Childcare, labor supply, and business development: Experimental evidence from Uganda*

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Abstract

We randomly offered a childcare subsidy, an equivalent cash grant, or both to mothers of three-to-five-year-old children. The childcare subsidy substantially increased labor supply and earnings of single mothers, highlighting the importance of time constraints for them. Among couples, childcare did not affect mothers' labor market outcomes but instead increased fathers' salaried employment. At the household level, childcare led to higher income, consumption and improved child development. Cash grants positively affected mothers' labor supply and income irrespective of the household structure, suggesting the general importance of credit constraints for women's business development.

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1 Introduction

Access to childcare has been critical in increasing women's labor supply in many high-income countries (Baker et al., 2008; Gelbach, 2002; Goldin, 2021), but we have limited evidence from low-income settings. Furthermore, we know little about how access to childcare affects other household members' labor supply and earnings (Evans et al., 2021). To shed light on these questions, we implemented a field experiment in Uganda to study the causal effect of subsidized childcare on household members' labor market outcomes, earnings, family wellbeing and child development. In Uganda, as in many other low-income countries, women bear the brunt of household chores (Jayachandran, 2021), regularly combine work with childcare (Delecourt and Fitzpatrick, 2021) and are more likely to be self-employed (Bonnet et al., 2019). As entrepreneurs, women's labor supply may be constrained not only by lack of time, but also by lack of access to capital.

To study the importance of time versus credit constraints, we randomly assigned mothers of a three-to-five-year-old child to one of four groups. The first group was offered free childcare in a nearby childcare center of choice. The childcare treatment covered all costs for full-day attendance for the duration of one year.[1] The second group was offered a cash grant of a value equal to the cost of the childcare treatment. The cash grant was unconditional but labeled as a business grant and transferred directly to the women. The third group was offered both free childcare and the cash grant, to explore potential complementarities. A final group of women remained as the control group. This design allows us to assess the relative importance of time and credit constraints for labor market outcomes and the cost-effectiveness of subsidized childcare. We surveyed the participants at baseline and approximately one year later to measure their labor supply and earnings and that of the other household members. We also collected information on family wellbeing and child development indicators for the "target child", i.e. the child eligible for the childcare treatment.

The childcare subsidy led to a large increase in the take-up of childcare services, with a 150% increase in the enrollment rates in full-day care relative to the control group. We find that free childcare did not significantly affect mothers' income or labor supply. However, these average effects mask important heterogeneity in household structure. At baseline, about a third of our sample consisted of single mothers. Among them, the childcare subsidy substantially increased labor supply, business development and income. In particular, single mothers offered the childcare subsidy were 29% more likely to be employed and

[1] While private childcare services exist in urban and peri-urban regions of Uganda, these are typically not accessible to the poor, or are limited to a program that runs only in the morning. Most of the childcare centers in our sample were preschool nurseries with lessons during the morning hours and (supervised) play or rest time in the afternoon. As such, our childcare intervention can be interpreted as providing subsidized access to preschool education.

generated 45% more income, with both effects being driven by self-employment. These findings highlight the importance of a binding time constraint for single mothers. Once they have access to free childcare, they can work more in their businesses and generate more profits. On the other hand, among couples, we find no effect of the childcare subsidy on mothers' labor market outcomes. Instead, we find that childcare increased the fathers' likelihood to be working for a wage. This reallocation of time could be driven by the high gender gap in wages that characterize the Ugandan labor market, which implies higher returns for men on average.

The cash transfers increased maternal labor supply and earnings. Mothers who received cash were 27% more likely to be employed on average. This was driven by self-employment, whereby mothers who received cash transfers were 61% more likely to be self-employed and generated 37% more profits from their businesses. Moreover, cash transfers similarly affected the labor market outcomes of single mothers and mothers in a couple. This suggests that limited access to capital is a general constraint for women's labor market outcomes in the Ugandan context. The cash treatments did not affect fathers' labor supply, potentially because the grants were offered to mothers and framed as support for their income-generating activities. We also do not find evidence of any complementarity between the cash grant and the childcare subsidy: Receiving both had similar effects as receiving the cash transfer alone.

In terms of family wellbeing, we find that the childcare subsidy improved household socioeconomic conditions, captured by increased household income and consumption. Moreover, childcare improved children's development, driven by early literacy and motor skills. Meanwhile, cash grants had a similar effect on household income and consumption. Finally, we estimate the treatment effects on the prevalence of domestic violence, as reported by the mothers. We find that offering childcare did not have any significant impact on intimate-partner violence, while the cash grants led to an increase in the prevalence of reported physical violence between partners.

Our study contributes to the research on the effects of childcare on labor supply and income. Evidence from middle- and high-income countries shows that childcare typically positively impacts mothers' employment,[2] with some evidence that the effects can be particularly important for single mothers (e.g. Gelbach, 2002). Some recent studies from India (Nandi et al., 2020) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Ajayi et al., 2022; Donald et al., 2024; Martinez et al., 2017) study the effects of introducing new, community-based childcare facilities, gen-

[2]See Attanasio et al. (2022); Baker et al. (2008); Bauernschuster et al. (2016); Berger and Black (1992); Berlinski and Galiani (2007); Berlinski et al. (2009); Bettendorf et al. (2015); Bick (2016); Clark et al. (2019); Eckhoff Andresen and Havnes (2019); Gelbach (2002); Givord and Marbot (2015); Havnes and Mogstad (2011a); Hojman and López Bóo (2019); Jain (2016); Martínez A. and Perticará (2017); Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas (2015); Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017); Paes de Barros et al. (2011); Rosero and Oosterbeek (2011), among others.

erally finding positive effects on mothers' labor supply. In contrast, we look at the effects of subsidizing access to existing preschool facilities. Fewer studies analyze the impact on fathers. Studies in high-income countries typically find childcare has limited effect on fathers' labor supply, as fathers are likely to work full-time already (e.g. Brewer et al., 2022; Eckhoff Andresen and Havnes, 2019). The effect may differ in low-income contexts due to the interplay of gender-segmented labor markets and household composition. The focus on other household members and the family as a whole —on which there is little evidence from low-income contexts (Evans et al., 2021)— is a key contribution of this paper.[3] Another contribution is the inclusion of cash transfers as a separate treatment arm at a cost equivalent to the childcare subsidy. This allows us to assess the relative importance of access to childcare versus capital on labor market outcomes and the cost-effectiveness of subsidizing access to existing childcare services.

Our experimental design also allows us to speak to the literature on the effectiveness of interventions aimed to promote small and medium enterprises. The literature on business development in low-income countries has focused mainly on the importance of financial and human capital constraints (Banerjee et al., 2015; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013). An important contribution of our study is also considering time constraints. Previous work has shown that male-owned enterprises benefit more from financial support and training programs than businesses owned by women (Berge et al., 2015; de Mel et al., 2008; Fafchamps et al., 2014; Fiala, 2018). One potential explanation is that women face more severe time constraints arising from domestic work and care obligations (Delecourt and Fitzpatrick, 2021; Le Barbanchon et al., 2021). Our experiment's factorial design allows us to test separately for the importance of time and credit constraints in explaining the development of women-led businesses. We find that, in the Ugandan context, credit constraints are binding for the average woman, while time constraints are important for particular subgroups such as single mothers. Moreover, our findings complement previous work on enterprise growth in developing countries (e.g. Bernhardt et al. (2019)) by demonstrating the importance of evaluating returns to childcare at the household rather than at the individual level.[4]

Finally, the paper complements growing evidence on the role of childcare services in promoting child development. Most of this evidence is from high-income countries and, in general, shows that the impact is particularly strong for children in families with low socio-

[3]To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is Donald et al. (2024), who find positive effects of childcare on fathers' commercial activities in rural areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[4]Bernhardt et al. (2019) show that returns to cash grants should be evaluated at the household rather than at the enterprise level as "men and women invest grants and loans into high-return enterprises within their household, but these enterprises are more often male-owned than female-owned". Our findings demonstrate that this is also true for childcare subsidies. Evaluating the returns to childcare by only focusing on mothers' labor outcomes would be misleading.

economic status.[5] The more limited evidence in low- and middle-income countries shows that effects are not always positive and highlights the quality of childcare and the recipient's economic status as important mediators.[6] Given the existing evidence, it is not trivial that access to existing childcare services in Uganda will benefit children. Furthermore, given the cost of childcare, it is plausible that a better outcome could be achieved through simple cash transfers. We contribute to this literature in two ways: By providing causal evidence on the effects of receiving full-time childcare on child development in Uganda and by comparing childcare with that of an equivalent cash grant.

2 Empirical Design and Data

2.1 Experimental design

Our experiment is designed to understand the effects of childcare and cash transfers on labor supply and income. As in many low-income countries, both the labor market and domestic work are highly gender-segmented in Uganda. In the labor market, women are more likely to be involved in self-employment, and men in wage-employment.[7] At home, Ugandan women carry out more domestic work than men, but men contribute substantially as well. According to a recent national time-use survey, women spend about seven hours per day doing unpaid care work, compared to an average of five hours per day for men (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Therefore, we document the treatment effects on mothers as well as other household members, such as the father, and for other income sources, such as wage labor.

Since women are more likely to be engaged in self-employment in our context, in order to understand the effects of childcare on women's labor market outcomes, we primarily focus on business development. Capital and labor are two key inputs of production in any business. Entrepreneurs may be unable to invest in capital due to credit constraints, while their labor supply may be constrained by domestic duties. Moreover, there may be important complementarities between capital and labor. For instance, a lack of access to capital may severely limit the returns to childcare, as the marginal product of labor may be low. Similarly, the returns to an increase in capital may be contingent on the entrepreneur having access to childcare, allowing her to work more hours in her business and be more

[5]For evidence from high-income countries see Baker et al. (2008); Cascio (2009); Cornelissen et al. (2018); Duncan et al. (2023); Felfe and Lalive (2018); Havnes and Mogstad (2011b, 2015); van Huizen and Plantenga (2018).

[6]For evidence from low and middle income countries, see Ajayi et al. (2022); Andrew et al. (2023); Attanasio et al. (2022); Behrman et al. (2004); Berlinski et al. (2009); Bernal and Fernández (2013); Bietenbeck et al. (2019); Bouguen et al. (2018); Dean and Jayachandran (2020); Donald et al. (2024); Dowd et al. (2016); Engle et al. (2011); Jakiela et al. (2023); Mwaura et al. (2008).

[7]According to the 2018/19 wave of the Uganda National Panel Survey (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018), within our study districts, 12% of women (of the same age range as the participants in our sample) were in wage-employment and 21% were self-employed. For males, the corresponding rates were 32% for wage labor and 25% for self-employment.

productive during those hours. Similar arguments may apply to wage labor. We expect childcare to increase labor supply by alleviating a time constraint, and cash transfers by improving access to capital. The cash transfers can also help facilitate investments in costly job search (e.g. Abebe et al. (2020) show that providing a transport subsidy to job seekers in Ethiopia increased their likelihood of finding a job).

To shed light on these mechanisms, we designed and implemented a randomized controlled trial with four treatment arms: [T1] A childcare treatment that primarily targets the time constraint; [T2] a cash treatment that primarily targets the capital constraint; [T3] a combined treatment, offering both childcare and cash, which explores any potential complementarity between the treatments; and [C] a control group with no intervention.

The childcare intervention offered free, full-day childcare for one year. While private childcare services exist in urban and peri-urban regions of Uganda, these are typically not accessible to the poor, or are limited to a program that runs only in the morning. Given that more than 40% of Ugandan households have a three-to-five year-old child (according to our own calculations using the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey, 2016), there is a potentially large unmet demand for better access to childcare services.

The childcare treatment offered to enroll one child aged three-to-five in a nearby childcare center chosen by the mother.[8] Most of these centers were preschool nurseries with lessons during the morning hours and (supervised) play or rest time in the afternoon. As such, the treatment effects can be interpreted as the effect of providing access to free preschool education. The childcare subsidy covered the tuition for full-day attendance, breakfast and lunch. The total cost was on average UGX 411,752 (equivalent to USD 111.2, or USD 333 at purchasing power parity) per year. We assisted with the enrollment of children and paid the centers directly at the start of each trimester (in line with their requirements).

The cash grant was delivered to the mothers in the form of mobile money and labeled as a business grant. The cash transfers were made at the same time as the childcare fees were paid to the childcare centers (three installments, one each trimester), the value of the transfers being equal to the average cost of childcare within the district. The total cost of the cash transfer was on average UGX 424,322 (USD 114.6) per year.

The sample for the study was selected from three districts in Western Uganda (Kasese, Kyenjojo and Kabarole), three districts in central Uganda (Mukono, Masaka and Mityana) and three districts in Eastern Uganda (Mbale, Iganga and Jinja). In these districts, using the official lists of registered childcare centers, we identified 454 communities containing at least one childcare center. To identify eligible households, we conducted a census of each of these communities. Households had to satisfy three criteria to be part of the study:

[8] It could not be a boarding school, and the parents had to take care of the transportation if the center was not within walking distance. Apart from these, there were no further constraints, and the parents could choose the center offering the best service according to them.

(i) the household should have one (and only one) child in the age range three to five (we refer to this child as the "target child"), (ii) the female caregiver should be present within the household (mother or grandmother) and (iii) the target child should not already be attending full-time childcare (but we allowed for children attending part-time childcare).[9] We also wanted to have a sufficiently large group of households without a younger child (less than three years old). To that end, we restricted the study sample to communities that have at least three households that satisfy the additional criteria of not having a younger child (and at least one household that has one or more younger siblings).[10] There were no constraints on the number of elder children. From the list of eligible communities and households, we randomly selected 1,496 households across 389 communities to participate in the baseline survey.

We collaborated with BRAC Uganda on collecting the data and with Dyadic Research Impact (DRI) on implementing the interventions. The baseline surveys were conducted in November and December 2018. We then randomized the sample into the four treatment arms. Randomization was conducted at the individual level and blocked by (i) district, (ii) whether the target child had younger siblings or not, (iii) whether the target child attended any (part-time) childcare or not, (iv) the female caregiver's main occupation (self-employed, wage-employed or unemployed), and (v) whether the female caregiver was the child's mother (versus grandmother).[11] The interventions covered the 2019 school year, which began in February and ended in late November. A short-term follow-up survey was conducted in July–August 2019, and a long-term follow-up survey in November–December 2019 for children and in February 2020 for households. Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of the project.

FIGURE 1: PROJECT TIMELINE



Notes: The numbers below the tick marks indicate the month of the year. We indicate the three household surveys (Baseline, Short-Term and Long-Term), the two child development surveys (Child), and the timing of the cash transfers ($).

[9] In the census sample, 49% of the households have a child aged three to five, and 39% of the households have exactly one child in that age range (note this is close to our calculations using the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey, 2016). Of those, the mother was absent in 3% of the households, and 23.5% of the target children were already enrolled in full-time daycare.

[10] This criteria led us to drop an additional 2.5% of the census households.

[11] Of the 1,496 households that took part in the baseline survey, 363 were randomly allocated to T1, 364 to T2, 357 to T3 and 412 to C. These are not symmetric groupings because the number of observations differed across strata and it was not always divisible by four.

The household surveys were answered by the primary female caregiver of the target child. At baseline and at the long-term follow-up, we collected information on the labor supply and business activities of the respondent and other household members, the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of all the household members, and on the respondent's wellbeing. During the short-term follow-up, we collected information on only a subset of indicators in order to track some potential short-run changes.

The child survey was based on the International Development and Early Learning Assessment (IDELA), as developed by Save the Children. The tool consists of a set of questions and tests aimed at measuring the level of competency that children possess across four domains: motor skills, early literacy, early numeracy and socio-emotional skills. We chose IDELA because that tool is tailored to the age of the children targeted by our study, covers the most important domains of child development and has been translated and tested for use in Uganda (Halpin et al., 2019; Pisani et al., 2018).

We registered a pre-analysis plan with the American Economic Association's registry for randomized control trials (Bjorvatn et al., 2019). It details the power calculations, sampling, research design, baseline balance checks, outcome variables, heterogeneity, and correction for attrition. Appendix D provides a link to the plan and identifies any deviations from the plan.

