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Soubeyran

Publications

Protection, lobbying, and market structureJournal articleArye L. Hillman, Ngo Van Long et Antoine Soubeyran, Journal of International Economics, Volume 54, Issue 2, pp. 383-409, 2001

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost-reducing activities. We ask the following questions: (i) if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost-reducing activities? (ii) can the possibility of lobbying reverse the profitability ranking among firms? (iii) under what condition is the conventional wisdom (that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection) valid? On analyse un modèle de lobbying par des entrepreneurs qui allouent leur temps entre les activités de supervision. On donne des réponses aux questions suivantes: (i) quelles sont les allocations de ressources en équilibre? Le lobbying pourrait-il renverser l'ordre de rentabilité parmi les firmes? (iii) y a-t-il une corrélation entre le degré de concentration d'une industrie et la protection qu'elle obtient du gouvernement?
Pricing Behaviors on Networks: Some General Results for Two-way NetworksJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran et Hubert Stahn, Journal of Global Optimization, Volume 20, Issue 3-4, pp. 347-373, 2001
Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétriqueJournal articleNgo Van Long et Antoine Soubeyran, Économie & Prévision, Volume 143, Issue 2, pp. 83-89, 2000

[fre] Nous montrons que quand des firmes polluantes sont des concurrents à la Cournot, elles peuvent avoir une incitation à utiliser des permis de pollution comme moyen indirect de coordonner leur production. Si les firmes sont initialement identiques, les échanges de permis peuvent conduire à un oligopole asymétrique. Le cas de firmes initialement asymétriques est aussi considéré. [eng] Emissions Trading and Asymmetric Oligopoly by Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran . We show that when polluting firms are Cournot competitors, they may have an incentive to use emissions trading to indirectly co-ordinate their production. If the firms are initially identical, emissions trading can create an asymmetric oligopoly. The case of initially asymmetric firms is also considered.
Existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium: a contraction mapping approachJournal articleNgo Van Long et Antoine Soubeyran, Economics Letters, Volume 67, Issue 3, pp. 345-348, 2000

We provide sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium. The contraction mapping approach is used. Equilibrium is characterized in terms of marginal costs. The result is useful for applications to two-stage games, where, in the first stage, firms incur costs to manipulate their marginal costs of production. Cet article donne des conditions suffisantes pour l'existence et l'unicité de l'équilibre de Cournot. Notre résultat s'applique aux jeux de Cournot à deux étapes. Dans un premier temps, les firmes manipulent leurs coûts marginaux en choisissant un paramètre. Dans un deuxième temps, les firmes font la concurrence à la Cournot.
Asymmetric Contributions to Research Joint VenturesJournal articleNgo Van Long et Antoine Soubeyran, The Japanese Economic Review, Volume 50, Issue 2, pp. 122-137, 1999

No abstract is available for this item.
Industry concentration and optimal discriminatory commercial policiesJournal articleNgo Van Long et Antoine Soubeyran, The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp. 241-256, 1999

We derive the characteristics of firm-specific strategic trade policies when industries consist of heterogenous firms, and show how the informational requirements for policy design are thereby expanded. A knowledge of the Herfindahl index of concentration of the foreign industry is required for the design of optimal protection for domestic firms. It is shown that optimal firm-specific tariffs reduce the degree of foreign concentration, thus shifting rents to domestic firms.
Learning-by-Doing and the Development of Industrial DistrictsJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran et Jacques-François Thisse, Journal of Urban Economics, Volume 45, Issue 1, pp. 156-176, 1999

Marshallian districts are locales that accomodate a large number of small firms producing similar goods to be exported and benefit from the accumulation of know-how associated with workers residing there. We study the making of such districts by assuming that the cost function of a firm is a decreasing function of the total output produced in the [ast by the firms established in the locale.
Upstream-Downstream Specialization by Integrated Firms in a Partially Integrated IndustryJournal articleGérard Gaudet, Ngo Van Long et Antoine Soubeyran, Review of Industrial Organization, Volume 14, Issue 4, pp. 321-335, 1999

We propose a simple model of a partially integrated industry which explicitly takes into account persistent production cost differences across upstream firms, such as one might observe in natural resource industries. The model allows us to highlight the respective roles of strategic considerations and of cost considerations in the determination of an integrated firm's interaction with the non- integrated sector of the industry and, in the end, on its relative upstream-downstream specialization. Stylized facts from the world oil industry are used to illustrate the type of behaviour one might expect in this context.
Oligopolistic Trade and Competition in Wages LegislationsJournal articleNgo Van Long et Antoine Soubeyran, The Japanese Economic Review, Volume 49, Issue 2, pp. 158-170, 1998

No abstract is available for this item.
On the effects of industrial, trade and environmental policies on the location choices of firmsJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran, Michèle Botteon, Carlo Carraro et Marina Boetti, Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Volume 83, Issue 1, pp. 63-80, 1998

[fre] Dans un précédent article (Carraro et Soubeyran, 1995) on a défini l'équilibre du jeu dans lequel n entreprises oligopolistiques choisissent simultanément leurs stratégies de R&D, leurs niveaux de production et la localisation de leurs implantations. On a montré que, en cas de politiques fiscales internationales asymétriques, en position d'équilibre, les entreprises formaient trois groupes, le premier qui décide d'innover, le deuxième qui imite le premier et un troisième groupe qui préfère déplacer ses unités productives à l'étranger. Dans cet article, nous souhaitons évaluer l'effet produit sur les stratégies d'équilibre par des changements dans le cadre des politiques industrielles, commerciales et environnementales. En particulier, la taille des trois groupes est modifiée par les politiques ci-dessus qui peuvent par conséquent être utilisées pour changer la distribution géographique des entreprises et leur degré d'innovation technologique.
[eng] In a previous paper (Carraro and Soubeyran, 1995), the equilibrium of the game in which n oligopolistic firms simultaneously choose their R&D strategies, output levels and plants location, was derived. It was shown that, in the presence of asymmetric international tax policies, at the equilibrium firms may form three groups, one which decides to innovate, a second one which imitates and a third group which prefers to relocate plants abroad. In this paper, we want to assess the effect on the equilibrium strategies of changes in industrial, trade and environmental policies. In particular, the size of the three groups is modified by the above policies which can therefore be used to change the geographic distribution of firms in the industry and their degree of technological innovation.