Lubrano

Publications

The Trade-off Between Growth and Redistribution: ELIE in an Overlapping Generations ModelBook chapterDavid de la Croix et Michel Lubrano, In: On Kolm's Theory of Macrojustice: A Pluridisciplinary Forum of Exchange, Claude Gamel et Michel Lubrano (Eds.), 2011, pp. 305-337, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011

The ELIE scheme of Kolm taxes labour capacities instead of labour income in order to circumvent the distortive effect of taxation on labour supply. Still, Kolm does not study the impact of ELIE on human capital formation and investment. In this paper, we build an overlapping generations (OLG) model with heterogenous agents and endogenous growth driven by investment in human capital. We study the effect of ELIE on education investment and other aggregate economic variables. Calibrating the model to French data, we highlight a trade-off between growth and redistribution. With a perfect credit market, ELIE is successful in reducing inequalities and poverty, but it is at the expense of lower investment in education and slower growth. In an economy with an imperfect credit market where individuals cannot borrow to educate, the trade-off between growth and redistribution is not overturned but is less severe. However, it is possible to overturn completely that trade-off simply by changing the base of taxation for the young generation which is equivalent to subsidising education.

The Redistributive Aspects of ELIE: A Simulation ApproachBook chapterMichel Lubrano, In: On Kolm's Theory of Macrojustice: A Pluridisciplinary Forum of Exchange, Claude Gamel et Michel Lubrano (Eds.), 2011, pp. 275-304, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011

This paper analyses the problems linked to the implementation of the Equal Labour Income Equalisation (ELIE) scheme proposed by [Kolm, 2005]. It successively studies the influence of uncertainty in the information about individual incomes, the impact of equivalence scales and finally the consequences of capital accumulation. If uncertainty does not modify fundamentally the equity properties of ELIE, equivalence scales can have non trivial consequences depending on the relation between income and fertility. Finally, capital accumulation introduces strong inequalities in the income distribution which are not removed by taxation. The paper relies on simulations of the income distribution, calibrated on French data and on the use of taxation indices.

On Kolm's Theory of MacrojusticeBookClaude Gamel et Michel Lubrano (Eds.), 2011, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011
The Redistributive Aspects of ELIE: A Simulation ApproachBook chapterMichel Lubrano, In: On Kolm's Theory of Macrojustice: A Pluridisciplinary Forum of Exchange, Claude Gamel et Michel Lubrano (Eds.), 2011, pp. 275-304, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011

This paper analyses the problems linked to the implementation of the Equal Labour Income Equalisation (ELIE) scheme proposed by [Kolm, 2005]. It successively studies the influence of uncertainty in the information about individual incomes, the impact of equivalence scales and finally the consequences of capital accumulation. If uncertainty does not modify fundamentally the equity properties of ELIE, equivalence scales can have non trivial consequences depending on the relation between income and fertility. Finally, capital accumulation introduces strong inequalities in the income distribution which are not removed by taxation. The paper relies on simulations of the income distribution, calibrated on French data and on the use of taxation indices.

An Exploration of Incentive-Compatible ELIEBook chapterLaurent Simula et Alain Trannoy, In: On Kolm's Theory of Macrojustice: A Pluridisciplinary Forum of Exchange, Claude Gamel et Michel Lubrano (Eds.), 2011, pp. 207-231, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011

[Simula and Trannoy, 2011] have shown that ELIE is confronted with implementation issues when the policymaker cannot observe the time worked by every individual. This paper tries to fix this problem. To this aim, we characterise the second-best allocations which are the closest to ELIE first in terms of welfare and then in terms of transfers. In the former perspective, we consider a welfarist setting in which the social weights are those required by ELIE to be generated as a first-best allocation. These weights are defined by the tangent hyperplane to the first-best Pareto set at the ELIE allocation. We show that, in the absence of income effect on labour supply, the closest solution to ELIE is the laissez-faire. In addition, simulations for a Cobb–Douglas economy show that the second-best transfers may then be substantially different from ELIE. This is why, in the latter perspective, we construct second-best allocations which are both incentive-compatible and generate net transfers coinciding with the first-best ELIE transfers. We show that the unique solution is Pareto-efficient in the constraint set.

Why Should We Debate the Theory of Macrojustice?Book chapterClaude Gamel et Michel Lubrano, In: On Kolm's Theory of Macrojustice: A Pluridisciplinary Forum of Exchange, Claude Gamel et Michel Lubrano (Eds.), 2011, pp. 1-32, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011

In this introductory chapter, we give a subjective account of the content of Kolm’s book Macrojustice (2005) that gave rise to the idea of organising in 2006 a round table where this book was discussed by different authors coming from a large variety of horizons: philosophers, economists, econometricians. We leave Serge-Christophe Kolm the task of presenting his theory in the first part of this book. Macrojustice is concerned about social justice proposing a comprehensive redistributive scheme. Of course, any distributive proposal always raises questions at the ethical, theoretical and practical levels. These questions are at the core of the discussions that are presented in this book, which is designed as a forum for multidisciplinary exchange.

Why Should We Debate the Theory of Macrojustice?Book chapterClaude Gamel et Michel Lubrano, In: On Kolm's Theory of Macrojustice: A Pluridisciplinary Forum of Exchange, Claude Gamel et Michel Lubrano (Eds.), 2011, pp. 1-32, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011

In this introductory chapter, we give a subjective account of the content of Kolm’s book Macrojustice (2005) that gave rise to the idea of organising in 2006 a round table where this book was discussed by different authors coming from a large variety of horizons: philosophers, economists, econometricians. We leave Serge-Christophe Kolm the task of presenting his theory in the first part of this book. Macrojustice is concerned about social justice proposing a comprehensive redistributive scheme. Of course, any distributive proposal always raises questions at the ethical, theoretical and practical levels. These questions are at the core of the discussions that are presented in this book, which is designed as a forum for multidisciplinary exchange.

Modeling Multivariate Interest Rates Using Time-Varying Copulas and Reducible Nonlinear Stochastic Differential EquationsJournal articleMichel Lubrano, Ruijun Bu, Ludovic Giet et Kaddour Hadri, Journal of Financial Econometrics, Volume 9, Issue 1, pp. 198-236, 2011

We propose a new approach for modeling nonlinear multivariate interest rate processes based on time-varying copulas and reducible stochastic differential equations (SDEs). In the modeling of the marginal processes, we consider a class of nonlinear SDEs that are reducible to Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) process or Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) (CIR) process. The reducibility is achieved via a nonlinear transformation function. The main advantage of this approach is that these SDEs can account for nonlinear features, observed in short-term interest rate series, while at the same time leading to exact discretization and closed-form likelihood functions. Although a rich set of specifications may be entertained, our exposition focuses on a couple of nonlinear constant elasticity volatility (CEV) processes, denoted as OU-CEV and CIR-CEV, respectively. These two processes encompass a number of existing models that have closed-form likelihood functions. The transition density, the conditional distribution function, and the steady-state density function are derived in closed form as well as the conditional and unconditional moments for both processes. In order to obtain a more flexible functional form over time, we allow the transformation function to be time varying. Results from our study of U.S. and UK short-term interest rates suggest that the new models outperform existing parametric models with closed-form likelihood functions. We also find the time-varying effects in the transformation functions statistically significant. To examine the joint behavior of interest rate series, we propose flexible nonlinear multivariate models by joining univariate nonlinear processes via appropriate copulas. We study the conditional dependence structure of the two rates using Patton (2006a) time-varying symmetrized Joe–Clayton copula. We find evidence of asymmetric dependence between the two rates, and that the level of dependence is positively related to the level of the two rates. (J

On Kolm's Theory of MacrojusticeBookClaude Gamel et Michel Lubrano, 2011, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011
Economic Macrojustice: Fair Optimum Income Distribution, Taxation and TransfersBook chapterSerge-Christophe Kolm, Claude Gamel et Michel Lubrano (Eds.), 2011, pp. 69-130, Springer, 2011

The basic, core theory of overall distributive justice in macrojustice is presented in this chapter. The basic facts are the following. (1) General opinion rejects differences in tastes and hedonic capacities as relevant for macrojustice in a society in a normal situation. (2) Experience shows the possibility of transfers based on given capacities with practically no disincentive effect (exemption of overtime labour earnings from the income tax). (3) Pareto efficiency is desired and a condition of stability. (4) Social liberty from given resources is desired and necessary. (5) Equal real liberty (for different domains of choice) is a priori desired and rational. The result is a simple distributive scheme rich of some twenty meaningful equivalent properties, including free exchange and labour from a given equal-labour income equalisation; general balanced labour reciprocity; basic income financed by an equal labour of each (or according to capacity); a “concentration” of total income; etc. The issues of the determination of the degree of redistribution and equalisation, and the relations with the rest of public finance are briefly recalled.