Boucekkine

Publications

Vintage Capital Growth Theory: Three BreakthroughsBook chapterRaouf Boucekkine, David de la Croix et Omar Licandro, In: Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, 2011, Volume 11, pp. 87-116, Emerald, 2011
The Dynamics of Wealth Inequality under Endogenous Fertility: A Remark on the Barro-Becker Model with Heterogenous EndowmentsJournal articleStefano Bosi, Raouf Boucekkine et Thomas Seegmuller, Theoretical Economics Letters, Volume 01, Issue 01, pp. 3-7, 2011

Implicit in the seminal contribution of Barro-Becker [1], the lack of persistence of inequality in the pre- sence of endogenous fertility is one of the most striking features of the models à la Barro-Becker. In this pedagogical note, we show how to uncover and interpret the latter property using standard optimization in contrast to the dynamic programming under homogeneity usually invoked in this literature.

Revisiting the Optimal Population Size Problem under Endogenous Growth: Minimal Utility Level and Finite LifeJournal articleRaouf Boucekkine, Giorgio Fabbri et Fausto Gozzi, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Volume 18, Issue 3, pp. 287-305, 2011

In this paper, we devise a social criterion in the spirit of the critical utility level of Blackorby-Donaldson (1984) to study an optimal population size problem in an endogenously growing economy populated by workers living a fixed amount of time and without capital accumulation. Population growth is endogenous. The problem is analytically solved, yielding closed-form solutions to optimal demographic and economic dynamics. It is shown that provided the economy is not driven to optimal finite time extinction, the optimal solution is egalitarian for appropriate choices of the critical utility levels: all individuals of any cohort are given the same consumption. The results obtained do not require any priori restriction of the values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution unlike in several related papers.

Environmental quality versus economic performance: A dynamic game approachJournal articleRaouf Boucekkine, Jacek B. Krawczyk et Thomas Vallée, Optimal Control Applications and Methods, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp. 29-46, 2011

We study a trade-off between economic and environmental benefits using a two-stage optimal control setting where the player can switch to a cleaner technology that is environmentally ‘efficient’ but economically less productive. We provide an analytical characterization of the solution paths for the case where the considered utility functions are increasing and strictly concave with respect to consumption and decreasing linearly with respect to the pollution stock. We establish that in this context, an isolated player will either immediately start using the cleaner technology or for ever continue applying the old ‘dirty’ technology. In a two-player dynamic game (between two neighboring countries) where the pollution results from a sum of two consumptions, we prove existence of a Nash (open-loop) equilibrium, in which each player chooses the technology selfishly, i.e., without considering the choice made by the other player. A Stackelberg game solution displays the same properties. Under cooperation, the country reluctant to adopt the clean technology under autarky will adopt the cleaner technology provided it benefits from some ‘transfer’ from the more environment-friendly partner. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Scarcity, regulation and endogenous technical progressJournal articleRaouf Boucekkine, Natali Hritonenko et Yuri Yatsenko, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 47, Issue 2, pp. 186-199, 2011

This paper studies to which extent a firm using a scarce resource input and facing environmental regulation can still manage to have a sustainable growth of output and profits. The firm has a vintage capital technology with two complementary factors, capital and a resource input subject to quota, the latter being increasingly scarce through an exogenously rising price. The firm can scrap obsolete capital and invest in adoptive and/or innovative R&D resource-saving activities. Within this realistic framework, we first characterize long-term growth regimes driven by scarcity (induced-innovation) vs. long-term growth regimes driven by quota regulation (Porter-like innovation). More importantly, we study the interaction between scarcity and quota regulation. In particular, we show that there exists a threshold level for the growth rate of the resource price above which the Porter mechanism is killed while the scarcity-induced growth regime may emerge. Symmetrically, we also find that there must exist a threshold value for the environmental quota under which the growth regime induced by scarcity vanishes while the Porter-like growth regime may survive.

Age-structured modelling, past, present and new perspectives, Introduction chapterBook chapterRaouf Boucekkine, Natali Hritonenko et Yuri Yatsenko, In: Optimal Control of Age-structured Populations in Economy, Demography, and the Environment, Raouf Boucekkine, Natali Hritonenko et Yuri Yatsenko (Eds.), 2010, Routledge-Taylor & Francis, 2010
Age-structured modelling, past, present and new perspectives, Introduction chapterBook chapterRaouf Boucekkine, Natali Hritonenko et Yuri Yatsenko, In: Optimal Control of Age-structured Populations in Economy, Demography, and the Environment, Raouf Boucekkine, Natali Hritonenko et Yuri Yatsenko (Eds.), 2010, Routledge-Taylor & Francis, 2010
Optimal Control of Age-structured Populations in Economy, Demography, and the EnvironmentBookRoutledge Explorations in Environmental Economics, Raouf Boucekkine, Natali Hritonenko et Yuri Yatsenko (Eds.), 2010, 295 pages, Routledge-Taylor & Francis, 2010

This book covers a wide range of topics within mathematical modelling and the optimization of economic, demographic, technological and environmental phenomena. Each chapter is written by experts in their field and represents new advances in modelling...

Introduction to the special issue on sustainabilityJournal articleRaouf Boucekkine, Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 59, Issue 2, pp. 145-147, 2010

No abstract is available for this item.

On the distributional consequences of epidemicsJournal articleRaouf Boucekkine et Jean-Pierre Laffargue, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 34, Issue 2, pp. 231-245, 2010

We develop a tractable general theory for the study of the economic and demographic impact of epidemics, notably its distributional consequences. To this end, we build up a three-period overlapping generations model where altruistic parents choose optimal health expenditures for their children and themselves. The survival probability of adults and children depends on such investments. Agents can be skilled or unskilled. In this paper, epidemics are modeled as one-period exogenous shocks to the adults' survival rates. We first show that such epidemics have permanent effects on the size of population and on the level of output. However, the income distribution is shown to be unaltered in the long-run. Second, we show that this distribution may be significantly altered in the medium-term: in particular, the proportion of the unskilled will necessarily increase at that term if orphans are too penalized in the access to education.