2.2 Baseline characteristics

Online Appendix Table A.1 presents key background characteristics of the participants from the baseline survey. In 87% of the households, the respondent was the target child's mother (as opposed to the grandmother). Throughout the paper, we refer to the female respondent as the *mother*. The average mother was 35 years old and lived in a household with five members.[12] Her partner (i.e. the father or stepfather of the target child) was listed as being part of the household for 68% of the families. We will refer to the partner of the mother as the *father* in what follows. In terms of religion, about a third of the women were Muslim and the remainder Christian. The average child was 3.6 years old at baseline and almost half of them are boys. In about three quarters of the households, the target child was the youngest child in the household, and the average target child had two elder siblings: one male and one female. The enrollment rate of the target children in half-day childcare was 38% and, by design, none attended full-day childcare.

Online Appendix Table A.2 shows details for mothers' and fathers' labor market outcomes. Self-employment constitutes a larger share of mothers' labor hours and earnings compared to wage-employment, whereas the opposite holds for fathers. At baseline, 33% of the

[12]Summary statistics from the nationally representative Demographic and Health Survey (2016) provide similar numbers: On average, adult Ugandan women are 37 years old and live in households with 4.7 members.

mothers in our sample were self-employed while only 12% were working for a wage. In contrast, 16% of fathers were self-employed while 26% were working for a wage. We see a similar pattern on the intensive margin of their labor supply: On average, mothers spent 74 hours in self-employment and 18 hours in wage-labor; while fathers spent 48 hours in self-employment and 59 hours in wage-labor. This confirms the gender-segmented nature of the labor market in Uganda as discussed in Section 2.1.

We measure income from self-employment as business profits over the past month and wages as the total wages received over the same time period. Total income is the sum of wages earned and business profits.[13,14] Household income, which averaged UGX 109 thousand per month, is measured as the sum of profits from household businesses and income earned from wage labor by the household members.

Tables A.1 and A.2 also provide balance tests, comparing the sample of non-attritors (i.e. households still in the sample at the time of the follow-up survey) by treatment status. Columns 2–4 present the standard difference between the control and the three treatment arms, while columns 5–7 report the normalized differences (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Fewer than 5% of the pairwise mean comparisons are statistically significantly different, which could have occurred through random chance. Moreover, all the normalized differences are smaller than one fourth of the combined sample variation. Hence, we conclude that the randomization was successful in achieving baseline balancing in key observable characteristics and that the control group therefore constitutes a valid counterfactual for the treatment groups.

2.3 Estimation strategy

We estimate the treatment effects using the following model:

$$y_{i1} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^{3} \beta^k T_i^k + \lambda y_{i0} + \Gamma_{i0} + \varepsilon_{i1} \tag{1}$$

where y_{i1} is the outcome of interest for respondent i at the follow-up (period 1), y_{i0} is the baseline level of the outcome (period 0),[15] $T_i^k = 1$ if the respondent is in the following treatment group: (i) childcare only (k=1), (ii) cash only (k=2), (iii) childcare & cash (k=3);

[13]We focus on income from self-employment and wage labor, as they are the most important sources of income generation in the peri-urban context of our study. Few households in our sample have income from farming (20% in the control group) or from livestock rearing (18% in the control group). As these are household activities, we cannot attribute those to the child's mother or father.

[14]In case the respondent was unsure about the level of profits, we asked them to estimate these using intervals. In particular, they were asked if the profits were higher than X where X = median level of profits at baseline; if they said "Yes" ("No") they were then asked if the level was higher than X where $X = 75^{th}$ (25^{th}) percentile of profits at baseline; followed by the 62.5^{th} or 12.5^{th} percentiles from the baseline. We impute missing values using the mid-point of the relevant interval in which they finished.

[15]If information on the baseline level of the outcome is missing due to non-response for a specific question, we impute the missing value at baseline with the sample mean and we control for this using a dummy indicating the observation has been imputed.

Γ_{i0} are indicators for the five variables on which we stratified our randomization. In this specification, the β^k correspond to intention to treat (ITT) estimates. Under the assumption that the control observations constitute a valid counterfactual for each treatment group, β^k identifies the causal effect of the offer of childcare (β^1), cash (β^2), or both (β^3). Throughout the paper, monetary values are expressed in 1,000 UGX and are winsorized at the 99^{th} percentile. We detail the construction of all outcome variables in Online Appendix E.

The treatments were randomized at the individual level. Hence, we do not cluster the standard errors but they are robust to heteroscedasticity.[16] We group outcomes that test the same hypothesis in families and correct the p-values to account for multiple hypotheses testing using the procedure proposed by Benjamini et al. (2006). This allows us to control the *false discovery rate* within families of outcome variables. We correct the p-values by treatment arm and group the outcomes into families as specified in the table notes.[17]

We test for differential attrition in Table A.3. For the household survey, the attrition rate was 8% among the control group and between 4 and 5% among the three treatment arms. The difference in attrition between the childcare and the childcare & cash arms relative to the control group is statistically significant, but not for the cash only versus control arm. There is no differential attrition across the three treatment arms, as can be seen from the p-values in the bottom panel of the table. For the child survey, the attrition rate was 10% among the control group and this was lower by 4 percentage points (ppt) for the childcare arm and by 3 ppt for the cash and combined arms. Due to the differential attrition rate in the control group relative to the treatment groups, we assess the sensitivity of our findings with respect to attrition throughout the analysis. To do so, we follow two methods. First, as pre-specified in our pre-analysis plan, we follow Kling et al. (2007) and Fairlie et al. (2015) and calculate the lower and upper bound estimates that adjust for differential non-response rates in the treatment groups relative to the control.[18] Second, we calculate Lee bounds. We report the results in Online Appendix B.

2.4 Take-up

Before presenting the treatment effects of the interventions, we confirm that the childcare treatment led to an increase in the enrollment of the targeted children in childcare. Column 1 in Table 1 indicates a 15 ppt increase in the likelihood that the target child is enrolled in any childcare among the childcare treatment groups. This corresponds to an increase of

[16] Appendix C shows that our results are robust to clustering the standard errors at the community level.

[17] In appendix C we also provide randomization inference p-values for the treatment effects estimated in the main tables, these are close to the standard p-values.

[18] In particular, we calculate the upper bounds by imputing the mean among the treated plus 0.1 (or 0.2) standard deviations (SD) to the non-responders in the treatment group. For the control group, we impute using the mean among the control minus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD. To calculate the lower bounds, we follow the opposite procedure. For the treatment group, we take the mean minus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD and for the control we take the mean plus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD. We then re-estimate the treatment effects.

around 18% relative to the control group where 82% of the children were enrolled in any childcare.[19] The effect of the combined treatment (childcare & cash) is 14 ppt (17% relative to control) and statistically not different from the childcare treatment. The cash transfer also increased enrollment in any childcare by 7 ppt — this effect is significantly smaller than the effects in the treatment arms that include childcare (p-value $< .01$). Column 2 shows the treatment effects on enrollment in full-day childcare. In the control group, 34% of the children were enrolled in full-day care. This proportion is approximately 50 ppt larger in the childcare treatments, which corresponds to a 150% increase in full-day childcare enrollment relative to the control group. In contrast, the cash treatment led to a 7 ppt (21% relative to the control) increase, which is significantly smaller than the effects of the childcare treatments (p-value $< .01$).

Overall, the findings in Table 1 demonstrate that all treatments increased the enrollment rates in full-day childcare among the targeted children, but the increase was significantly greater in the groups assigned to the childcare subsidy in comparison to those assigned to the cash transfer.[20] One important finding from the research on childcare interventions is that full-time programs generally have stronger effects than part-time programs (Brewer et al., 2022; van Huizen and Plantenga, 2018) and it is therefore important to note the strong effects on full-day enrollment. Nevertheless, we observe that the recipients of cash grants increase their child's enrollment in childcare to some extent, primarily in half-day programs. This is also confirmed by additional evidence from the follow-up survey. When we presented an open question "What did you use the cash transfer for?", 65% of the respondents in the cash group said they used it at least partly to cover childcare expenditures. This could reflect a latent demand for childcare that may be subject to liquidity constraints. It could also be that the cash grant increases the opportunity cost of time, by increasing labor productivity, and thereby the attractiveness of childcare services.

[19] We see similar enrollment rates among children of this age range in other data from this region. For example, in Figure A.1 we compare the school enrollment rates of the children in our control group with children residing in the same districts using the 2018/19 wave of the Uganda LSMS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Among our control group, enrollment rates in any type of school are 80% and 83% among children aged three or four at baseline, while in the LSMS sample the corresponding rates are 78% and 81% respectively. Among the children aged five years at baseline, enrollment rates are above 90% in both samples.

[20] Online Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds, and Table B.3 the Lee bounds for the findings in Table 1. Overall, the results are robust to alternative assumptions about the attritors.

TABLE 1: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT

	Any childcare	Full-day childcare
	(1)	(2)
Childcare	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.48^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.07^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.07^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.50^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.463	0.571
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.003	0.254
Mean Control	.82	.34
Obs.	1428	1428

Notes: In columns 1-2 the dependent variables are dummies indicating the child is enrolled in any childcare, or in full-day childcare respectively. All regressions control for the baseline level of the outcome variable and the randomization strata: district indicators, an indicator for whether the target child has younger siblings, whether the target child was already attending childcare at baseline, whether the respondent was self-employed at baseline and the corresponding indicator for being wage-employed, and whether the respondent was the birth mother of the target child. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group both outcomes as one family.

We also estimate the treatment effects on older siblings' school enrollment and attendance (children aged 7–18 years). As we show in Online Appendix Table A.4, there are no significant effects on enrollment rates, but we find some significant effects on their attendance. In particular, the childcare & cash treatment decreased the number of school days missed by older siblings during the last school term by four days, corresponding to a 38% decrease relative to the control mean of ten days. The effect is driven by both sisters (3 days) and brothers (2 days). The other two treatments, childcare alone and cash alone, do not significantly impact the school attendance of older siblings compared to the control group. We conclude that the increased enrollment by the target children caused by the childcare treatments did not come at the expense of the enrollment of their siblings. This reinforces our confidence that these treatments freed up the parents' time.

3 Effects on labor supply and business development

Our main research questions are whether subsidizing childcare increases labor supply and income, and how this compares to a similar-sized cash grant. We hypothesize that access to childcare can alleviate a time constraint. If this is a relevant constraint for mothers, it should lead to an increase in their labor supply and income. On the other hand, a cash grant can reduce a credit constraint, which can lead to business development. We first discuss the impact on mothers, before turning to fathers. All the results are based on the long-term follow-up survey which was conducted approximately one year after the interventions started.

3.1 Mothers

Table 2 provides the treatment effects on mothers' income and labor supply. For both outcomes, we report total effects as well as effects by occupation (self-employment versus wage labor). The first column of the table displays effects on profits generated by the mother from any businesses she was operating during the past month. We find that the childcare treatment increased monthly business profits by UGX 7,000, which is a 27% increase relative to the control group. The cash transfer led to a UGX 9,000 (37% relative to control) increase. While the effect of the childcare subsidy is imprecisely estimated, it is also not significantly different from the effect of the cash transfer (p-value=0.640). As we will see later on, the positive yet imprecisely estimated effects of the childcare treatment mask a high degree of heterogeneity, driven by single mothers. Mothers who received both the childcare subsidy and the cash transfer increased their business profits by UGX 16 thousand (66% relative to control). This effect is significantly larger than the effect of the childcare subsidy alone (p-value=0.083) but not significantly different from the effect of cash transfer alone (p-value=0.176).[21]

In the second column, we find that all three treatments partly crowded out wage income although the effects are only precisely estimated for the cash and the childcare & cash treatments. In particular, the childcare subsidy led to an estimated UGX 4,000 fall in wage earnings, while the cash transfer and the combined treatment reduced wage income by UGX 7,000 and UGX 10,000 respectively. The total effect on income, displayed in column 3, is positive but statistically insignificant for all three treatments. Our results suggest that mothers prefer to be engaged in self-employment rather than wage-employment. This is consistent with gender norms (e.g. Jayachandran, 2020, 2021) and flexibility of self-employment (Bandiera et al., 2022; Ho et al., 2023; Zipfel, 2023) shaping women's occupa-

[21] Since reported business profits are notoriously noisy, in Online Appendix Table A.5, we also estimate the effects on business revenues as an alternative measure of business income. We find that all three treatments led to a significant increase in the mother's revenues from self-employment, ranging from UGX 42 to 63 thousand compared to a control group mean of UGX 90 thousand, and we fail to reject the null of equality of treatment effects on revenues across the three treatment arms.

tional choices.

Turning to the drivers of income changes, we look at labor supply at the extensive and intensive margin in Table 2, and investments in business assets and the recruitment of employees in Online Appendix Table A.5. On average, the childcare treatment did not significantly alter mothers' working hours, productive assets or the number of employees.[22] On the other hand, we find that the cash transfers increased mothers' labor supply as well as their investments in business capital and labor. Mothers receiving cash transfers were 9 to 13 ppt more likely to be employed (compared to a control group average of 47%) and worked 21 to 31 hours longer per month (compared to 112 hours in the control group). They were also 6 to 7 ppt more likely to buy business assets, and the value of these assets was more than UGX 5,000 higher, amounting to at least a doubling compared to the control group mean. Mothers who received cash were also six to seven ppt more likely to employ at least one worker, which is a 10% increase compared to the control group.

Throughout the paper, we check for any complementarities between the childcare and the cash transfer treatments by testing if the treatment effect of the childcare & cash arm is equal to the sum of the treatment effects of the single-arm treatments. The p-value associated with this test is reported in the lower panel of the corresponding tables. In Table 2, we find no evidence of complementarities between access to childcare and cash transfers for mothers' labor market outcomes.[23]

To sum up, we find that the childcare subsidy did not lead to significant increases in mothers' earnings or labor supply on average. This suggests that, for the average mother in our sample, time constraints were not critical in limiting their labor market outcomes. On the other hand, access to capital seems to be key for increasing mothers' earnings from self-employment and their labor supply. This implies that credit constraints are binding for the average mother in our sample, limiting their labor supply and business profits.[24]

[22] In addition, childcare did not lead to the creation of new or the closure of old businesses (Table A.6). This suggests that mothers stayed in the same occupations. Consistent with this, we do not find effects on the operating time of the business nor on the travel time to the business (Table A.7).

[23] Online Appendix Tables B.4 and B.5 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds, and Table B.6 the Lee bounds for the findings in Table 2. Overall, our findings are robust to alternative methods of adjusting for attrition. The only exception is the effect of cash transfers on business profits for which we lose significance when we calculate Lee bounds.

[24] Our finding that cash grants positively impact mothers' business earnings is in line with Blattman et al. (2014) who study similarly labeled cash grants.

TABLE 2: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	6.65	-3.83	3.37	0.02	2.61	-0.02	-6.83	0.01	-4.24
	(4.74)	(3.41)	(6.04)	(0.03)	(10.31)	(0.03)	(5.58)	(0.04)	(10.93)
Cash	$9.00^{**}_{\star}$	$-7.26^{**}_{\star}$	2.51	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$39.73^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.04_{\star\star}$	$-10.51^{*}_{\star\star}$	$0.13^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$31.31^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.56)	(3.30)	(5.86)	(0.03)	(10.98)	(0.03)	(5.54)	(0.04)	(11.44)
Childcare & cash	$16.06^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-9.67^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$7.65_{\star}$	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$36.10^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.05^{**}_{\star\star}$	$-16.28^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.09^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$20.39^{*}_{\star\star}$
	(4.91)	(3.11)	(6.15)	(0.03)	(11.03)	(0.02)	(5.08)	(0.04)	(11.42)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.640	0.311	0.891	0.000	0.001	0.540	0.503	0.001	0.003
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.083	0.071	0.520	0.000	0.003	0.219	0.059	0.017	0.036
Cash = childcare & cash	0.176	0.433	0.421	0.389	0.762	0.546	0.245	0.370	0.373
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.954	0.757	0.842	0.253	0.693	0.797	0.888	0.424	0.684
Mean Control	24.27	19.34	45.1	.31	81.76	.17	30.58	.47	112.34
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure profits earned through self-employment (column 1); income earned through wage labor (column 2) and the sum of wages and profits (column 3); labor supply in wage labor, self-employment, and in total at the extensive (columns 4, 6 and 8) and at the intensive (columns 5, 7 and 9) margins. All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99^{th} percentile. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

While the childcare subsidy did not have any significant effect on mothers' labor on average, this could mask substantial heterogeneity. In particular, one dimension that is likely to be key is the composition of the household and presence of other working-age household members. At baseline, 32% of our sample was comprised of single mothers while 68% had a partner. While it may be more profitable for a couple to allocate the freed-up time to the partner, this is not an option for single mothers. When we assess the heterogeneity of the treatment effects on mothers with respect to this dimension, we find evidence of substantial heterogeneity. The full regression results are presented in Online Appendix Table A.8, while Figure 2 graphically summarizes the impact of the childcare subsidy on mothers who lived with their partner at baseline (left panel) versus single mothers (right panel). The left axis indicates income (in UGX 1,000) and labor supply at the intensive margin (in hours per month), and the right axis labor supply at the extensive margin (percent of working mothers).

FIGURE 2: THE IMPACT OF CHILDCARE BY FAMILY COMPOSITION.



Figure 2 demonstrates that while the childcare subsidy does not impact the labor supply and income of mothers in a couple, the effects are large among single mothers: Their labor supply and profits from self-employment increased substantially. In particular, the proportion of self-employed increased by 13 ppt (from 30 to 43%) and business profits by UGX 23 thousand per month (compared to a control mean of UGX 24 thousand) among single mothers. The effects carry through to total income and the extensive margin of labor

supply: The childcare treatment increased single mothers' total labor income by UGX 23 thousand (45% relative to the control mean) and their likelihood to be working (either in self- or wage-employment) by 14 ppt (29% relative to the control group). On the other hand, the childcare subsidy had no impact on mothers' labor supply or income when a partner was present.[25]

This evidence is consistent with our interpretation that the childcare subsidy alleviated time constraints. When a father is present, additional time may be used by either parent. For single mothers, such a reallocation is not an option, leading them to increase their own labor supply, which in our context is driven by self-employment.[26] Furthermore, the magnitude of the effects suggests that single mothers may have become more productive in their businesses. In the control group, the average single mother worked 75 hours and earned UGX 24 thousand, so her average hourly earnings was UGX 0.32 thousand. When provided childcare, the average single mother worked 75+36=111 hours and earned UGX 24+23=47 thousand, corresponding to hourly earnings of UGX 0.42 thousand. Assuming a concave production function with diminishing marginal productivity of labor, the higher hourly earnings for single mothers in the treatment group relative to single mothers in the control group (i.e. 0.42>0.32) indicates that single mothers become more productive when they receive a childcare subsidy. This suggests that the time constraint may have implications both in terms of the quantity (affecting the number of hours at work) as well as the quality of labor supply (affecting productivity at work).[27]

3.2 Fathers

In the preceding section, we find that the effect of the childcare subsidy depends on the family composition, in particular on the presence of a father. In Table 3, we report the treatment effects on fathers. For this analysis, the sample is restricted to households where a father was present at baseline. We find that the childcare subsidy led to a significant increase in fathers' total labor income by UGX 23 thousand. This corresponds to a 23%

[25]The regression results in Online Appendix Table A.8 confirm that the differences in effects between the two groups are statistically significant, i.e. the interaction effects between the childcare treatment and the mother being single are positive and significant, although they are not robust to adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing. Note that presence of the father was one of the dimensions that we pre-specified for heterogeneity analysis. Online Appendix Tables A.9, A.10 and A.11 show the heterogeneous effects for the other pre-specified dimensions: the presence of a younger child, the child's age and the child's gender. The point estimates of the interaction effects are sizable for some of these dimensions but not statistically significant.

[26]The evidence is also consistent with a scenario in which single mothers are less credit constrained than mothers living with a partner but our data does not support this hypothesis. We asked all mothers at baseline if they would be able to borrow UGX 300 thousand for the next six months: 65% of single mothers said no, while only 57% of mothers who live with their partner said no. The difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.004$).

[27]In line with this, Delecourt and Fitzpatrick (2021) provide evidence that in Uganda, female business owners who take their children to work have lower profitability than other female-owned businesses where a child is not present, and Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) theoretically show that limited attention (e.g. due to the presence of children) can reduce productivity.

increase relative to the earnings of the average father in the control group. While the coefficients on income from self-employment and wage labor are both positive and imprecisely estimated, the latter seems to be driving the effect on income. Fathers receive UGX 14.5 thousand (19%) more in wages than those in the control group.

In terms of labor supply, we find a significant increase in fathers' likelihood to be in wage employment. On the extensive margin, fathers in the childcare arm were 10 ppt more likely to be working for a wage, which a 26% increase compared to the control group where 38% of the fathers were in salaried employment. On the intensive margin, fathers in the childcare arm spent 21 hours (21%) more time working for a wage, although this is imprecisely estimated. The effect on fathers' total labor supply is attenuated by a slight decrease in time spent in self-employment, but it is still positive. Consistent with the increase in fathers' income being driven by changes in wage employment, we do not observe a change in their business revenues, assets or employees (see Online Appendix Table A.5).[28]

The cash treatments also affect fathers' labor income positively, but these effects are imprecisely estimated. Providing cash only had a similar impact on fathers' wage labor as providing childcare only, and did not change their business outcomes or inputs. In the combined arm, we find that the fathers were more likely to be self-employed and spent more hours working in self-employment compared to the fathers in the childcare only arm (p-values are 0.048 and 0.057 respectively). This suggests that addressing both time and credit constraints caused fathers to work more in household businesses relative to addressing only the time constraint which increased their wage-employment instead.[29]

To sum up, we find that providing childcare led to an increase in fathers' likelihood to be working for a wage, while the cash transfer, given to the mother of the target child, did not have any significant effects on fathers' labor. The impact of the childcare subsidy on fathers' wage labor and income could be driven by two potential mechanisms. First, childcare may have freed up some of the father's time, either directly, by freeing time he would otherwise have spent caring for the child, or indirectly, by the mother taking over some of his domestic work. A recent national time-use survey shows that Ugandan men spent about five hours per day doing unpaid care work (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2019). This is less than the seven hours women spent on such tasks, but it is still substantial.[30] The childcare treatment relieved the household from part of the domestic work required, resulting in the reallocation of the parents' time to other tasks, such as income-generating

[28]Note that only 15% of the fathers owned a business at baseline.

[29]In Online Appendix Tables B.7 and B.8, we provide the lower and upper attrition bounds using imputation, and in Table B.9 using Lee bounds. Overall, the effects on fathers' labor supply are robust to various attrition bounds while the effects on their earnings is not robust when we use Lee bounds.

[30]According to Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2019), cooking, shopping, childcare and care for dependent adults take up most of this time (5.3 hours for women and three hours for men). Men spend more time on other domestic tasks, such as home maintenance, transporting goods or family members, and unpaid work in support of other households (2.7 hours versus 1.4 for women).

activities. If there are capital constraints, the main income-generating option is wage labor. Given the importance of the gender gap in the labor market in Uganda (see Section 2.1), the most lucrative option from the household's point of view is to increase the father's wage labor, with the mother potentially taking over some of his domestic chores. In addition, the division of labor may also be guided by the traditional role of the woman as the main responsible for household chores (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2019). The time channel, therefore, provides a plausible explanation.

Second, the childcare subsidy may have freed up resources, as some households would have sent their child to daycare even without the subsidy, allowing the fathers to invest more in costly job search. After all, while the cash transfers did not significantly impact fathers' labor supply, we cannot reject the null of equality between the treatment effects of the childcare and the cash only arms, which suggests that the resource channel could also be driving the results. Moreover, the cash transfer was labeled to be used by the mothers, whereas any resources freed up by the childcare subsidy would have no such label. To shed more light on this, we predict for which households the resource channel could be more relevant by assessing the correlates of full-day childcare enrollment in the control group using baseline covariates.[31] We then use the same covariates to predict the target child's likelihood to be in full-day childcare in the absence of the subsidy. We use this predicted likelihood to split the sample into households where it is highly likely that the target child would have attended full-day childcare in the absence of the subsidy. For families who would have sent the target child to full-time childcare anyhow, our childcare subsidy is more likely to free up resources, alleviating the credit constraint rather than the time constraint. We find that among families who are less likely to have sent the target child to daycare, the childcare subsidy caused a large and significant increase in the father's total income and labor supply. On the other hand, for households who were more likely to send the target child to daycare, the childcare subsidy had no discernible effect on the father's total income or labor supply (see Online Appendix Table A.13).[32] This suggests the main mechanism driving the effects on fathers is time as opposed to the credit constraint.

[31] In particular, we find that the mother's occupation (wage-employment) and education level, as well as the target child's age and gender are among the significant correlates of childcare enrollment among the control group. See Online Appendix Table A.12.

[32] Note that this analysis (i.e. results presented in Online Appendix Tables A.12 and A.13) was not pre-specified and should therefore be caveated as such.

TABLE 3: EFFECTS ON FATHERS

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	4.63	14.51	23.24*	-0.03	-7.24	0.10$^{**}_{\star}$	20.90	0.06	12.28
	(6.27)	(12.20)	(13.70)	(0.03)	(10.96)	(0.04)	(12.86)	(0.04)	(14.65)
Cash	-6.70	14.55	12.59	0.00	3.79	0.07*	14.59	0.05	20.47
	(5.91)	(12.89)	(14.33)	(0.04)	(12.27)	(0.04)	(12.84)	(0.04)	(15.24)
Childcare & cash	4.01	-1.71	8.62	0.04	16.69	0.05	9.93	0.06	24.96
	(6.14)	(12.40)	(14.27)	(0.04)	(12.40)	(0.04)	(13.20)	(0.04)	(15.25)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.085	0.998	0.476	0.354	0.375	0.546	0.625	0.866	0.596
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.928	0.194	0.327	0.048	0.057	0.231	0.406	0.837	0.412
Cash = childcare & cash	0.102	0.215	0.801	0.310	0.344	0.583	0.726	0.718	0.778
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.506	0.087	0.194	0.155	0.250	0.038	0.166	0.511	0.719
Mean Control	25.33	77.37	103.19	.21	57.19	.38	100.22	.57	156.17
Obs.	970	968	968	970	969	970	968	970	967

Notes: The dependent variables measure profits earned through self-employment (column 1); income earned through wage labor (column 2) and the sum of wages and profits (column 3); labor supply in wage labor, self-employment, and in total at the extensive (columns 4, 6 and 8) and at the intensive (columns 5, 7 and 9) margins. All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99^{th} percentile. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

4 Effects on family wellbeing

We now turn to the impact of the childcare subsidy and the cash transfers on a range of outcomes related to family wellbeing. We first discuss the treatment effects on household income and consumption, and then on child development and domestic violence.

4.1 Household income and consumption

Table 4 reports the treatment effects on total household income and consumption. Column 1 shows that households assigned to the childcare treatment saw a large increase in total household income. In particular, households in the childcare arm generated UGX 28 thousand more. Compared to the control group average of UGX 143 thousand, this corresponds to a 19% increase. The cash transfer and the combined treatment also have positive but imprecisely estimated effects on total household income.

To measure changes in household socio-economic conditions, we also collected data on household consumption.[33] In column 2 of Table 4, we estimate treatment effects on household consumption per day.[34] We find that all treatments increased total household consumption. Relative to the control group, household consumption per day was 8% higher among households who received the childcare treatment, 11% more for those who got only the cash transfer and 14% higher for those who received both childcare and cash. While the point estimates are higher for the combined treatment arm, the differences across the three treatments are not statistically significant and we do not find evidence of a complementarity between childcare and cash. In columns 3 and 4, we present the treatment effects on household food and non-food consumption separately. The results suggest that the increase in total household consumption is mainly driven by an increase in non-food expenditures by 15% (childcare only), 16% (cash only) and 24% (childcare and cash). The treatment effects on food consumption are positive for all treatment arms, yet insignificant.[35]

Overall, the effects on household income and consumption highlight the importance of both time and credit constrains. Childcare subsidies as well as cash grants have the potential to improve household income and consumption. Based on our findings, we cannot

[33] To measure consumption, respondents were asked about their households' expenditures over the past month for infrequent purchases, and the value of consumption over the past week for drinks, food and tobacco. Using these, we impute the average household consumption per day. The measure, therefore, does not only include expenditures, but also the consumption of goods produced by the household (from farming and livestock) and received from others.

[34] We did not collect data on consumption at baseline, but only at the long-term follow-up survey. Therefore, the regressions presented in columns 2-4 of Table 4 are slightly different from our estimating equation (1) in that we cannot control for the baseline level of the outcome, y_{i0}.

[35] Online Appendix Tables B.10 and B.11 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds using imputation, and Table B.12 the Lee bounds for the results in Table 4. Our findings are robust with respect to attrition when we use the imputation method, but the lower Lee bounds are not precisely estimated.

conclude that one policy is more effective than the other in improving household socioeconomic conditions.

TABLE 4: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND CONSUMPTION

	Total household income	Consumption per day		
		Total	Food	Non-food
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Childcare	$27.84^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.93^{*}_{\star}$	0.09	$0.83^{**}_{\star}$
	(13.46)	(0.52)	(0.27)	(0.37)
Cash	4.70	$1.29^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.33_{\star}$	$0.91^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(13.00)	(0.53)	(0.27)	(0.38)
Childcare & cash	7.83	$1.63^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.22	$1.35^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(13.32)	(0.57)	(0.28)	(0.41)
p-value (equal treatment effects):				
Childcare = cash	0.115	0.524	0.353	0.847
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.182	0.234	0.612	0.232
Cash = childcare & cash	0.831	0.563	0.711	0.320
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.215	0.454	0.624	0.496
Mean Control	142.84	11.44	5.9	5.54
Obs.	1411	1393	1413	1393

Notes: In column 1, the dependent variable is total income. In column 2, the dependent variable measures total household expenditures per day, comprising expenditures on food in column 3, and non-food in column 4. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99^{th} percentile. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: 1 and 2-4.

4.2 Child development

Table 5 presents the treatment effects on the target child's development. Column 1 presents the impact on the standardized aggregate IDELA score, while columns 2–5 show the effects on each of its four dimensions: emergent literacy, emergent numeracy, socio-emotional skills and motor development.

We find that the childcare subsidy —alone or when combined with cash— had positive and significant effects of about 0.15 SD on the aggregate score, driven by significant improvements in emergent literacy and motor development. The effects on emergent numeracy and socio-emotional skills are also positive (0.1 SD and 0.04 SD, respectively), but not statistically significant. Turning to the cash treatment, the impact on the aggregate score is 0.09 SD and on its components are positive, but not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment effects of the three types of treatment on child development are equal. The positive but noisy effect of the cash transfer on children's development could be driven by the fact that some cash transfer recipients used

this to send their children to childcare as well (see discussion in section 2.4 above).[36]

Overall, our findings suggest that the childcare subsidy had a positive effect on child development after one year. As we discussed in Section 2.4, the childcare subsidy results in an increase in children's enrollment in full-day childcare. Our findings in Table 5 imply that this increase in full-day childcare had a positive effect on child development after one year.[37]

TABLE 5: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT

		Breakdown into components			
	IDELA score (1)	Emergent literacy (2)	Emergent numeracy (3)	Socio-emotional (4)	Motor development (5)
Childcare	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.12^{**}_{\star}$	$0.11^{*}_{\star}$	0.04	$0.23^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Cash	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.01	0.11^{*}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Childcare & cash	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star}$	$0.10_{\star}$	0.04	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.219	0.334	0.588	0.562	0.056
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.918	0.491	0.846	0.950	0.523
Cash = childcare & cash	0.273	0.100	0.731	0.613	0.207
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.244	0.786	0.325	0.921	0.080
Mean Control	0	0	0	0	0
Obs.	1366	1366	1366	1366	1366

Notes: In column 1, the dependent variable is the standardized aggregate IDELA score, and in columns 2-5 the standardized components of the score: emergent literacy, emergent numeracy, socio-emotional skills and motor development. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group the outcomes together in two families: the total IDELA score (1) and its sub-component (2–5).

4.3 Domestic violence

As a final outcome, we analyze the treatment effects on domestic violence. Previous literature has shown that cash transfers targeted to women may affect the prevalence of intimate partner violence (IPV). Theoretically, the effect of cash transfers targeted to women on intimate partner violence is ambiguous. Cash transfers and the resulting increase in mothers'

[36]Online Appendix Tables B.13 and B.14 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds, and Table B.15 the Lee bounds for the findings in Table 5. Overall, the effects on child development are robust to alternative methods of adjusting for attrition. The only exception is the lower bounds for emergent literacy.

