TIZIÉ BENE

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RESEARCH INTERESTS

Network economics, Game theory, Development economics.

EDUCATION

AMSE, Aix-Marseille University   September 2019 - Current
Ph.D, Economics
THESIS - Analysis of interactions between formal insurance
and informal risk-sharing institutions: A network-based approach.

AMSE, Aix-Marseille University   September 2017 - june 2019
Master Degree in Economics
Research Track

TSE, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole   September 2014 - June 2016
Bachelor Degree in Economics

RESEARCH VISIT

Janeway Institute Cambridge, University of Cambridge   June-August 2022

WORKING PAPER

Formal Insurance and Altruism Networks*(with Y. Bramoullé & F. Déroïan)* Under Revision for ***Journal of development economics***

Abstract: *We study how altruism networks affect the adoption of formal insurance. Agents have private CARA utilities and are embedded in a network of altruistic relationships. Incomes are subject to both a common shock and a large idiosyncratic shock. Agents can adopt formal insurance to cover the common shock. We show that ex-post altruistic transfers induce interdependence in ex-ante adoption decisions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the insurance adoption game. We show that adoption decisions are substitutes and that the number of adopters is unique in equilibrium. The demand for formal insurance is lower with altruism than without at low prices, but higher at high prices. Remarkably, individual incentives are aligned with social welfare. We extend our analysis to CRRA utilities and to a fixed utility cost of adoption.*

Formal insurance and risk-sharing networks*(Job Market Paper)*

Abstract: *I develop a model to explore the interplay between formal insurance and informal risk-sharing networks. Agents face idiosyncratic shocks, which they mitigate by establishing risk-sharing links and opting for formal insurance. When forming a link, agents consider the sum of their utilities. My findings indicate that below the actuarial price, formal insurance eliminates the need for informal networks, leading to an empty network as the unique stable state. Above the actuarial price but still low, specific price thresholds shape stable networks' structure. Importantly, I find that the size of the largest component in a risk-sharing network can be greater when insurance is priced above the actuarial price level but is still low, compared to a no-insurance scenario.*

WORKS IN PROGRESS

Utility transfer and risk-sharing networks*(singled authored)*

I propose a model of strategic network formation that accounts for the fact that risk-sharing occurs within kinship and friendship circles. Agents can either promise or demand utility transfers when forming links. Equal sharing is maintained at the component level. I prove the existence of stable networks and characterize their structures. Stable networks can either be empty, forest networks, or trees.

Migration and risk-sharing networks*(with A. Salih)*

EVENT (PRESENTER)

Les journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet (LAGV22)
Marseille, France   june 2023

26th Annual Coalition Theory Network Conference
Bielefeld University
Bielefeld, DE   May 2023

NETWORK ECONOMICS WORKSHOP
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, UK   June 2022

MICROTHEORY DISCUSSION GROUP
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, UK   June 2022

AMSE PhD Seminar
Aix-Marseille School of Economics
Marseille, France   May 2020, April 2021, April 2022, February 2023

CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT (GTM2020)
Graduate School of Management, St Petersburg University   October 2020

Les journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet (LAGV20)
Marseille, France   june 2021

AWARD AND GRANT

ANR MaRiNe, 2019-2022   Market, Risk and Network .
Best Master Dissertation AMSE 2019   Formal Insurance and Altruism Networks

TEACHING

Statistical approach to economic and social issues   2020 -
Undergraduate-fr, 1st year, Aix-Marseille University, FR.

LANGUAGES AND SOFTWARE

Language   fluent in English and French native speaker .
Software   Familiar with Latex, Python