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Implicit in the seminal contribution of Barro-Becker [1], the lack of persistence of inequality in the pre- sence of endogenous fertility is one of the most striking features of the models à la Barro-Becker. In this pedagogical note, we show how to uncover and interpret the latter property using standard optimization in contrast to the dynamic programming under homogeneity usually invoked in this literature.
In this paper, we devise a social criterion in the spirit of the critical utility level of Blackorby-Donaldson (1984) to study an optimal population size problem in an endogenously growing economy populated by workers living a fixed amount of time and without capital accumulation. Population growth is endogenous. The problem is analytically solved, yielding closed-form solutions to optimal demographic and economic dynamics. It is shown that provided the economy is not driven to optimal finite time extinction, the optimal solution is egalitarian for appropriate choices of the critical utility levels: all individuals of any cohort are given the same consumption. The results obtained do not require any priori restriction of the values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution unlike in several related papers.
We study a trade-off between economic and environmental benefits using a two-stage optimal control setting where the player can switch to a cleaner technology that is environmentally ‘efficient’ but economically less productive. We provide an analytical characterization of the solution paths for the case where the considered utility functions are increasing and strictly concave with respect to consumption and decreasing linearly with respect to the pollution stock. We establish that in this context, an isolated player will either immediately start using the cleaner technology or for ever continue applying the old ‘dirty’ technology. In a two-player dynamic game (between two neighboring countries) where the pollution results from a sum of two consumptions, we prove existence of a Nash (open-loop) equilibrium, in which each player chooses the technology selfishly, i.e., without considering the choice made by the other player. A Stackelberg game solution displays the same properties. Under cooperation, the country reluctant to adopt the clean technology under autarky will adopt the cleaner technology provided it benefits from some ‘transfer’ from the more environment-friendly partner. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This paper studies to which extent a firm using a scarce resource input and facing environmental regulation can still manage to have a sustainable growth of output and profits. The firm has a vintage capital technology with two complementary factors, capital and a resource input subject to quota, the latter being increasingly scarce through an exogenously rising price. The firm can scrap obsolete capital and invest in adoptive and/or innovative R&D resource-saving activities. Within this realistic framework, we first characterize long-term growth regimes driven by scarcity (induced-innovation) vs. long-term growth regimes driven by quota regulation (Porter-like innovation). More importantly, we study the interaction between scarcity and quota regulation. In particular, we show that there exists a threshold level for the growth rate of the resource price above which the Porter mechanism is killed while the scarcity-induced growth regime may emerge. Symmetrically, we also find that there must exist a threshold value for the environmental quota under which the growth regime induced by scarcity vanishes while the Porter-like growth regime may survive.
This book covers a wide range of topics within mathematical modelling and the optimization of economic, demographic, technological and environmental phenomena. Each chapter is written by experts in their field and represents new advances in modelling...
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We develop a tractable general theory for the study of the economic and demographic impact of epidemics, notably its distributional consequences. To this end, we build up a three-period overlapping generations model where altruistic parents choose optimal health expenditures for their children and themselves. The survival probability of adults and children depends on such investments. Agents can be skilled or unskilled. In this paper, epidemics are modeled as one-period exogenous shocks to the adults' survival rates. We first show that such epidemics have permanent effects on the size of population and on the level of output. However, the income distribution is shown to be unaltered in the long-run. Second, we show that this distribution may be significantly altered in the medium-term: in particular, the proportion of the unskilled will necessarily increase at that term if orphans are too penalized in the access to education.