[37]Recent evidence on the effects of preschools on child development suggests that quality of the service is very important (Andrew et al., 2023). We do not have a direct measure of the quality of childcare. Presuming the cost reflects its quality, and under the caveat that households in the control and in the cash only arm self-select into paying for childcare, there is no evidence that children attend different types of schools. The average cost per trimester for full-time daycare is UGX 152,040 in the control arm, UGX 155,390 in the childcare arms, and 144,040 in the cash only arm.

earnings could improve their position within the households and reduce IPV. On the other hand, it may lead to a backlash. Most studies have found that cash transfers either reduce or have little impact on IPV on average, although for some subgroups, such as women with low education, they may have adverse effects (Baranov et al., 2021; Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013). There is less evidence on how access to free childcare affects IPV. To the extent that access to childcare affects mothers' or fathers' labor income, it may affect their relative bargaining powers within the household which can have implications for IPV.

In Table 6, we investigate potential treatment effects on domestic violence, as reported by the mothers. In columns 1-3, we present treatment effects on reported prevalence of IPV. Mothers who have a partner were asked in private about the occurrence of psychological and physical violence over the past month.[38] We report effects on the extensive margin, looking separately at psychological violence, physical violence, and the combination of both. For the childcare treatment, there was no impact on IPV as the coefficients are small and insignificant. We do, however, find that the cash transfer led to an 8 ppt increase in the prevalence of IPV, as reported by mothers. Relative to the control groups where 14% of mothers reported having experienced any physical violence, this corresponds to a large increase. The effect of the cash transfer on any type of IPV is similar. The effects of the combined treatment are similar to the cash only arm, although they are imprecisely estimated. Nevertheless, the large point estimates imply that we cannot exclude that the cash transfers increased IPV in our context.[39]

We also track any effects on violence against children (VAC), which is prevalent in Uganda (Devries et al., 2015; Ministry of Gender and Development, 2015).[40] Columns 4-6 in Table 6 report treatment effects on violence against children by household members, as reported by the mother of the child.[41] Note that in the control group, 78% report at least one episode of psychological violence and 75% report at least one episode of physical violence against children. Overall, we do not find any significant treatment effects on prevalence of intra-household VAC. The point estimates are small and statistically insignificant. Columns 7-9 discuss violence against children by others. In this case, we asked the mother if she was aware of any other adult having performed the same acts of violence against the target child. We do not find any evidence of increased violence against children outside the

[38] For details on the questions, see Online Appendix E.

[39] We also pre-specified and collected information on mothers' own assessment of their wellbeing. We report the results on these outcome in Online Appendix Table A.14. We find that all three treatments lead to improvements in the mother's subjective wellbeing, measured through self-reported happiness, life satisfaction and perceived stress. The effect of cash transfer on mothers' reported happiness and life satisfaction is significantly higher than the effect of the childcare subsidy.

[40] The childcare subsidy and the cash transfer may have affected the risk of VAC via various mechanisms. For example, attending childcare implies the child spends less time in the household, which may reduce the risk of intra-household VAC. Cash transfers and higher income levels can also reduce stress and the risk of violence.

[41] For VAC, mothers were asked if they, or any other adult household member, committed violent acts against the target child in the past month. See Online Appendix E for further details.

household.[42]

TABLE 6: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

	Against partner			Against child (in hh)			Against child (others)		
	Psych. (1)	Phy. (2)	Any (3)	Psych. (4)	Phy. (5)	Any (6)	Psych. (7)	Phy. (8)	Any (9)
Childcare	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05*	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Cash	0.04	0.08$^{**}_{\star}$	0.08$^{*}_{\star}$	0.04	0.00	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Childcare & cash	0.03	0.06*	0.06	0.05	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.290	0.019	0.079	0.687	0.499	0.874	0.111	0.170	0.098
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.478	0.072	0.196	0.930	0.568	0.666	0.993	0.644	0.920
Cash = childcare & cash	0.730	0.584	0.655	0.756	0.923	0.554	0.117	0.351	0.127
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.825	0.717	0.750	0.317	0.610	0.217	0.643	0.851	0.704
Mean Control	.29	.14	.32	.78	.75	.88	.47	.23	.51
Obs.	907	907	903	1388	1388	1388	1388	1388	1388

Notes: The dependent variables measure the extensive margin of psychological, physical or any violence against the respondent (columns 1-3), against children by members of the household (columns 4-6) and against children by others (columns 7-9). We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in three families: violence against the partner (1-3), against children by household members (4-6), and against children by others (7-9).

5 Conclusion

We reported findings from a randomized control trial that offered women who have a child aged three to five (i) free childcare, (ii) a cash grant, or (iii) both a cash grant and free childcare. A fourth group of women remained as the control group. We find that access to free childcare did not affect average maternal labor market outcomes, but it positively affected household socioeconomic status (as measured by household income and consumption). The increase in household income was driven by different channels depending on the household composition. For single mothers, maternal labor supply and earnings improved, while among couples, an increase in fathers' earnings were driving the impact on household income. In terms of other indicators of family wellbeing, we find that childcare had a positive effect on child development and did not have any notable effect on domestic violence.

The cash grant of similar value and timing as the childcare subsidy triggered an occupational shift from wage labor to self-employment for mothers, increasing their earnings, business profits and total income. However, its impact on family wellbeing was more mixed. Cash transfers had a positive effect on household consumption, no significant impact on child development and led to an increase in the prevalence of intimate partner

[42]Online Appendix Tables B.16 and B.17 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds, and Table B.18 the Lee bounds for the findings in Table 6. Our finding on effects of cash transfers on IPV are in general robust to attrition bounds, with the exception of lower Lee bounds.

violence, as reported by the mothers.

Based on the findings, our main conclusion is that subsidizing childcare can be a cost-effective way to improve household economics status and child development. The positive effect of childcare on household income, consumption and child development is at least as large as that of a cash grant of equivalent cost. However, if the policy objective is to improve women's labor market outcomes in a context where women are mainly involved in self-employment, cash grants are likely to be more effective.

Given the large returns to childcare in terms of household income and child development, one question is why families do not use such services more often. One plausible explanation is the increase in household income is not sufficient to cover the cost of formal childcare.[43] Credit-constrained households may, therefore, be unable to use childcare services as much as they would like. The fact that 65% of households receiving the cash transfer reported using it partly to pay for childcare is consistent with the hypothesis of binding liquidity constraints limiting access to childcare for some families. However, the enrollment rates in full-day childcare among the cash transfer recipients still fall short of the levels obtained through the subsidy. This may be driven by the labelling of cash grants for business activities, by households underestimating the potential impact of childcare on household income and child development, or simply by their preference for less uncertain and immediate income gains over long-term investments in children.

Our paper has several limitations. First, the duration of our project implies we cannot evaluate the effects of having access to childcare beyond one year. Second, we cannot assess the impact of offering childcare to multiple children in the household. Third, the lack of detailed time-use information for all household members implies we cannot shed light on the exact mechanisms through which childcare enabled fathers, as opposed to mothers, to work more. Finally, our small-scale experiment allows us only to estimate partial equilibrium effects. If childcare subsidies were to be offered on a larger scale, their impact on labor market outcomes and child development would likely differ. These are important questions for further research.

[43] The childcare treatment increased monthly household income by around UGX 28 thousand on average. The cost was approximately UGX 410 thousand per year, or UGX 34 thousand per month per child. Taking into account the take-up rate of the subsidy, the effect on monthly household income is still lower than the cost of the childcare treatment.

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ONLINE APPENDIX: MATERIAL NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

A Appendix Figures and Tables

FIGURE A.1: ENROLLMENT RATE AMONG CHILDREN, BY AGE AT BASELINE



Notes: The figure shows the enrollment rates among the target children in our control group and children of a similar age, who reside in the same districts, in the LSMS data. The age on the *X*-axis refers to the age of the target child at baseline (the actual age of the child is +1 year older at the follow-up survey and in the LSMS).

TABLE A.1: BASELINE DESCRIPTIVES AND BALANCE

	Control	Basic Difference			Normalized Difference		
	Mean (SD)	T1 v.s. C	T2 v.s. C	T3 v.s. C	T1 v.s. C	T2 v.s. C	T3 v.s. C
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				A: Descriptives			
Respondent is target child's mother	0.873	0.030	0.025	0.034	0.066	0.056	0.076
	(0.333)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)			
Mother's age	34.540	-0.253	-0.415	-0.875	-0.017	-0.029	-0.061
	(10.381)	(0.781)	(0.755)	(0.754)			
Mother's education (years)	8.190	-0.532	-0.065	-0.211	-0.098	-0.012	-0.038
	(3.946)	(0.285)*	(0.297)	(0.293)			
Household size	5.362	-0.079	-0.069	-0.036	-0.027	-0.023	-0.012
	(2.172)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.159)			
Single mother household	0.323	-0.062	0.014	0.013	-0.097	0.022	0.019
	(0.468)	(0.034)*	(0.035)	(0.035)			
Target child has younger sibling	0.286	-0.014	-0.018	-0.012	-0.021	-0.029	-0.018
	(0.452)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)			
Elder male siblings (#)	0.952	-0.076	-0.025	-0.092	-0.051	-0.017	-0.064
	(1.072)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.076)			
Elder female siblings (#)	0.889	0.097	0.006	0.038	0.062	0.004	0.026
	(1.050)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.078)			
Mother's religion is Islam	0.270	0.017	0.009	-0.031	0.026	0.015	-0.050
	(0.444)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)			
Household owns land	0.656	-0.023	0.004	0.044	-0.034	0.006	0.066
	(0.476)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)			
Target child is a boy	0.499	0.024	-0.028	0.032	0.034	-0.039	0.045
	(0.501)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)			
Target child's age	3.627	-0.063	-0.028	-0.076	-0.061	-0.027	-0.071
	(0.742)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.056)			
				B: Child outcomes			
Target child attends childcare	0.384	-0.034	-0.035	-0.026	-0.050	-0.051	-0.037
	(0.487)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)			
Target child attends full-day childcare	0.022	-0.007	0.002	-0.016	-0.037	0.009	-0.095
	(0.146)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)*			
Child development score (IDELA)	0.005	-0.139	-0.116	-0.103	-0.102	-0.085	-0.078
	(0.993)	(0.076)*	(0.076)	(0.074)			
Emergent literacy (IDELA)	0.006	-0.164	-0.090	-0.156	-0.123	-0.064	-0.119
	(1.006)	(0.075)**	(0.078)	(0.073)**			
Emergent numeracy (IDELA)	0.002	-0.138	-0.081	-0.053	-0.102	-0.060	-0.040
	(0.993)	(0.076)*	(0.075)	(0.074)			
Socio-emotional skills (IDELA)	-0.006	-0.115	-0.051	-0.109	-0.085	-0.036	-0.083
	(0.983)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.074)			
Motor development (IDELA)	0.010	-0.080	-0.145	-0.054	-0.059	-0.108	-0.040
	(1.000)	(0.077)	(0.075)*	(0.076)			

Notes: Column 1 gives the mean and the standard deviation of observations in the control group; columns 2-4 report the differences between the control group and the childcare only, cash only, and combined arms respectively. These differences are obtained by regressing each variable on the treatment indicators, and the tests of significance are based on the regression estimates (* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$). Columns 5-7 report the normalized difference between the control and the three different treatments, computed as the difference in means in the relevant treatment and control observations divided by the square root of the sum of the variances. All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99^{th} percentile.

TABLE A.2: BASELINE DESCRIPTIVES AND BALANCE (CONTINUED)

	Control	Basic Difference			Normalized Difference		
	Mean (SD)	T1 v.s. C	T2 v.s. C	T3 v.s. C	T1 v.s. C	T2 v.s. C	T3 v.s. C
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				C: Household-level outcomes			
Total household income	108.892	-19.659	1.613	18.471	-0.065	0.023	0.046
	(215.452)	(16.558)	(18.466)	(27.491)			
				D: Mothers' labor market outcomes			
Mother's total income	39.706	-6.116	3.598	-4.221	-0.053	0.023	-0.035
	(90.737)	(6.273)	(8.712)	(6.562)			
Mother's income from wage-employment	12.003	0.448	4.432	0.371	0.006	0.059	0.006
	(49.585)	(3.733)	(3.980)	(3.477)			
Mother's profits from self-employment	26.957	-6.816	0.190	-4.491	-0.072	0.001	-0.043
	(78.883)	(5.134)	(7.947)	(5.722)			
Mother is employed	0.429	-0.010	0.022	-0.009	-0.015	0.031	-0.012
	(0.496)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)			
Mother's total working hours	91.175	-4.338	9.721	1.222	-0.023	0.049	0.006
	(136.693)	(9.985)	(10.504)	(10.442)			
Mother is wage-employed	0.116	0.010	0.035	0.012	0.021	0.072	0.026
	(0.321)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)			
Mother's hours in wage-employment	17.542	-0.262	11.167	2.781	-0.003	0.108	0.030
	(61.120)	(4.348)	(5.501)**	(4.854)			
Mother is self-employed	0.325	-0.025	-0.009	-0.019	-0.037	-0.013	-0.029
	(0.469)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)			
Mother's hours in self-employment	73.743	-4.238	-1.121	-1.408	-0.023	-0.006	-0.008
	(128.325)	(9.540)	(9.559)	(9.620)			
				E: Fathers' labor market outcomes			
Father's total income	93.394	-22.314	26.106	53.660	-0.089	0.084	0.100
	(201.432)	(18.103)	(23.379)	(41.087)			
Father's income from wage-employment	54.624	-7.433	24.594	43.475	-0.043	0.102	0.095
	(121.236)	(11.321)	(16.657)	(31.335)			
Father's profits from self-employment	25.766	-13.301	-4.640	-4.946	-0.078	-0.026	-0.028
	(152.739)	(11.515)	(12.171)	(12.344)			
Father is employed	0.407	-0.006	-0.021	-0.034	-0.009	-0.030	-0.050
	(0.492)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)			
Father's total working hours	106.205	-2.089	4.177	-3.880	-0.010	0.019	-0.018
	(153.988)	(11.382)	(11.770)	(11.492)			
Father is wage-employed	0.387	-0.046	-0.031	-0.084	-0.067	-0.046	-0.125
	(0.488)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.043)*			
Father's hours in wage-employment	86.848	-6.355	3.113	-7.054	-0.034	0.016	-0.036
	(135.449)	(11.822)	(12.795)	(12.702)			
Father is self-employed	0.159	0.002	0.004	0.013	0.003	0.008	0.025
	(0.366)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)			
Father's hours in self-employment	47.766	-3.461	2.932	1.363	-0.021	0.017	0.008
	(119.649)	(8.751)	(9.133)	(8.858)			

Notes: See Table A.1.

TABLE A.3: ATTRITION

	Household survey (1)	Child survey (2)
Childcare	-0.04***	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Cash	-0.03	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Childcare & cash	-0.04***	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.274	0.917
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.941	0.941
Cash = childcare & cash	0.310	0.976
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.214	0.184
Mean Control	0.08	0.10
Obs.	1496	1496

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent (column 1) or the target child (column 2) could not be surveyed in the follow-up survey. All regressions control for the randomization strata. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis (* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$).

TABLE A.4: EFFECTS ON OLDER SIBLINGS' ENROLLMENT AND ATTENDANCE

	Enrollment			Days missed		
	All	Females	Males	All	Females	Males
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Childcare	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.41	-1.66	0.93
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.88)	(1.54)	(1.74)
Cash	0.01	0.02	0.01	-1.81	-1.47	-1.47
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.55)	(1.39)	(1.42)
Childcare & cash	0.00	0.00	0.01	-4.26$^{***}_{\star\star}$	-2.82$^{**}_{\star}$	-3.11$^{***}_{\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.41)	(1.36)	(1.20)
p-value (equal treatment effects):						
Childcare = cash	0.161	0.077	0.810	0.419	0.891	0.156
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.475	0.386	0.803	0.018	0.367	0.008
Cash = childcare & cash	0.491	0.351	0.982	0.042	0.221	0.113
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.920	0.905	0.951	0.364	0.872	0.203
Mean Control	.87	.86	.86	10.43	7.22	6.75
Obs.	1054	805	787	1054	787	805

Notes: The dependent variables measure the share of the target child's siblings enrolled in school and the number of school days missed during the last trimester for older siblings (columns 1 and 4), older sisters (columns 2 and 5), and older brothers (columns 3 and 6). The sample is restricted to households where the target child has any older sibling (columns 1 and 4), an older sister (columns 2 and 5), or an older brother (columns 3 and 6). All regressions control for the randomization strata listed in Table 1. The regressions in columns 1-3 also control for the baseline level of the outcome variable. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group all the outcomes in one family.

