This paper proposes some simple models where the central bank trades off between stabilizing the business cycle and targeting inflation to a level that stabilizes the public debt ratio. We show that in a closed economy fiscal dominance does not necessarily imply hyperinflation. Moreover, in an open economy it is successful in lowering debt ratios when output is reactive enough to unconventional monetary policy and when the expectations of future inflation are well anchored to the debt-stabilization inflation target. We show that the dynamics of both inflation and public debt ratio are described by first-difference equations with time varying coefficients. We provide some conditions for the asymptotic solutions of the long-run steady states. In particular, we define two regimes of respectively strong and weak fiscal dominance, depending upon whether or not the central bank's action ensures both the sustainability and the speed of convergence of debt to its long-term level.

Selon l'auteur, professeur d'économie à l'Université d'Aix-Marseille, le statut des pauvres a évolué. Longtemps oubliés du capitalisme, ils seraient devenus des piliers du profit marchand. De cette relation entre deux entités contradictoires émerge un questionnement sur les fondements et l'avenir du système économique capitaliste.

This paper investigates, in the case of the euro area, the standard assumption that the liquidity trap steady state, which arises from the existence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, is locally unstable. We show that the policy function of the European Central Bank (ECB) is described by a nonlinear Taylor rule. Then, using our estimations, we show that around the liquidity trap steady state the equilibrium is locally determinate for most plausible parameter values. Finally, we find that an inflation shock is more efficient than a demand shock to escape the liquidity trap steady state.

This paper proposes a regime-dependent model to estimate fiscal multipliers in the US. Output, consumption and investment are assumed to respond to tax and spending changes in a nonlinear manner. Fiscal multipliers are time-varying because their size and sign depend upon the state of the economy (upturns and downturns). Keynesian effects appear essentially during downturns, while anti-Keynesian effects are observed during expansions. Transfer payments contributes to a higher private consumption when they are given to consumers in bad times. Reducing taxes boosts consumption in good times. Investment responds positively to lower taxes during downturns, but negatively in the upturn regime. Our results thus suggest that Keynesian effects have been associated to expansionary policies during recessions, while anti-Keynesian effects were observed during expansions illustrating situations of expansionary fiscal consolidation. The effectiveness of fiscal positive impulses increases in downturns relative to upturns. A corollary is therefore that austerity measures during recessions would have detrimental effects on the GDP and its components.