1. Accueil
  2. Membres
  3. Soubeyran

Soubeyran

Publications

A proximal algorithm with quasi distance. Application to habit's formationJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran, Felipe Garcia Moreno et Paulo Roberto Oliveira, Optimization, Volume 61, Issue 12, pp. 1383-1403, 2012
Maximal Elements Under Reference-Dependent Preferences with Applications to Behavioral Traps and GamesJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran, Fabián Flores Bazán et Dinh The Luc, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Volume 155, Issue 3, pp. 883-901, 2012
Local Search Proximal Algorithms as Decision Dynamics with Costs to MoveJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran et H. Attouch, Set-Valued and Variational Analysis, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp. 157-177, 2011
Proximal Alternating Minimization and Projection Methods for Nonconvex Problems: An Approach Based on the Kurdyka-Łojasiewicz InequalityJournal articleHédy Attouch, Jérôme Bolte, Patrick Redont et Antoine Soubeyran, Mathematics of Operations Research, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp. 438-457, 2010

We study the convergence properties of an alternating proximal minimization algorithm for nonconvex structured functions of the type: L(x,y)=f(x)+Q(x,y)+g(y), where f and g are proper lower semicontinuous functions, defined on Euclidean spaces, and Q is a smooth function that couples the variables x and y. The algorithm can be viewed as a proximal regularization of the usual Gauss-Seidel method to minimize L.We work in a nonconvex setting, just assuming that the function L satisfies the Kurdyka-Łojasiewicz inequality. An entire section illustrates the relevancy of such an assumption by giving examples ranging from semialgebraic geometry to “metrically regular” problems.Our main result can be stated as follows: If L has the Kurdyka-Łojasiewicz property, then each bounded sequence generated by the algorithm converges to a critical point of L. This result is completed by the study of the convergence rate of the algorithm, which depends on the geometrical properties of the function L around its critical points. When specialized to and to f, g indicator functions, the algorithm is an alternating projection mehod (a variant of von Neumann's) that converges for a wide class of sets including semialgebraic and tame sets, transverse smooth manifolds or sets with “regular” intersection. To illustrate our results with concrete problems, we provide a convergent proximal reweighted ℓ1 algorithm for compressive sensing and an application to rank reduction problems.
A proximal method with separable Bregman distances for quasiconvex minimization over the nonnegative orthantJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran, Sissy da S. Souza, Paolo R. Oliveira et J.X. da Cruz Neto, European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 201, Issue 2, pp. 365-376, 2010

We present an interior proximal method with Bregman distance, for solving the minimization problem with quasiconvex objective function under nonnegative constraints. The Bregman function is considered separable and zone coercive, and the zone is the interior of the positive orthant. Under the assumption that the solution set is nonempty and the objective function is continuously differentiable, we establish the well definedness of the sequence generated by our algorithm and obtain two important convergence results, and show in the main one that the sequence converges to a solution point of the problem when the regularization parameters go to zero.
Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries MatterJournal articleJoan Canton, Antoine Soubeyran et Hubert Stahn, Environmental & Resource Economics, Volume 40, Issue 3, pp. 369-382, 2008

No abstract is available for this item.
Competition, Regulation And Welfare In The Presence Of Network ExternalitiesJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran, Kotaro Suzumura et Shlomo Weber, The Japanese Economic Review, Volume 58, Issue 1, pp. 47-70, 2007

No abstract is available for this item.
A Theory of Favoritism in an International OligopolyJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran et Ngo Van Long, Review of International Economics, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 481-498, 2007

This paper offers an explanation of the fact that some foreign firms are favored at the expense of others, and characterizes the distribution of favors in terms of the cost parameters of firms. We present a model where favors must be bought: they come from competing contributions. This model is compared with a benchmark model with a benevolent government. We show how the distribution of favors in the favor-seeking model deviates from the distribution that would be obtained if the government were really benevolent. Copyright © 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Do Investments in Specialized Knowledge Lead to Composite Good Industries?Journal articleAntoine Soubeyran et Hubert Stahn, Small Business Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp. 119-135, 2007

We try to understand why firms producing goods by means of complementary components do not merge, especially in industries in which investments in component-based knowledge matters. As Audretsch, we state that these activities are developed by “individuals” who do their best to appropriate the return from their knowledge and whose effort is non-contractible. The organization of the industry into firms is identified to a partition of the set of individuals. In this context, we prove that an organization in which each individual hold his own firms is both stable with respect to unilateral deviation and optimal in the line of the property right approach. If the returns are high enough, this structure is even the only one which shares both properties. Copyright Springer 2007
Trade, Wage Gaps, and Specific Human Capital AccumulationJournal articleNgo Van Long, Raymond Riezman et Antoine Soubeyran, Review of International Economics, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp. 75-92, 2007

We develop a new framework for the analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on the wage structure and on welfare. Our model focuses on the decision of workers to accumulate firm-specific skills, by "on-the-job" training, knowing that this means their future wages will have to be negotiated, and that the outcome of negotiation will depend on the profitability prospect of firms operating in a new trading environment. We show that trade liberalization may reduce the welfare of a developing country because of its adverse effect on skill accumulation. We also explore the effects of trade liberalization on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors.