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Laussel

Publications

Intersectoral adjustment and unemployment in a two-country Ricardian model. Une approche par la méthode événementielleJournal articleDidier Laussel, Philippe Michel et Thierry Paul, Recherches économiques de Louvain, Volume 70, Issue 2, pp. 169-192, 2004

No abstract is available for this item.
Dynamic duopoly with congestion effectsJournal articleDidier Laussel, Maxime de Montmarin et Ngo Van Long, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 22, Issue 5, pp. 655-677, 2004

We analyze duopolistic competition between horizontally differentiated firms selling durable goods or services subject to congestion. At each point of time, new customers buy one unit of the commodity from one of the firms, by comparing present prices and future congestion rates. We study the linear Markov equilibrium of this game which exists and is unique when firms are not too different. The existence of negative consumption externalities is shown to soften the price competition. Moreover, we show that the firm with the larger capacity has, at the steady state, a larger market share, a higher price, and a lower congestion rate. The price of an entrant decreases gradually after entry, while the price of the incumbent rises. The speed of convergence to the steady state is faster, the stronger is the congestion effect. On étudie la concurrence entre deux firmes qui vendent des biens ou des services durables sous la condition d'encombrement. À chaque instant, des clients nouveaux achètent une unité du bien, en comparant les prix et les taux d'encombrement futur. On caractérise l'équilibre markovien de ce jeu. L'existence des externalités négatives rend la concurrence moins féroce. On montre que la firme qui a la plus grande capacité a, dans l'état stationnaire, une plus grande part de marché, un prix plus élevé, et un taux d'encombrement plus faible. Le prix du bien d'une nouvelle firme diminue continuellement, tandis que celui de son rival en exercise monte. La vitesse de convergence est une fonction croissante de l'effet d'encombrement.
Programming and Advertising Competition in the Broadcasting IndustryJournal articleDidier Laussel, Jean J. Gabszewicz et Nathalie Sonnac, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 13, Issue 4, pp. 657-669, 2004

We analyze competition between two private television channels that derive their profits from advertising receipts. These profits are shown to be proportional to total population advertising attendance. The channels play a sequential game in which they first select their profiles (program mixes) and then their advertising ratios. We show that these ratios play the same role as prices in usual horizontal differentiation models. We prove that whenever ads' interruptions are costly for viewers the program mixes of the channels never converge but that the niche strategies are less effective and that the channel "profiles" are closer as advertising aversion becomes stronger. Copyright Blackwell Publishing 2004.
Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private InformationJournal articleDidier Laussel et Thomas R. Palfrey, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 5, Issue 3, pp. 449-478, 2003

We characterize generally the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions public goods game for two consumers with private information.The two consumers simultaneously make voluntary contributions to the public good, and the contributions are refunded if the total falls short of the cost of the public good. Several families of equilibria (step-function, regular and semi-regular) are studied. Necessary and sufficient conditions for regular and semi-regular equilibrium allocations to be interim incentive efficient are derived. In the uniform distribution case we prove (i) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient regular equilibria when the cost of production is large enough and (ii) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient semi-regular equilibria when the cost of production is low enough. Step-function equilibra are proved to be interim incentive inefficient. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
Press Advertising and the Political Differentiation of NewspapersJournal articleDidier Laussel, Jean J. Gabszewicz et Nathalie Sonnac, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp. 317-34, 2002

The press industry depends in a crucial way on the possibility of financing an important fraction of its activities by advertising receipts. We show that this may induce the editors of the newspapers to moderate the political message they display to their readers, compared with the political opinions they would have expressed otherwise. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
Delegation effects in representative democracies: do they foster extremism?Journal articleDidier Laussel, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 85, Issue 2, pp. 191-205, 2002

No abstract is available for this item.
Unidimensional Downsian politics: median, utilitarian or what else?Journal articleDidier Laussel et Michel Le Breton, Economics Letters, Volume 76, Issue 3, pp. 351-356, 2002

No abstract is available for this item.
Press advertising and the ascent of the 'Pensee Unique'Journal articleJean J. Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel et Nathalie Sonnac, European Economic Review, Volume 45, Issue 4-6, pp. 641-651, 2001

No abstract is available for this item.
Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common AgencyJournal articleDidier Laussel et Michel Le Breton, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 100, Issue 1, pp. 93-128, 2001

No abstract is available for this item.
Endogenous growth and multiplicity due to finite patents' lifetimeJournal articleDidier Laussel et Jules Nyssen, Economics Letters, Volume 63, Issue 2, pp. 167-173, 1999

No abstract is available for this item.