Maison de l'économie et de la gestion d'Aix
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Soubeyran
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This paper considers the allocation of two types of individuals differentiated by levels of talent within and between two countries when they choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. The equilibrium with international migrations requires both countries to be sufficiently different in talent endowments and is consistent with individuals moving in one or in both directions whether they are entrepreneurs or workers. Average welfare per capita falls in the country losing highly talented individuals and rises in the country attracting them. However, in both countries, the liberalization of migrations for immigrants, emigrants or both is always supported by majority voting.
Criteria for initiation of highly active antiretroviral treatments (HAART) in HIV-infected patients remain a matter of debate world-wide because short-term benefits have to be balanced with costs of these therapies, and restrictions placed on future treatment options if resistant viral strains develop. On the other hand, postponing the introduction of HAART may involve a therapeutic opportunity cost if a patient’s health is allowed to deteriorate to such an extent of becoming unable to benefit from new treatments currently under development when they become available. We introduce a two period model where period one treatment adoption is an irreversible act with future, but uncertain, consequences. New information, both endogenous and exogenous, arises over time and shapes the conditions surrounding the second period therapeutic decision. A surprising result is that, under conditions that appear close to those surrounding the HAART debate, the magnitude of the feared resistance effect has no effect on leaves the optimal treatment decision as far as it is high enough.
Le bien-fondé d’administrer précocement des traitements antirétroviraux à haute activité (HAART) aux personnes infectées par le VIH reste objet de débats dans le monde, car leurs bienfaits à court terme peuvent compromettre les traitements futurs si se développent des souches résistantes du virus. Par ailleurs retarder le recours aux HAART comporte un coût d’opportunité thérapeutique si la santé du patient se dégrade au point qu’il ne peut plus bénéficier par la suite des traitements encore en cours de développement. Nous formulons un modèle à deux périodes où l’adoption du traitement de première période est irréversible et engage le futur, alors que des informations et connaissances nouvelles, exogènes et endogènes, déterminent les conditions entourant la décision thérapeutique de deuxième période. Paradoxalement, sous des conditions reflétant bien les enjeux
No abstract is available for this item.
No abstract is available for this item.
We consider an asymmetric polluting oligopoly. We demonstrate that optimal tax rates per unit of emission are not the same for all firms. We call this property selective penalization. Our Optimal Distortion Theorem states that the efficient tax structure requires that high cost firms pay a higher tax rate. Our Pro-concentration Motive Theorem states that optimal taxes increase the concentration of the industry, as measured by the Herfindahl index. Our Magnification Effect indicates that the variance of marginal costs is magnified by a factor which depends on the marginal cost of public funds. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
Criteria for initiation of highly active antiretroviral treatments (haart) in hiv-infected patients remain a matter of debate world-wide because short-term benefits have to be balanced with costs of these therapies, and restrictions placed on future treatment options if resistant viral strains develop. The debate has intensified with the adoption of an international objective to guarantee access to treatment to a minimum of three million infected individuals by 2005 in developping countries. In order to take into account irreversibility and inertia effects associated with ex ante choices, we propose a simple stochastic dynamic model of sequential therapeutic choice with intermediary revelation of information, in which the efficiency gains from a new effective Therapy in second period are conditional on the results of the treatment in the previous period. We find that identical patients may be administered different treatments at the optimum; for parameters implying an all or nothing cut decision in period 2, a more forward looking decision rule is required in period 1 because there will be little space for adjustment to its consequences. Another finding is that as soon as risks of resistance due to therapeutic failure of initial treatments are significant, as perhaps in developing countries and in marginalized groups of developed countries, differences in the estimation of this risk should not influence the optimal decision about the size of the hiv-infected population eligible for early antiretroviral Therapy. The decision should then be based on pure efficiency/cost considerations.Classification JEL : I18, C61.
This paper revisits the tragedy of the commons when agents have different capabilities in both production and encroachment activities, and can allocate their time between them. Under fairly general assumptions on production and encroachment technologies, an individual's expected income is convex with respect his actions so that individuals specialize. Consequently, in equilibrium, the economy is divided into at most two homogenous groups: encroachers and producers. The partition obeys a relative advantage criterion. Several equilibria may exist. The tragedy of the commons equilibrium without production always does; the Pareto optimal allocation of activities may not be an equilibrium. We show that minute changes in property right enforcement may lead to drastic improvements for society. We argue that, in convex games such as this paper's role choice game, bounded rationality is a natural assumption, and the concept of local Nash equilibrium is the natural analytical tool to handle it. Nous étudions la tragédie des richesses communes dans un cadre où des agents qui diffèrent par leurs capacités productives et par leurs aptitudes à la prédation, choisissent d'allouer leur temps entre ces deux activités. Sous des hypothèses peu restrictives sur les technologies, les revenus attendus d'un agent sont convexes par rapport à ses actions, si bien que les individus se spécialisent et que la société se divise, à l'équilibre, en deux groupes au maximum: les prédateurs et les producteurs. La répartition s'opère selon un critère d'avantage comparatif. Il y a plusieurs équilibres. La tragédie des richesses communes (aucun producteur) est toujours l'un d'eux; l'allocation Pareto optimale pas toujours. Nous montrons que des changements mineurs dans la mise en vigueur des droits de propriété peuvent mener à des améliorations majeures pour la société. Les jeux convexes tels celui-ci appellent l'hypothèse de rationalité limitée; nous introduisons un conce
No abstract is available for this item.
We analyze a class of two-stage games where rival firms incur real resource costs in manipulating their marginal costs, so as to influence the outcome of the game they want to play in stage two. Marginal costs may be manipulated by various means, such as redistribution of productive assets, choice of location, or creation of an internal input market. A general formulation of the game is provided, and several applications are analyzed. We show that the optimal allocation of resources within an oligopoly can be asymmetric, even for ex-ante symmetric firms. This is an additional explanation of heterogeneity in oligopoly. Copyright 2001 by American Economic Association.
The paper analyzes a model of strategic trade policies in the presence of international cross-ownership of firms that are heterogenous both in terms of costs and in terms of extent of foreign ownership. The equilibrium pattern of taxes and subsidies is characterized for any arbitrary cross-ownership profile, and any number of heterogenous firms. The equilibrium subsidy (or tax) given to any firm is shown to depend, in a separable manner, on the firm's characteristics and on the covariance of the distribution of cost and foreign ownership across firms. A neutrality theorem is proved concerning the Nash equilibrium of the game between governments: in equilibrium, the pattern of trade, the value of each firm, and world welfare are independent of the ownership pattern. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.