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- Laussel
Laussel
Didier Laussel
Enseignant-Chercheur
,
Aix-Marseille Université
,
Faculté d'économie et de gestion (FEG)
Statut
Professeur émérite
Domaine(s) de recherche
Économie industrielle
Économie internationale et géographique
Économie publique
Thèse
1974
,
Université de Grenoble 2
Téléchargement
Contact
didier.laussel[at]univ-amu.fr
+33(0)4 42 93 59 84
Adresse
MEGA
Publications
No abstract is available for this item.
In this paper, a lobby group or union may influence public policy because it is able, via a costly signal such as a boycott or a strike, to negatively impact the image of decision makers. The competence of a government is measured by its ability to do a lot with only a little money. Voters receive, through observing the level of public output, only a noisy signal of government's quality so that the lobby groups, which are better informed, may transmit to them more precise information about it.
We analyze the optimal contract between a risk neutral regulator providing a curative goods and a risk averse patient who learns the realized value of his/her health status after the contracting stage. Consumption of a curative good (healthcare) reduces the disutility associated with a disease. We show that the consumption of curative goods is larger than in the complete information case, that this overprovision increases with the degree of patients’ risk-aversion and the marginal cost of treatment. Ceilings on the amount of healthcare are part of the optimal contract when risk aversion is important.
In this paper we address the following question: is it more profitable, for an entrant in a differentiated market, to acquire an existing firm than to compete? We illustrate the answer by considering competition in the banking sector.
In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their “natural markets”, while they cross-advertise when this cost is high. Second, the outcome at equilibrium is compared with random advertising. Surprisingly, we prove that firms' equilibrium profits may be lower with targeted advertising relative to random advertising, while firms are given more options with targeted advertising.
We examine patterns of acquiring non-native languages in a model with two linguistic communities with heterogeneous learning skills, where every individual faces the choice of self-learning the foreign language or acquiring it at a profit-maximizing linguistic school. We consider a one-school model with divisions in both communities and various two-school settings with a school in each community. We compare the number of learners and welfare implications under self-learning with those obtained under various schooling contexts. In particular, we show that for communities with similar size, introducing language schools always increases the number of learners with respect to the exclusive self-learning option.
In a spatial competition model with exogenous fixed costs and divisible goods, we obtain non-Suttonian results. When the economy is infinitely replicated, the number of firms does go to infinity but, as consumers' income goes to infinity, the equilibrium number of firms tends toward a finite value. This occurs because the global demand to each firm becomes in the limit infinitely sensitive to price differentials since they give then rise to infinitely large differences in purchase expenditure.
This article first provides an alternative formulation of the Cancian, Bills and Bergstrom (1995) problem, which discards the non-existence difficulty and consequently allows one to consider some extensions of the TV newscast scheduling game. The extension considered consists in assuming that viewers' preferences between the competing channels do not depend only on the timing of their broadcast, but also on some other characteristics, like the content of the show or the identity of the newscaster. Then, this article identifies a sufficient condition on the dispersion of these preferences over the viewers' population, guaranteeing the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
"In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its "n" subcontractors the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we show that backward integration is limited by a strategic negative effect: the prices and profits of independent suppliers increase when a merger reduces their number. Mergers are profitable only if the downstream firm buys at least two thirds of its suppliers. In an endogenous acquisition game "à la" Kamien and Zang (1990) the only merged equilibrium occurs when there is only one subcontractor. In a sequential acquisition game full integration is not an equilibrium when the number of suppliers is at least five." Copyright (c) 2008, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