TABLE A.5: EFFECTS ON BUSINESS REVENUES, ASSETS AND EMPLOYEES

	Mother					**Father**				
	Revenues	Assets		Employees		Revenues	Assets		Employees	
	UGX	>0	UGX	>0	Number	UGX	>0	UGX	>0	Number
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Childcare	41.51**	0.03	1.71	0.01	-0.06	16.89	0.00	1.40	0.00	0.02
	(21.04)	(0.02)	(2.22)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(20.68)	(0.02)	(1.86)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Cash	$49.47^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.07^{***}_{\star\star}$	$4.79^{*}_{\star\star}$	$0.06^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.05	-7.81	0.00	3.53	0.00	0.04
	(19.68)	(0.02)	(2.50)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(19.27)	(0.02)	(2.36)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Childcare & cash	$63.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.08^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$7.41^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.07^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.02	46.65**	-0.01	1.16	0.02	0.09
	(20.56)	(0.02)	(2.78)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(23.43)	(0.02)	(1.88)	(0.02)	(0.10)
p-value (equal treatment effects):										
Childcare = cash	0.741	0.078	0.288	0.065	0.056	0.253	0.878	0.438	0.945	0.839
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.380	0.032	0.066	0.028	0.100	0.242	0.735	0.914	0.435	0.532
Cash = childcare & cash	0.559	0.690	0.433	0.759	0.641	0.026	0.637	0.380	0.492	0.609
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.376	0.632	0.819	0.926	0.757	0.241	0.741	0.243	0.532	0.809
Mean Control	89.92	.07	4.25	.1	.25	76.07	.04	2.46	.07	.14
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	970	970	970	969	969

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues earned through self-employment (column 1), whether the household purchased any business assets during the last 12 months for businesses operated by the respondent (column 2) and the value of these assets (column 3); whether she has any employee in her businesses (column 4) and the number of employees (column 5). Columns 1-5 refer to the business of the mother, and columns 6-10 report the same outcomes for the business of the father. All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99^{th} percentile. All regressions control for the randomization strata listed in Table 1. The regressions in columns 1, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10 also control for the baseline level of the outcome variable. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: the mother (1–5) and the father (6-10).

TABLE A.6: BUSINESS CREATION AND SURVIVAL

	Household	Mother	
	New business	New business	Closed business
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Childcare	0.00	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.03_{\star}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000	0.375
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.000	0.000	0.477
Cash = childcare & cash	0.362	0.605	0.859
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.496	0.390	0.754
Mean Control	.24	.15	.17
Obs.	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure whether a new business was created at the household level (column 1) or by the mother (column 2). Column 3 measures whether at least one of the mother's baseline businesses closed down. All regressions control for the randomization strata listed in Table 1. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group all the outcomes together in one family.

TABLE A.7: EFFECTS ON TRAVEL TIME TO BUSINESS AND OPERATING HOURS

	Travel time			Operating time (total)		
	Any business	New business	Old business	Any business	New business	Old business
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Childcare	0.99	0.36	0.63	8.44	3.90	4.90
	(0.73)	(0.53)	(0.49)	(9.04)	(7.49)	(6.10)
Cash	$2.35^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$1.89^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.46_{\star}$	$45.68^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$36.57^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$9.20_{\star}$
	(0.75)	(0.63)	(0.41)	(10.28)	(8.44)	(6.45)
Childcare & cash	$1.65^{**}_{\star}$	$1.21^{**}_{\star}$	0.45	$42.73^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$36.73^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	6.33
	(0.72)	(0.59)	(0.42)	(10.09)	(8.70)	(5.97)
p-value (equal treatment effects):						
Childcare = cash	0.114	0.022	0.751	0.001	0.000	0.505
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.428	0.181	0.744	0.001	0.000	0.813
Cash = childcare & cash	0.407	0.336	0.982	0.801	0.987	0.651
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.130	0.239	0.351	0.442	0.765	0.379
Mean Control	2.33	1.35	.99	78.43	32.52	45.91
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure the time needed to travel to the business (minutes per day, for all businesses) and the operating time (total hours per month, for all businesses). Columns 1 and 4 provide this for all businesses, columns 2 and 5 for newly created businesses, and columns 3 and 6 for businesses that were already in existence at the time of the baseline. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. In columns 4-6, we also control for the baseline level of the outcome variable. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group the outcomes in two families: travel time (1–3) and operating time (4–6).

TABLE A.8: EFFECTS ON SINGLE MOTHERS

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	0.34	-4.73	-3.17	-0.02	-10.25	-0.02	-1.28	-0.04	-11.60
	(5.35)	(4.05)	(6.90)	(0.04)	(11.99)	(0.03)	(5.86)	(0.04)	(12.66)
Cash	11.14*	-7.38**	5.78	0.19$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	33.40$^{**}_{\star\star}$	-0.04$_{\star}$	-4.28	0.12$^{***}_{\star\star}$	29.22$^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(5.97)	(3.57)	(7.42)	(0.04)	(13.63)	(0.03)	(5.64)	(0.04)	(14.01)
Childcare & cash	14.28$^{**}_{\star\star}$	-8.43$^{**}_{\star\star}$	8.08	0.18$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	40.19$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.06$^{**}_{\star\star}$	-9.83$^{*}_{\star\star}$	0.11$^{**}_{\star\star}$	30.03$^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(5.82)	(3.79)	(7.38)	(0.04)	(13.54)	(0.03)	(5.22)	(0.04)	(13.84)
Single mother	-6.24	1.85	-1.36	-0.03	-14.93	0.06	23.48**	0.03	10.79
	(6.44)	(5.42)	(8.93)	(0.05)	(15.23)	(0.04)	(10.21)	(0.05)	(16.63)
Childcare $\times$ single mother	22.74**	3.89	24.84*	0.15**	45.93*	0.01	-15.80	0.17**	30.84
	(11.55)	(7.27)	(13.99)	(0.07)	(23.68)	(0.06)	(13.20)	(0.08)	(24.84)
Cash $\times$ single mother	-6.03	0.28	-9.62	0.01	19.49	0.00	-19.30	0.02	5.75
	(9.10)	(7.67)	(12.30)	(0.07)	(23.17)	(0.06)	(13.36)	(0.08)	(24.38)
Childcare & cash $\times$ single mother	5.55	-3.77	-1.27	-0.06	-11.46	0.02	-20.23*	-0.05	-29.25
	(10.73)	(6.68)	(13.34)	(0.07)	(23.47)	(0.06)	(12.22)	(0.08)	(24.68)
Impact for single mothers at baseline									
Childcare	23.08$^{**}_{\star}$	-.83	21.67$^{*}_{\star}$	.13**	35.68*	-.01	-17.08	.14**	19.24
	(10.18)	(6.07)	(12.13)	(.06)	(20.38)	(.05)	(11.93)	(.06)	(21.36)
Cash	5.1	-7.1	-3.84	.2$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	52.9$^{***}_{\star\star}$	-.04	-23.58$^{*}_{\star\star}$	.14$^{**}_{\star\star}$	34.97$^{*}_{\star}$
	(6.81)	(6.81)	(9.71)	(.06)	(18.67)	(.05)	(12.17)	(.06)	(19.95)
Childcare & cash	19.83$^{**}_{\star\star}$	-12.2$^{**}_{\star\star}$	6.81	.12**	28.72	-.04	-30.06$^{***}_{\star\star}$	.06	.78
	(9.04)	(5.5)	(11.14)	(.06)	(19.11)	(.05)	(11.1)	(.06)	(20.39)
p-value (equal treatment effects)									
Childcare = cash	.064	.341	.023	.29	.416	.665	.545	.933	.463
Childcare = childcare & cash	.776	.03	.237	.875	.748	.607	.174	.22	.4
Cash = childcare & cash	.086	.391	.296	.2	.231	.945	.508	.17	.098
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.532	.616	.489	.018	.038	.889	.493	.013	.073
Mean Control (single mothers)	24	22	49	.3	75	.22	48	.49	123
Mean het. variable	.31	.31	.31	.31	.31	.31	.31	.31	.31
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. "Single mother" is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent did not have a partner living in the household at baseline. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE A.9: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS BY PRESENCE OF A YOUNGER SIBLING AT BASELINE

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	10.58*	-2.46	8.25	0.04	7.22	-0.04	-11.78*	0.01	-4.23
	(5.94)	(4.03)	(7.38)	(0.04)	(12.45)	(0.03)	(6.77)	(0.04)	(13.16)
Cash	7.89	-7.21*	1.69	0.20$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	49.70$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.06$^{*}_{\star\star}$	-12.52$^{*}_{\star\star}$	0.13$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	39.53$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(5.31)	(3.81)	(6.89)	(0.04)	(13.17)	(0.03)	(7.03)	(0.04)	(13.81)
Childcare & cash	19.49$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-9.42$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	11.39$_{\star\star}$	0.15$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	38.20$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.07$^{**}_{\star\star}$	-21.40$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.07$^{*}_{\star\star}$	18.06$_{\star}$
	(6.12)	(3.62)	(7.57)	(0.04)	(13.13)	(0.03)	(6.28)	(0.04)	(13.60)
Younger sibling	0.79	-0.69	-1.13	0.00	8.09	-0.04	-15.21**	-0.03	-7.13
	(6.20)	(5.54)	(8.62)	(0.05)	(15.38)	(0.04)	(7.62)	(0.05)	(16.04)
Childcare $\times$ younger sibling	-14.23	-4.94	-17.63	-0.06	-16.16	0.05	17.73	0.00	0.29
	(9.25)	(7.44)	(12.46)	(0.07)	(21.74)	(0.06)	(11.82)	(0.08)	(23.35)
Cash $\times$ younger sibling	4.52	-0.12	3.49	-0.02	-36.33	0.06	6.77	0.00	-30.38
	(10.42)	(7.42)	(13.14)	(0.08)	(23.47)	(0.06)	(10.72)	(0.08)	(24.24)
Childcare & cash $\times$ younger sibling	-12.24	-0.86	-13.31	0.05	-7.02	0.04	18.28*	0.07	8.81
	(9.88)	(7.04)	(12.64)	(0.08)	(24.12)	(0.06)	(10.40)	(0.08)	(25.01)
Impact with younger sibling at baseline									
Childcare	-3.65	-7.4	-9.38	-.02	-8.94	.01	5.94	0	-3.94
	(7.12)	(6.3)	(10.08)	(.06)	(17.91)	(.05)	(9.69)	(.07)	(19.36)
Cash	12.41	-7.33	5.18	.18$^{***}_{\star}$	13.37	0	-5.75	.13*	9.15
	(8.95)	(6.42)	(11.19)	(.07)	(19.48)	(.05)	(8.06)	(.07)	(19.97)
Childcare & cash	7.24	-10.27*	-1.92	.2$^{***}_{\star\star}$	31.18	-.02	-3.13	.15$^{**}_{\star}$	26.87
	(7.76)	(6.06)	(10.12)	(.07)	(20.27)	(.05)	(8.29)	(.07)	(21)
p-value (equal treatment effects)									
Childcare = cash	.073	.989	.192	.004	.246	.829	.22	.076	.524
Childcare = childcare & cash	.164	.597	.461	.001	.046	.482	.349	.045	.153
Cash = childcare & cash	.584	.592	.525	.766	.407	.617	.75	.83	.423
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.898	.596	.88	.668	.339	.603	.793	.906	.461
Mean Control (with younger sibling)	21	19	40	.31	84	.15	20	.44	103
Mean het. variable	.28	.28	.28	.28	.28	.28	.28	.28	.28
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. "Younger sibling" is a dummy variable equal to one if the target child had at least one younger sibling at baseline. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE A.10: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS BY AGE OF TARGET CHILD

	Income			Labor supply					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	12.84*	-3.70	10.56	0.03	1.34	-0.01	-5.57	0.03	-4.73
	(7.18)	(5.26)	(9.24)	(0.05)	(15.31)	(0.04)	(7.93)	(0.05)	(16.12)
Cash	9.40	-7.64*	3.28	0.15$^{***}_{\star\star}$	29.71*	-0.03	-6.23	0.09*	25.63
	(6.87)	(4.59)	(8.71)	(0.05)	(16.43)	(0.04)	(8.43)	(0.05)	(17.31)
Childcare & cash	20.97$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-7.47$_{\star}$	14.48$_{\star}$	0.16$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	33.09$^{**}_{\star}$	-0.05$_{\star}$	-14.54$^{*}_{\star}$	0.10$^{**}_{\star}$	17.94
	(7.12)	(4.80)	(9.31)	(0.05)	(15.99)	(0.03)	(7.42)	(0.05)	(16.52)
Old	-3.64	-1.00	-5.40	-0.03	-15.63	0.02	-0.59	0.00	-16.67
	(5.85)	(4.78)	(7.83)	(0.05)	(14.34)	(0.04)	(7.98)	(0.05)	(15.16)
Childcare $\times$ old	-13.06	-0.33	-15.24	-0.01	1.43	-0.03	-2.66	-0.04	-0.30
	(9.61)	(7.01)	(12.39)	(0.06)	(20.75)	(0.05)	(11.17)	(0.07)	(22.01)
Cash $\times$ old	-0.81	0.72	-1.58	0.08	19.27	-0.02	-8.37	0.06	10.77
	(9.40)	(6.66)	(12.17)	(0.07)	(22.30)	(0.05)	(11.16)	(0.07)	(23.23)
Childcare & cash $\times$ old	-10.25	-4.53	-14.27	0.00	5.13	-0.01	-3.62	-0.02	3.89
	(9.89)	(6.34)	(12.41)	(0.07)	(22.07)	(0.05)	(10.28)	(0.07)	(22.92)
Impact when target child is old									
Childcare	-.22	-4.03	-4.68	.02	2.77	-.04	-8.23	-.01	-5.03
	(6.2)	(4.51)	(7.94)	(.05)	(13.92)	(.04)	(7.9)	(.05)	(14.9)
Cash	8.59	-6.92	1.71	.23$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	48.98$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-.05$_{\star}$	-14.6$^{**}_{\star\star}$	.16$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	36.4$^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(6.22)	(4.78)	(8.19)	(.05)	(14.87)	(.03)	(7.3)	(.05)	(15.29)
Childcare & cash	10.72	-12$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	.21	.16$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	38.22$^{**}_{\star\star}$	-.06$_{\star}$	-18.16$^{**}_{\star\star}$	.08$_{\star}$	21.83$_{\star}$
	(6.8)	(4.07)	(8.09)	(.05)	(15.24)	(.03)	(7.05)	(.05)	(15.88)
p-value (equal treatment effects)									
Childcare = cash	.137	.547	.421	0	.003	.719	.403	.001	.01
Childcare = childcare & cash	.103	.052	.545	.006	.025	.591	.178	.071	.107
Cash = childcare & cash	.75	.234	.856	.172	.515	.853	.596	.161	.389
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.799	.866	.784	.186	.533	.544	.651	.381	.673
Mean Control (target child is old)	25	18	45	.31	79	.17	30	.48	109
Mean het. variable	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. "Old" is a dummy variable equal to one if the child was five at baseline (compared to three or four years old). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* p < 0.1$, $** p < 0.05$, $*** p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star p < 0.1$, $\star\star p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE A.11: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS BY GENDER OF TARGET CHILD

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	8.21	-3.34	4.94	0.01	4.53	-0.03	-10.89	-0.01	-6.27
	(6.71)	(4.91)	(8.52)	(0.05)	(14.26)	(0.04)	(8.74)	(0.05)	(15.47)
Cash	$17.20^{***}_{\star\star}$	-6.22	10.76	$0.22^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$52.36^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.05_{\star\star}$	$-18.38^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$35.56^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(6.34)	(4.59)	(8.09)	(0.05)	(14.98)	(0.04)	(8.14)	(0.05)	(15.93)
Childcare & cash	$17.78^{**}_{\star\star}$	$-12.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	4.35	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$32.73^{**}_{\star\star}$	$-0.08^{**}_{\star\star}$	$-26.62^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.06	5.04
	(7.20)	(3.76)	(8.58)	(0.05)	(15.05)	(0.03)	(7.23)	(0.05)	(15.76)
Boy	5.38	-1.40	1.81	0.02	19.38	-0.04	-13.22_{*}	-0.02	4.49
	(5.99)	(4.66)	(7.82)	(0.05)	(14.11)	(0.04)	(7.90)	(0.05)	(14.97)
Childcare × boy	-3.18	-0.86	-3.04	0.03	-4.49	0.02	8.36	0.03	3.71
	(9.54)	(6.79)	(12.08)	(0.07)	(20.66)	(0.05)	(11.02)	(0.07)	(21.89)
Cash × boy	-17.05_{*}	-2.27	-17.36	-0.06	-25.62	0.01	16.03	-0.03	-8.69
	(8.92)	(6.53)	(11.35)	(0.07)	(21.98)	(0.05)	(11.11)	(0.07)	(22.91)
Childcare & cash × boy	-3.54	4.77	6.13	0.03	5.17	0.05	20.31_{**}	0.06	28.66
	(9.95)	(6.20)	(12.34)	(0.07)	(22.08)	(0.05)	(10.07)	(0.07)	(22.87)
Impact when target child is a boy									
Childcare	5.03	-4.21	1.9	.04	.03	-.01	-2.53	.02	-2.56
	(6.75)	(4.75)	(8.58)	(.05)	(14.9)	(.03)	(6.85)	(.05)	(15.48)
Cash	.15	-8.49_{*}	-6.6	$.16^{***}_{\star\star}$	26.74_{*}	-.03	-2.36	$.11_{**}$	26.87
	(6.38)	(4.68)	(8.2)	(.05)	(16.08)	(.04)	(7.55)	(.05)	(16.49)
Childcare & cash	14.24_{**}	-7.38	10.48	$.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$37.9^{**}_{\star\star}$	-.03	-6.3	$.12^{**}_{\star\star}$	$33.7^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(6.82)	(4.91)	(8.85)	(.05)	(16.08)	(.03)	(6.99)	(.05)	(16.47)
p-value (equal treatment effects)									
Childcare = cash	.473	.321	.317	.015	.099	.543	.982	.106	.082
Childcare = childcare & cash	.205	.491	.351	.005	.018	.588	.593	.044	.03
Cash = childcare & cash	.041	.806	.052	.799	.518	.938	.612	.763	.701
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.35	.42	.219	.737	.624	.758	.892	.913	.689
Mean Control (target child is a boy)	26	18	45	.31	86	.15	23	.45	109
Mean het. variable	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. "Boy" is a dummy variable equal to one if the child is male (compared to female). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE A.12: CORRELATES OF FULL-DAY CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT IN CONTROL GROUP

	Full-day childcare
	(1)
Mother is self-employed	0.05
	(0.05)
Mother is wage-employed	0.09
	(0.07)
Child's age: 4	0.00
	(.)
Child's age: 5	-0.09*
	(0.05)
Target child is a boy	0.09*
	(0.05)
Respondent is the target child's mother	0.08
	(0.11)
Target child attends half-day childcare	-0.01
	(0.06)
Mother's age	0.01
	(0.00)
Mother's education (years)	0.02***
	(0.01)
Household size	0.01
	(0.02)
Mother is in a couple	0.02
	(0.06)
Other caregivers, besides mother and father	-0.01
	(0.06)
Elder male siblings (#)	-0.03
	(0.03)
Elder female siblings (#)	0.00
	(0.03)
Mother's religion is Islam	0.01
	(0.06)
Household owns land	-0.16***
	(0.06)
Household's income	0.01
	(0.01)
Observations	383
R-squared	0.15
Mean of outcome	0.33

Notes: The sample consists of the control group. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value one if the child is enrolled in full-day childcare at the long-term follow-up survey. All the right-hand side variables are defined at baseline. In addition, we also control for district fixed effects and a dummy taking value one if the household's income was missing and therefore imputed to the sample mean. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$.

TABLE A.13: EFFECTS ON FATHERS BY TARGET CHILD'S LIKELIHOOD TO BE IN CHILDCARE

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	13.37	29.16	48.54$^{**}_{\star}$	-0.02	1.05	0.12**	29.51	0.09	30.81
	(9.79)	(17.97)	(20.12)	(0.05)	(17.44)	(0.06)	(19.35)	(0.06)	(21.94)
Cash	-8.44	12.74	4.37	-0.03	-12.42	0.08	21.29	0.05	12.60
	(7.98)	(18.38)	(19.37)	(0.06)	(16.75)	(0.06)	(19.58)	(0.06)	(21.78)
Childcare & cash	6.57	3.62	13.33	0.03	14.87	0.04	4.49	0.06	21.29
	(8.61)	(18.51)	(20.62)	(0.06)	(18.21)	(0.06)	(19.87)	(0.06)	(22.52)
Target child likely to be in childcare	10.69	10.65	25.12	0.00	-0.64	0.00	-3.66	0.03	7.36
	(7.99)	(18.42)	(19.75)	(0.05)	(16.06)	(0.06)	(19.38)	(0.06)	(21.84)
Childcare $\times$ t. c. likely to be in childcare	-20.47*	-27.43	-55.67**	-0.04	-18.64	-0.05	-14.49	-0.07	-34.57
	(12.09)	(24.50)	(26.61)	(0.07)	(22.04)	(0.08)	(25.68)	(0.08)	(29.28)
Cash $\times$ t. c. likely to be in childcare	3.30	4.90	16.96	0.05	29.77	-0.01	-9.54	0.01	17.69
	(11.48)	(25.76)	(28.55)	(0.07)	(24.42)	(0.08)	(26.05)	(0.09)	(30.55)
Childcare & cash $\times$ t. c. likely to be in childcare	-4.67	-8.64	-7.26	0.01	2.04	0.04	14.72	0.03	10.84
	(12.77)	(25.13)	(29.30)	(0.08)	(25.48)	(0.08)	(26.52)	(0.09)	(30.86)
Impact when target child is likely to be in childcare									
Childcare	-7.1	1.73	-7.13	-.06	-17.59	.08	15.03	.02	-3.76
	(7.13)	(16.77)	(17.63)	(.04)	(13.52)	(.05)	(17.07)	(.06)	(19.62)
Cash	-5.14	17.64	21.33	.02	17.35	.07	11.75	.05	30.29
	(8.47)	(18.16)	(21.01)	(.05)	(17.87)	(.06)	(17.05)	(.06)	(21.45)
Childcare & cash	1.9	-5.02	6.07	.04	16.91	.07	19.21	.08	32.14
	(9.14)	(16.92)	(20.49)	(.05)	(17.5)	(.06)	(17.58)	(.06)	(20.98)
p-value (equal treatment effects)									
Childcare = cash	.793	.386	.175	.097	.045	.917	.851	.568	.117
Childcare = childcare & cash	.298	.688	.518	.051	.043	.927	.816	.313	.094
Cash = childcare & cash	.465	.222	.521	.729	.983	.989	.679	.655	.936
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.249	.326	.783	.266	.487	.335	.761	.927	.854
Mean Control (target child likely in childcare)	27	75	103	.19	52	.36	96	.54	148
Mean het. variable	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51	.51
Obs.	966	964	964	966	965	966	964	966	963

Notes: See Table 3 for a description of the dependent and control variables. "Target child likely to be in childcare" is a dummy taking value one if we predict it is likely the child will be enrolled in childcare (based on Table A.12). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE A.14: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS' SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING

	Happiness with life (0 to 10)	Life satisfaction (0 to 10)	Perceived stress scale (0-40)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Childcare	$0.40^{***}_{\star\star}$	$0.31^{***}_{\star\star}$	$-0.58_{\star\star}$
	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.38)
Cash	$0.81^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.65^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-1.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.37)
Childcare & cash	$0.62^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.42^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.78^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.39)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.010	0.003	0.136
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.151	0.325	0.605
Cash = childcare & cash	0.256	0.063	0.348
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.009	0.001	0.083
Mean Control	4.2	3.54	23.63
Obs.	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure the mother's happiness with life (column 1) and her position on the ladder of life (column 2), both measured on a scale from zero to ten, and the mother's stress level (column 3), captured by Cohen's perceived stress scale (Cohen et al., 1983). We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group the outcomes together in one family.

B Attrition Bounds

Given the differential attrition rate in the control relative to the treatment groups, we assess the sensitivity of our main findings with respect to attrition. To do so, we follow two methods. First, as pre-specified in our pre-analysis plan, we follow Kling et al. (2007) and Fairlie et al. (2015) and calculate lower and upper bound estimates that adjust for differential non-response rates in the treatment groups relative to the control. We calculate the upper bounds by imputing the mean among the treated plus 0.1 (or 0.2) standard deviations (SD) to the non-responders in the treatment group. For the control group, we impute using the mean among the control minus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD. To calculate lower bounds, we follow the opposite procedure: For the treatment group, we take the mean minus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD and for the control we take the mean plus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD. We then re-estimate the treatment effects. Second, we also calculated Lee bounds. We report the results in the following tables.

TABLE B.1: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT – 10% IMPUTATION

	Any childcare	Full-day childcare
	(1)	(2)
	Panel A: Lower bound	
Childcare	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.48^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.07^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.06^{*}_{\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	$0.13^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.50^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.397	0.600
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.003	0.258
Mean Control	.83	.34
Obs.	1496	1496
	Panel B: Upper bound	
Childcare	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.49^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.08^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.07^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.51^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.409	0.598
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.001	0.180
Mean Control	.82	.33
Obs.	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 1 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group both outcomes together in one family.

TABLE B.2: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT – 20% IMPUTATION

	Any childcare	Full-day childcare
	(1)	(2)
	Panel A: Lower bound	
Childcare	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.48^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.07^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.06^{*}_{\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	$0.13^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.49^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.392	0.602
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.004	0.304
Mean Control	.83	.34
Obs.	1496	1496
	Panel B: Upper bound	
Childcare	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.50^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.08^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.08^{**}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.51^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.415	0.596
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.001	0.149
Mean Control	.82	.33
Obs.	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 1 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group both outcomes together in one family.

TABLE B.3: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT – LEE BOUNDS

	Any childcare	Full-day childcare
	(1)	(2)
	Panel A: Lower bound	
Childcare	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.48^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.07^{***}_{\star\star}$	$0.05_{\star}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.50^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.448	0.580
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.005	0.494
Mean Control	.82	.34
Obs.	1398	1398
	Panel B: Upper bound	
Childcare	$0.18^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.51^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.11^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.08^{**}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Childcare & cash	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.52^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.076	0.624
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.000	0.124
Mean Control	.82	.34
Obs.	1398	1398

Notes: See Table 1 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \; p < 0.1$, $** \; p < 0.05$, $*** \; p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \; p < 0.1$, $\star\star \; p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \; p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group both outcomes together in one family.

TABLE B.4: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS – 10% IMPUTATION

	Income			Labor supply					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	6.28	-3.85	3.29	0.02	2.10	-0.02	-6.62	0.00	-3.71
	(4.47)	(3.23)	(5.69)	(0.03)	(9.73)	(0.02)	(5.26)	(0.03)	(10.32)
Cash	$8.62^{**}_{\star}$	$-7.29^{**}_{\star}$	2.56	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$38.68^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.04^{*}_{\star\star}$	$-10.46^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.12^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$31.09^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.28)	(3.08)	(5.48)	(0.03)	(10.28)	(0.02)	(5.19)	(0.03)	(10.71)
Childcare & cash	$15.87^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-10.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$7.36_{\star}$	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$35.75^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.06^{**}_{\star\star\star}$	$-16.76^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.09^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$20.50^{*}_{\star\star}$
	(4.67)	(2.96)	(5.85)	(0.03)	(10.46)	(0.02)	(4.77)	(0.03)	(10.82)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.627	0.286	0.903	0.000	0.001	0.478	0.464	0.001	0.002
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.066	0.042	0.525	0.000	0.002	0.166	0.036	0.014	0.033
Cash = childcare & cash	0.146	0.327	0.432	0.400	0.798	0.503	0.185	0.345	0.366
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.886	0.824	0.858	0.299	0.737	0.797	0.964	0.440	0.659
Mean Control	24.78	19.8	45.79	.32	82.95	.18	31.28	.48	113.6
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	7.87_{*}	-2.54	5.38	0.03	5.68	-0.02	-4.62	0.02	0.06
	(4.47)	(3.24)	(5.69)	(0.03)	(9.74)	(0.02)	(5.27)	(0.03)	(10.33)
Cash	$10.36^{**}_{\star}$	$-5.84^{*}_{\star}$	4.87	$0.20^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$42.90^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.03_{\star}$	$-8.23_{\star\star}$	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$35.51^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.28)	(3.09)	(5.49)	(0.03)	(10.29)	(0.02)	(5.20)	(0.03)	(10.72)
Childcare & cash	$17.50^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-8.95^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$9.46_{\star\star}$	$0.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$39.47^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.05^{**}_{\star\star}$	$-14.89^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.10^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$24.38^{**}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.68)	(2.96)	(5.85)	(0.03)	(10.47)	(0.02)	(4.77)	(0.03)	(10.83)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.605	0.308	0.932	0.000	0.001	0.508	0.493	0.001	0.002
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.065	0.040	0.523	0.000	0.002	0.164	0.034	0.014	0.032
Cash = childcare & cash	0.153	0.290	0.452	0.374	0.764	0.467	0.161	0.323	0.342
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.913	0.897	0.925	0.188	0.543	0.960	0.774	0.291	0.473
Mean Control	23.76	18.88	44.4	.31	80.56	.17	29.88	.47	111.07
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE B.5: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS – 20% IMPUTATION

	Income			Labor supply					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	5.48	-4.50	2.25	0.01	0.30	-0.03	-7.61	0.00	-5.59
	(4.47)	(3.23)	(5.69)	(0.03)	(9.74)	(0.02)	(5.26)	(0.03)	(10.32)
Cash	$7.75^{*}_{\star}$	$-8.02^{***}_{\star\star}$	1.41	$0.18^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$36.57^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.05^{**}_{\star\star}$	$-11.58^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.12^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$28.88^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.28)	(3.08)	(5.49)	(0.03)	(10.29)	(0.02)	(5.19)	(0.03)	(10.72)
Childcare & cash	$15.06^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-10.78^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	6.30	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$33.89^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.06^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-17.69^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.08^{**}_{\star\star\star}$	$18.56^{*}_{\star\star}$
	(4.67)	(2.96)	(5.85)	(0.03)	(10.46)	(0.02)	(4.77)	(0.03)	(10.82)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.638	0.277	0.888	0.000	0.001	0.464	0.451	0.001	0.002
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.067	0.044	0.526	0.000	0.002	0.168	0.037	0.014	0.033
Cash = childcare & cash	0.144	0.348	0.423	0.413	0.815	0.522	0.199	0.357	0.379
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.787	0.691	0.752	0.369	0.843	0.681	0.833	0.529	0.762
Mean Control	25.29	20.26	46.49	.32	84.15	.18	31.97	.48	114.87
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	8.67^{*}	-1.89	6.43	0.04	7.47	-0.01	-3.63	0.02	1.94
	(4.47)	(3.24)	(5.70)	(0.03)	(9.75)	(0.02)	(5.28)	(0.03)	(10.35)
Cash	$11.23^{***}_{\star\star}$	-5.12^{*}	6.02	$0.21^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$45.01^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.03_{\star}$	$-7.12_{\star}$	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$37.71^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.29)	(3.09)	(5.50)	(0.03)	(10.30)	(0.02)	(5.21)	(0.03)	(10.74)
Childcare & cash	$18.31^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-8.34^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$10.51^{*}_{\star\star}$	$0.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$41.32^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.04^{*}_{\star\star}$	$-13.96^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.11^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$26.32^{**}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.68)	(2.96)	(5.86)	(0.03)	(10.48)	(0.02)	(4.78)	(0.03)	(10.85)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.594	0.319	0.946	0.000	0.001	0.523	0.508	0.000	0.002
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.065	0.038	0.523	0.000	0.002	0.163	0.033	0.014	0.032
Cash = childcare & cash	0.157	0.273	0.463	0.362	0.747	0.450	0.150	0.313	0.331
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.813	0.760	0.817	0.146	0.457	0.838	0.651	0.231	0.393
Mean Control	23.25	18.42	43.71	.31	79.36	.17	29.18	.47	109.8
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE B.6: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS – LEE BOUNDS

	Income			Labor supply					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	-5.39*	-12.30$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-10.58$^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.00	-14.73*	-0.06$^{**}_{\star\star}$	-20.02$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.01	-21.22$^{**}_{\star}$
	(3.60)	(2.70)	(4.93)	(0.03)	(9.41)	(0.02)	(4.55)	(0.04)	(10.16)
Cash	1.58	-12.17$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-6.81	0.18$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	26.67$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.06$^{**}_{\star\star\star}$	-18.49$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.11$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	18.01$^{*}_{\star\star}$
	(3.77)	(2.89)	(5.00)	(0.03)	(10.23)	(0.02)	(4.82)	(0.04)	(10.73)
Childcare & cash	3.58	-16.10$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-7.57	0.14$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	20.09$^{*}_{\star\star}$	-0.09$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-26.56$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.08$^{**}_{\star\star}$	3.96
	(3.74)	(2.60)	(4.87)	(0.04)	(10.37)	(0.02)	(4.22)	(0.04)	(10.78)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.022	0.947	0.363	0.000	0.000	0.937	0.633	0.001	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.004	0.013	0.465	0.000	0.000	0.137	0.005	0.015	0.015
Cash = childcare & cash	0.535	0.021	0.852	0.308	0.535	0.163	0.003	0.309	0.200
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.130	0.010	0.130	0.469	0.565	0.399	0.026	0.637	0.631
Mean Control	24.27	19.34	45.1	.31	81.76	.17	30.58	.47	112.34
Obs.	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	7.82	-2.93	5.53	0.04	6.07	-0.02	-5.71	0.03	0.53
	(4.86)	(3.48)	(6.17)	(0.03)	(10.53)	(0.03)	(5.70)	(0.04)	(11.15)
Cash	9.79$^{**}_{\star}$	-7.15$^{**}_{\star}$	3.75	0.21$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	42.94$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.04*	-10.26$^{*}_{\star\star}$	0.14$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	35.41$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.62)	(3.35)	(5.94)	(0.04)	(11.13)	(0.03)	(5.63)	(0.04)	(11.56)
Childcare & cash	17.67$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-9.32$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	9.78**	0.18$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	40.91$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.05$^{**}_{\star\star}$	-15.86$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.12$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	26.29$^{**}_{\star\star\star}$
	(5.04)	(3.17)	(6.30)	(0.04)	(11.24)	(0.02)	(5.16)	(0.04)	(11.60)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.705	0.229	0.785	0.000	0.002	0.440	0.425	0.002	0.004
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.082	0.058	0.537	0.000	0.003	0.201	0.053	0.012	0.034
Cash = childcare & cash	0.145	0.494	0.361	0.510	0.869	0.619	0.279	0.517	0.467
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.994	0.873	0.956	0.204	0.616	0.901	0.987	0.312	0.565
Mean Control	24.27	19.34	45.1	.31	81.76	.17	30.58	.47	112.34
Obs.	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373	1373

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE B.7: EFFECTS ON FATHERS – 10% IMPUTATION

	Income			Labor supply					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	3.54	16.48	24.80*	-0.03	-7.21	0.10$^{***}_{\star\star}$	22.52*	0.06	12.27
	(6.03)	(11.64)	(13.06)	(0.03)	(10.46)	(0.04)	(12.27)	(0.04)	(13.91)
Cash	-8.10	16.16	13.85	0.00	3.52	0.07*	13.70	0.04	19.51
	(5.70)	(12.21)	(13.66)	(0.03)	(11.61)	(0.04)	(12.17)	(0.04)	(14.37)
Childcare & cash	3.35	0.58	10.79	0.04	16.18	0.05	10.67	0.06	24.76*
	(5.88)	(11.86)	(13.61)	(0.04)	(11.72)	(0.04)	(12.56)	(0.04)	(14.39)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.069	0.980	0.447	0.357	0.372	0.420	0.481	0.796	0.627
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.978	0.189	0.331	0.045	0.054	0.162	0.354	0.868	0.401
Cash = childcare & cash	0.072	0.217	0.840	0.295	0.333	0.587	0.813	0.679	0.731
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.370	0.062	0.164	0.138	0.235	0.027	0.148	0.519	0.734
Mean Control	25.85	78.45	104.33	.21	58.09	.39	101.3	.57	157.38
Obs.	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	4.95	19.12	27.69**	-0.03	-4.75	0.11$^{***}_{\star\star}$	25.43**	0.06	15.68
	(6.03)	(11.66)	(13.08)	(0.03)	(10.46)	(0.04)	(12.29)	(0.04)	(13.92)
Cash	-6.55	19.60	17.61	0.01	6.41	0.08**	17.11	0.06	23.38
	(5.70)	(12.23)	(13.68)	(0.03)	(11.61)	(0.04)	(12.17)	(0.04)	(14.38)
Childcare & cash	5.08	3.90	14.51	0.05	19.18	0.06	14.10	0.07*	28.62**
	(5.88)	(11.89)	(13.63)	(0.04)	(11.73)	(0.04)	(12.57)	(0.04)	(14.41)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.072	0.969	0.484	0.334	0.352	0.445	0.506	0.828	0.604
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.985	0.209	0.361	0.040	0.048	0.178	0.376	0.831	0.384
Cash = childcare & cash	0.067	0.213	0.838	0.288	0.328	0.589	0.814	0.675	0.732
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.449	0.043	0.125	0.178	0.295	0.018	0.108	0.425	0.613
Mean Control	24.82	76.29	102.05	.2	56.29	.38	99.14	.57	154.96
Obs.	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015

Notes: See Table 3 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE B.8: EFFECTS ON FATHERS – 20% IMPUTATION

	Income			Labor supply					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	2.83	15.16	23.36*	-0.04	-8.43	0.10$^{**}_{\star}$	21.07*	0.05	10.56
	(6.03)	(11.64)	(13.06)	(0.03)	(10.46)	(0.04)	(12.26)	(0.04)	(13.91)
Cash	-8.87	14.44	11.97	-0.01	2.08	0.06	12.00	0.04	17.57
	(5.71)	(12.21)	(13.67)	(0.03)	(11.61)	(0.04)	(12.18)	(0.04)	(14.38)
Childcare & cash	2.49	-1.08	8.93	0.03	14.67	0.04	8.96	0.06	22.84
	(5.88)	(11.86)	(13.61)	(0.04)	(11.73)	(0.04)	(12.56)	(0.04)	(14.40)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.068	0.954	0.430	0.368	0.382	0.408	0.469	0.780	0.638
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.959	0.180	0.317	0.049	0.057	0.155	0.344	0.887	0.410
Cash = childcare & cash	0.074	0.219	0.841	0.298	0.335	0.586	0.813	0.681	0.731
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.334	0.074	0.188	0.120	0.209	0.033	0.173	0.571	0.798
Mean Control	26.36	79.53	105.47	.21	58.99	.39	102.38	.58	158.59
Obs.	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	5.66	20.45$^{*}_{\star}$	29.13$^{**}_{\star}$	-0.02	-3.53	0.11$^{***}_{\star\star}$	26.88$^{**}_{\star}$	0.07*	17.39
	(6.03)	(11.67)	(13.09)	(0.03)	(10.48)	(0.04)	(12.31)	(0.04)	(13.94)
Cash	-5.78	21.32*	19.49	0.01	7.86	0.09**	18.81	0.06	25.32*
	(5.70)	(12.25)	(13.70)	(0.03)	(11.62)	(0.04)	(12.18)	(0.04)	(14.39)
Childcare & cash	5.94	5.55	16.37	0.05	20.68*	0.06	15.81	0.08*	30.54**
	(5.89)	(11.91)	(13.66)	(0.04)	(11.74)	(0.04)	(12.59)	(0.04)	(14.42)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.074	0.944	0.504	0.323	0.343	0.459	0.519	0.844	0.594
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.966	0.220	0.376	0.037	0.046	0.186	0.387	0.812	0.376
Cash = childcare & cash	0.065	0.212	0.837	0.286	0.326	0.591	0.815	0.673	0.733
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.492	0.035	0.108	0.202	0.329	0.014	0.091	0.382	0.556
Mean Control	24.31	75.21	100.92	.2	55.39	.38	98.07	.56	153.75
Obs.	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015	1015

Notes: See Table 3 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE B.9: EFFECTS ON FATHERS – LEE BOUNDS

	Income			Labor supply					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	-10.11**	-7.98	-3.55	-0.08$^{**}_{\star}$	-26.91$^{***}_{\star\star}$	0.07*	1.77	0.03	-6.06
	(4.67)	(10.83)	(11.82)	(0.03)	(9.42)	(0.04)	(11.74)	(0.04)	(13.78)
Cash	-15.85$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.19	-5.64	-0.03	-11.96	0.05	5.93	0.03	6.44
	(4.52)	(11.90)	(12.85)	(0.04)	(10.77)	(0.04)	(12.49)	(0.04)	(14.44)
Childcare & cash	-4.48	-15.96	-11.17	0.02	5.59	0.03	-0.25	0.06	12.86
	(5.11)	(11.16)	(12.35)	(0.04)	(11.66)	(0.04)	(12.71)	(0.04)	(14.72)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.088	0.456	0.858	0.158	0.112	0.626	0.717	0.992	0.366
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.161	0.406	0.490	0.010	0.002	0.307	0.862	0.630	0.179
Cash = childcare & cash	0.004	0.142	0.652	0.256	0.131	0.621	0.620	0.649	0.663
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.000	0.610	0.907	0.017	0.003	0.110	0.641	0.823	0.536
Mean Control	25.33	77.37	103.19	.21	57.19	.38	100.22	.57	156.17
Obs.	942	938	938	942	942	942	942	942	942
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	5.93	18.61	29.79**	-0.03	-5.02	0.12$^{***}_{\star\star}$	25.96$^{**}_{\star}$	0.09$^{**}_{\star}$	20.48
	(6.46)	(12.50)	(13.98)	(0.04)	(11.21)	(0.04)	(13.10)	(0.04)	(14.78)
Cash	-6.31	17.60	16.35	0.01	6.21	0.08**	17.92	0.07	25.66*
	(6.02)	(13.05)	(14.54)	(0.04)	(12.50)	(0.04)	(12.96)	(0.04)	(15.34)
Childcare & cash	4.86	0.05	11.29	0.05	19.28	0.06	12.52	0.08*	29.92*
	(6.23)	(12.61)	(14.53)	(0.04)	(12.58)	(0.04)	(13.37)	(0.04)	(15.41)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.076	0.940	0.382	0.365	0.384	0.450	0.543	0.609	0.740
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.881	0.153	0.230	0.053	0.061	0.161	0.323	0.841	0.547
Cash = childcare & cash	0.097	0.194	0.755	0.317	0.351	0.553	0.691	0.763	0.792
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.576	0.051	0.105	0.212	0.314	0.017	0.097	0.203	0.459
Mean Control	25.33	77.37	103.19	.21	57.19	.38	100.22	.57	156.17
Obs.	942	938	938	942	942	942	942	942	942

Notes: See Table 3 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE B.10: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND CONSUMPTION – 10% IMPUTATION

	Total household income (1)	Consumption per day		
		Total (2)	Food (3)	Non-food (4)
	Panel A: Lower bound			
Childcare	$29.31^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.96^{**}_{\star}$	0.04	$0.86^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(12.76)	(0.48)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Cash	6.03	$1.27^{***}_{\star\star}$	$0.29_{\star}$	$0.89^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(12.31)	(0.49)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Childcare & cash	9.90	$1.62^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.18	$1.35^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.67)	(0.52)	(0.26)	(0.38)
p-value (equal treatment effects):				
Childcare = cash	0.097	0.560	0.312	0.957
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.179	0.236	0.592	0.239
Cash = childcare & cash	0.781	0.525	0.678	0.262
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.180	0.415	0.674	0.461
Mean Control	144.28	11.51	5.94	5.59
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496
	Panel B: Upper bound			
Childcare	$33.80^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$1.18^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.14	$1.02^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.78)	(0.49)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Cash	11.11	$1.52^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.40_{\star\star}$	$1.06^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.33)	(0.49)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Childcare & cash	14.58	$1.85^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.28	$1.51^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.69)	(0.52)	(0.26)	(0.38)
p-value (equal treatment effects):				
Childcare = cash	0.106	0.518	0.294	0.907
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.183	0.231	0.589	0.233
Cash = childcare & cash	0.804	0.556	0.654	0.282
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.110	0.253	0.481	0.291
Mean Control	141.41	11.37	5.87	5.49
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 4 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1) and consumption (2-4).

TABLE B.11: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND CONSUMPTION – 20% IMPUTATION

	Total household income	Consumption per day		
		Total	Food	Non-food
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: Lower bound			
Childcare	$27.07^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.85^{*}_{\star}$	0.00	$0.79^{**}_{\star}$
	(12.77)	(0.48)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Cash	3.49	$1.14^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.24	$0.80^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(12.31)	(0.49)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Childcare & cash	7.57	$1.51^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.14	$1.27^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.68)	(0.52)	(0.26)	(0.38)
p-value (equal treatment effects):				
Childcare = cash	0.093	0.582	0.322	0.982
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.177	0.239	0.594	0.242
Cash = childcare & cash	0.771	0.510	0.690	0.253
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.226	0.515	0.781	0.563
Mean Control	145.72	11.59	5.97	5.64
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496
	Panel B: Upper bound			
Childcare	$36.04^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$1.29^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.18	$1.09^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.79)	(0.49)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Cash	13.64	$1.64^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.45^{*}_{\star\star}$	$1.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.35)	(0.49)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Childcare & cash	16.92	$1.96^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.33_{\star}$	$1.59^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.71)	(0.52)	(0.26)	(0.38)
p-value (equal treatment effects):				
Childcare = cash	0.111	0.498	0.285	0.882
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.185	0.229	0.588	0.231
Cash = childcare & cash	0.815	0.572	0.643	0.292
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.085	0.191	0.397	0.225
Mean Control	139.97	11.29	5.84	5.44
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 4 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1) and consumption (2-4).

TABLE B.12: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND CONSUMPTION – LEE BOUNDS

	Total household income	Consumption per day		
		Total	Food	Non-food
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: Lower bound			
Childcare	-4.85	-0.32	-0.34	-0.16
	(11.06)	(0.45)	(0.25)	(0.30)
Cash	-18.18	0.33	0.02	0.17
	(11.15)	(0.46)	(0.25)	(0.32)
Childcare & cash	$-19.48^{*}_{\star}$	0.18	-0.26	0.18
	(11.23)	(0.47)	(0.25)	(0.31)
p-value (equal treatment effects):				
Childcare = cash	0.206	0.112	0.110	0.255
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.165	0.231	0.736	0.226
Cash = childcare & cash	0.903	0.734	0.229	0.965
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.817	0.778	0.859	0.688
Mean Control	142.84	11.44	5.9	5.54
Obs.	1369	1336	1373	1336
	Panel B: Upper bound			
Childcare	$35.47^{***}_{\star\star}$	$1.58^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.31_{\star}$	$1.20^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(13.74)	(0.53)	(0.26)	(0.38)
Cash	8.89	$1.70^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.47^{*}_{\star\star}$	$1.13^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(13.20)	(0.53)	(0.27)	(0.38)
Childcare & cash	15.05	$2.28^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.43_{\star\star}$	$1.72^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(13.53)	(0.57)	(0.28)	(0.42)
p-value (equal treatment effects):				
Childcare = cash	0.078	0.826	0.556	0.867
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.185	0.230	0.671	0.245
Cash = childcare & cash	0.682	0.328	0.899	0.193
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.151	0.212	0.361	0.299
Mean Control	142.84	11.44	5.9	5.54
Obs.	1369	1336	1373	1336

Notes: See Table 4 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1) and consumption (2-4).

