessive number of competing regions that would prevail in equilibrium.
No abstract is available for this item.
This contribution investigates fiscal coordination in the framework of two countries asymmetric in respect of their capital-labor endowment. When tax policies are decided by majority voting inside each country, and they are not coordinated at a supranational level, factors of production are inefficiently allocated, at equilibrium. Our main result shows that fiscal coordination, via a minimum capital tax, does not always lead to a Pareto-improvement for the median voter's welfare, with respect to the noncooperative outcome. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
No abstract is available for this item.
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus segmenting the market for industrial location. Regions that compete on infrastructure quality have an incentive to increase the degree of differentiation between them. This places an upper bound on the number of regions successfully able to participate in the location market, and limits the dissipation of regional surplus through Tiebout competition. It indicates a process of fiscal agglomeration, through which regional concentrations arise, which does not depend on the circular causation underlying much of the recent literature on economic geography.
This paper compares reward systems to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by the government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights. But a principal difficulty with rewards is the information required for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward systems and that an optional reward system–under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights–is superior to intellectual property rights. Copyright 2001 by the University of Chicago.
Basic economic theory identifies a number of efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility. But just as free trade in goods, there is no guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better off. Consequently, capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances efficiency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise, and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under some circumstances.
[fre] Métropoles et concurrence territoriale Le développement des activités économiques autour des grandes villes (métropolisation de l'économie) et la concurrence croissante entre régions pour attirer les: investissements forment les tendances lourdes de la recomposition actuelle des territoires, comme en témoigne une littérature largement présentée ici. Les entreprises . sont, en effet, de plus en plus sensibles aux avantages locaux, fiscaux, salariaux ou de taille et de qualité des marchés. La taille des zones d'accueil ainsi que les politiques d'aménagement locales sont en jeu. La théorie d'économie géographique permet d'analyser ces phénomènes ; elle trouve aussi des débouchés concrets : en témoignent les propositions des auteurs en matière d'organisation de l'espace et de stratégies régionales. [eng] Cities and Regional Competition The development of economic activities around cities (economic metropolisation) and growing competition among regions to attract investment constitute the strong trends in the current regional restructuring, as found by studies presented for the most part in this article. Businesses are increasingly sensitive to local, tax, wage, market-size and quality advantages. Host area size and local development policies come into play. The theory of geographic economics is used to analyse these phenomena. It finds concrete outlets, as shown by , the authors' assertions regarding space organisation and regional strategies. [spa] Metropolis y competencia territorial El desarrollo de las actividades econômicas en torno de las grandes urbes (metropolizaciôn de la economîa) y la . competencia creciente entre regiones para atraer las . inversiones son las tendencias pesadas de la recomposiciôn actual de los territorios, asî lo subraya una literatura ampliamente comentada aquî. Las empresas son de hecho cada vez mâs sensibles a las ventajas locales, fiscales, salariales y de tamarïo y de calidad de los mercados. El t