TABLE B.13: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT – 10% IMPUTATION

		Breakdown into components			
	IDELA score	Emergent literacy	Emergent numeracy	Socio-emotional	Motor development
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Panel A: Lower bound		
Childcare	$0.13^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.09	0.08	0.03	$0.21^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Cash	0.07	0.04	0.06	-0.01	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Childcare & cash	$0.14^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.14^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.09_{\star}$	0.01	$0.18^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.231	0.375	0.646	0.540	0.043
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.929	0.308	0.925	0.808	0.616
Cash = childcare & cash	0.205	0.057	0.584	0.719	0.130
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.412	0.826	0.555	0.949	0.139
Mean Control	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
			Panel B: Upper bound		
Childcare	$0.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.12^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.12^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.07_{\star}$	$0.24^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Cash	$0.10^{**}_{\star}$	0.08	0.09	0.03	0.13^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Childcare & cash	$0.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.18^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.13^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.05	$0.21^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.233	0.368	0.648	0.533	0.045
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.926	0.310	0.922	0.807	0.618
Cash = childcare & cash	0.207	0.057	0.584	0.712	0.135
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.191	0.793	0.300	0.621	0.052
Mean Control	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group the outcomes together in two families: the total IDELA score (1) and its sub-component (2–5).

TABLE B.14: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT – 20% IMPUTATION

		Breakdown into components			
	IDELA score	Emergent literacy	Emergent numeracy	Socio-emotional	Motor development
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Panel A: Lower bound		
Childcare	$0.11^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.07	0.06	0.01	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Cash	0.05	0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Childcare & cash	$0.12^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.12^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.07	-0.01	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.230	0.379	0.646	0.544	0.042
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.930	0.308	0.927	0.809	0.615
Cash = childcare & cash	0.205	0.058	0.585	0.724	0.128
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.566	0.645	0.714	0.879	0.213
Mean Control	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
			Panel B: Upper bound		
Childcare	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star}$	$0.14^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.09_{\star\star}$	$0.26^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Cash	$0.12^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.09^{*}_{\star}$	$0.11^{*}_{\star}$	0.05	$0.15^{**}_{\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Childcare & cash	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.20^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.15^{**}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.07_{\star}$	$0.23^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.236	0.366	0.650	0.530	0.046
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.925	0.312	0.921	0.807	0.620
Cash = childcare & cash	0.209	0.057	0.584	0.708	0.138
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.121	0.615	0.209	0.479	0.030
Mean Control	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \; p < 0.1$, $** \; p < 0.05$, $*** \; p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \; p < 0.1$, $\star\star \; p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \; p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group the outcomes together in two families: the total IDELA score (1) and its sub-component (2–5).

TABLE B.15: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT – LEE BOUNDS

		Breakdown into components			
	IDELA score	Emergent literacy	Emergent numeracy	Socio-emotional	Motor development
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Panel A: Lower bound		
Childcare	$0.11^{*}_{\star}$	0.06	0.05	-0.03	$0.20^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Cash	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.08	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Childcare & cash	0.09^{*}	0.09	0.02	-0.05	$0.15^{**}_{\star}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.168	0.320	0.376	0.458	0.035
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.837	0.563	0.673	0.754	0.424
Cash = childcare & cash	0.256	0.121	0.642	0.673	0.190
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.597	0.761	0.811	0.511	0.184
Mean Control	0	0	0	0	0
Obs.	1322	1322	1322	1322	1322
			Panel B: Upper bound		
Childcare	$0.22^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.09_{\star\star}$	$0.31^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Cash	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.13^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.14^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.07_{\star}$	$0.22^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Childcare & cash	$0.23^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.22^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.17^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.10_{\star\star}$	$0.29^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.288	0.468	0.699	0.771	0.091
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.861	0.381	0.931	0.900	0.724
Cash = childcare & cash	0.226	0.111	0.638	0.681	0.182
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.046	0.325	0.126	0.487	0.002
Mean Control	0	0	0	0	0
Obs.	1322	1322	1322	1322	1322

Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \; p < 0.1$, $** \; p < 0.05$, $*** \; p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \; p < 0.1$, $\star\star \; p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \; p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group the outcomes together in two families: the total IDELA score (1) and its sub-component (2–5).

TABLE B.16: EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – 10% IMPUTATION

	Against partner			Against child (in hh)			Against child (others)		
	Psych. (1)	Phy. (2)	Any (3)	Psych. (4)	Phy. (5)	Any (6)	Psych. (7)	Phy. (8)	Any (9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cash	0.04	$0.08^{**}_{\star}$	$0.07^{*}_{\star}$	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.220	0.010	0.044	0.647	0.470	0.893	0.079	0.129	0.067
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.474	0.065	0.181	0.955	0.504	0.692	0.881	0.522	0.779
Cash = childcare & cash	0.614	0.456	0.503	0.691	0.964	0.595	0.113	0.373	0.129
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.890	0.685	0.779	0.404	0.472	0.275	0.515	0.931	0.583
Mean Control	.3	.14	.33	.78	.75	.89	.48	.23	.52
Obs.	1015	1015	1015	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06^{**}	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.06_{\star\star}$	$0.09^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.09^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.04	0.00	0.03^{*}	-0.02	0.00	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	0.04	$0.07^{**}_{\star}$	0.07^{*}	0.05^{**}	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.210	0.008	0.040	0.650	0.473	0.897	0.080	0.126	0.068
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.452	0.053	0.163	0.951	0.509	0.693	0.877	0.515	0.775
Cash = childcare & cash	0.620	0.473	0.514	0.698	0.961	0.599	0.114	0.372	0.130
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.599	0.462	0.507	0.237	0.712	0.152	0.754	0.677	0.833
Mean Control	.29	.13	.31	.77	.75	.88	.47	.22	.51
Obs.	1015	1015	1015	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 6 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in three families: violence against the partner (1-3), against children by household members (4-6), and against children by others (7-9).

TABLE B.17: EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – 20% IMPUTATION

	Against partner			Against child (in hh)			Against child (others)		
	Psych. (1)	Phy. (2)	Any (3)	Psych. (4)	Phy. (5)	Any (6)	Psych. (7)	Phy. (8)	Any (9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.04	-0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cash	0.02	0.07**	0.06	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.225	0.011	0.046	0.646	0.470	0.892	0.079	0.131	0.067
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.486	0.072	0.192	0.958	0.501	0.692	0.883	0.526	0.781
Cash = childcare & cash	0.612	0.448	0.498	0.688	0.966	0.593	0.113	0.375	0.128
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.956	0.810	0.929	0.509	0.372	0.358	0.413	0.938	0.472
Mean Control	.31	.15	.34	.78	.76	.89	.48	.24	.52
Obs.	1015	1015	1015	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	0.02	0.02	0.02	$0.06^{**}_{\star}$	-0.01	$0.04^{*}_{\star}$	0.05	0.05*	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.07^{*}_{\star\star}$	$0.10^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.11^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.05*	0.01	0.04*	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Childcare & cash	$0.05_{\star}$	$0.08^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.08^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.06^{**}_{\star}$	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.206	0.008	0.038	0.652	0.475	0.899	0.080	0.125	0.068
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.442	0.048	0.155	0.949	0.512	0.694	0.875	0.513	0.774
Cash = childcare & cash	0.623	0.483	0.521	0.702	0.959	0.602	0.115	0.372	0.131
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.473	0.369	0.393	0.175	0.846	0.109	0.885	0.562	0.968
Mean Control	.28	.13	.31	.77	.74	.88	.46	.22	.5
Obs.	1015	1015	1015	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 6 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in three families: violence against the partner (1-3), against children by household members (4-6), and against children by others (7-9).

TABLE B.18: EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – LEE BOUNDS

	Against partner			Against child (in hh)			Against child (others)		
	Psych. (1)	Phy. (2)	Any (3)	Psych. (4)	Phy. (5)	Any (6)	Psych. (7)	Phy. (8)	Any (9)
Panel A: Lower bound									
Childcare	-0.06	-0.07$^{***}_{\star\star}$	-0.06	0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Cash	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Childcare & cash	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.222	0.002	0.042	0.733	0.541	0.856	0.113	0.147	0.102
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.350	0.003	0.087	0.910	0.507	0.623	0.977	0.635	0.940
Cash = childcare & cash	0.767	0.846	0.747	0.823	0.947	0.501	0.112	0.320	0.126
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.481	0.159	0.513	0.371	0.428	0.229	0.389	0.635	0.454
Mean Control	.29	.14	.32	.78	.75	.88	.47	.23	.51
Obs.	861	861	857	1351	1351	1351	1351	1351	1351
Panel B: Upper bound									
Childcare	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.08$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.00	0.06$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.05	0.05	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Cash	0.07$_{\star\star}$	0.10$^{***}_{\star\star}$	0.11$^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.07$^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.02	0.06$^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	-0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Childcare & cash	0.06	0.07$_{**}$	0.08$_{*}$	0.08$^{***}_{\star\star}$	0.02	0.05$^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.05	0.03	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.292	0.016	0.086	0.660	0.509	0.908	0.118	0.174	0.100
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.434	0.078	0.203	0.977	0.526	0.666	0.995	0.690	0.916
Cash = childcare & cash	0.780	0.511	0.657	0.685	0.988	0.586	0.121	0.324	0.132
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.599	0.515	0.473	0.091	0.991	0.013	0.896	0.761	0.991
Mean Control	.29	.14	.32	.78	.75	.88	.47	.23	.51
Obs.	861	861	857	1351	1351	1351	1351	1351	1351

Notes: See Table 6 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in three families: violence against the partner (1-3), against children by household members (4-6), and against children by others (7-9).

C Standard errors and p-values

We show the robustness of our results to clustering standard errors at the level of the community and using randomization inference.

C.1 Clustered standard errors

The treatment is at the individual level, but this does not exclude that some of the outcomes may be correlated across households within communities. The following tables show the results are robust to clustering the standard errors at the community level.

TABLE C.1: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Any childcare	Full-day childcare
	(1)	(2)
Childcare	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.48^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cash	$0.07^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.07^{*}_{\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Childcare & cash	$0.14^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.50^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):		
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.475	0.574
Cash = childcare & cash	0.002	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.004	0.286
Mean Control	.82	.34
Obs.	1428	1428

Notes: See Table 1 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Clustered standard errors at the community level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group both outcomes as one family.

TABLE C.2: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	6.65	-3.83	3.37	0.02	2.61	-0.02	-6.83	0.01	-4.24
	(4.99)	(3.85)	(6.20)	(0.03)	(10.00)	(0.03)	(5.87)	(0.04)	(10.61)
Cash	$9.00^{**}_{\star}$	$-7.26^{**}_{\star}$	2.51	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$39.73^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.04_{\star\star}$	$-10.51^{*}_{\star\star}$	$0.13^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$31.31^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(4.44)	(3.38)	(5.55)	(0.03)	(11.04)	(0.03)	(5.73)	(0.03)	(11.23)
Childcare & cash	$16.06^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-9.67^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$7.65_{\star}$	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$36.10^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$-0.05^{**}_{\star\star}$	$-16.28^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.09^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$20.39^{*}_{\star\star}$
	(5.01)	(3.24)	(6.12)	(0.03)	(10.82)	(0.03)	(5.42)	(0.03)	(11.29)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.652	0.328	0.890	0.000	0.002	0.558	0.501	0.001	0.003
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.088	0.082	0.530	0.000	0.005	0.240	0.057	0.015	0.044
Cash = childcare & cash	0.180	0.436	0.404	0.389	0.761	0.563	0.264	0.359	0.365
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.954	0.772	0.841	0.245	0.693	0.805	0.891	0.403	0.678
Mean Control	24.27	19.34	45.1	.31	81.76	.17	30.58	.47	112.34
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Clustered standard errors at the community level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \; p < 0.1$, $** \; p < 0.05$, $*** \; p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \; p < 0.1$, $\star\star \; p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \; p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE C.3: EFFECTS ON FATHERS – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Childcare	4.63	14.51	23.24	-0.03	-7.24	0.10**	20.90	0.06	12.28
	(6.35)	(12.87)	(14.26)	(0.04)	(11.22)	(0.04)	(13.70)	(0.04)	(14.61)
Cash	-6.70	14.55	12.59	0.00	3.79	0.07*	14.59	0.05	20.47
	(5.76)	(13.64)	(15.18)	(0.04)	(11.75)	(0.04)	(13.17)	(0.04)	(14.50)
Childcare & cash	4.01	-1.71	8.62	0.04	16.69	0.05	9.93	0.06	24.96
	(5.96)	(12.45)	(14.26)	(0.04)	(12.79)	(0.04)	(13.73)	(0.04)	(15.24)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.081	0.998	0.498	0.362	0.387	0.553	0.622	0.868	0.589
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.929	0.195	0.333	0.038	0.052	0.237	0.403	0.834	0.396
Cash = childcare & cash	0.072	0.232	0.803	0.315	0.362	0.588	0.730	0.721	0.773
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.496	0.099	0.208	0.146	0.236	0.043	0.181	0.508	0.707
Mean Control	25.33	77.37	103.19	.21	57.19	.38	100.22	.57	156.17
Obs.	970	968	968	970	969	970	968	970	967

Notes: See Table 3 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Clustered standard errors at the community level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1–3) and labor supply (4–9).

TABLE C.4: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND CONSUMPTION – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Total household income	Consumption per day		
		Total	Food	Non-food
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Childcare	$27.84^{**}_{\star\star}$	0.93^{*}	0.09	0.83^{**}
	(13.26)	(0.54)	(0.25)	(0.38)
Cash	4.70	$1.29^{**}_{\star\star}$	$0.33_{\star}$	$0.91^{**}_{\star\star}$
	(13.22)	(0.51)	(0.25)	(0.38)
Childcare & cash	7.83	$1.63^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	0.22	$1.35^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(12.86)	(0.57)	(0.27)	(0.43)
p-value (equal treatment effects):				
Childcare = cash	0.123	0.493	0.327	0.833
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.183	0.242	0.615	0.227
Cash = childcare & cash	0.831	0.542	0.689	0.296
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.217	0.459	0.607	0.495
Mean Control	142.84	11.44	5.9	5.54
Obs.	1411	1393	1413	1393

Notes: See Table 4 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Clustered standard errors at the community level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \; p < 0.1$, $** \; p < 0.05$, $*** \; p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \; p < 0.1$, $\star\star \; p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \; p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: income (1) and consumption (2-4).

TABLE C.5: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

		Breakdown into components			
	IDELA score	Emergent literacy	Emergent numeracy	Socio-emotional	Motor development
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Childcare	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.12^{**}_{\star}$	$0.11^{*}_{\star}$	0.04	$0.23^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Cash	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.01	0.11^{*}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Childcare & cash	$0.15^{***}_{\star\star\star}$	$0.16^{***}_{\star\star}$	$0.10_{\star}$	0.04	$0.19^{***}_{\star\star\star}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.222	0.334	0.589	0.550	0.063
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.918	0.482	0.850	0.949	0.507
Cash = childcare & cash	0.259	0.091	0.736	0.605	0.204
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.224	0.774	0.331	0.916	0.075
Mean Control	0	0	0	0	0
Obs.	1366	1366	1366	1366	1366

Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Clustered standard errors at the community level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $*$ $p < 0.1$, $**$ $p < 0.05$, $***$ $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star$ $p < 0.1$, $\star\star$ $p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star$ $p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values, we group the outcomes together in two families: the total IDELA score (1) and its sub-component (2–5).

TABLE C.6: EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Against partner			**Against child (in hh)**			**Against child (others)**		
	Psych. (1)	Phy. (2)	Any (3)	Psych. (4)	Phy. (5)	Any (6)	Psych. (7)	Phy. (8)	Any (9)
Childcare	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Cash	0.04	$0.08^{**}_{\star}$	0.08^{*}	0.04	0.00	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Childcare & cash	0.03	0.06^{*}	0.06	0.05	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.315	0.023	0.098	0.670	0.502	0.874	0.113	0.186	0.105
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.464	0.080	0.183	0.931	0.568	0.682	0.993	0.616	0.920
Cash = childcare & cash	0.727	0.611	0.649	0.752	0.920	0.560	0.126	0.353	0.144
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.823	0.721	0.740	0.345	0.595	0.233	0.655	0.847	0.717
Mean Control	.29	.14	.32	.78	.75	.88	.47	.23	.51
Obs.	907	907	903	1388	1388	1388	1388	1388	1388

Notes: See Table 6 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Clustered standard errors at the community level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by $* \ p < 0.1$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p-values and by $\star \ p < 0.1$, $\star\star \ p < 0.05$, $\star\star\star \ p < 0.01$ for p-values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in three families: violence against the partner (1-3), against children by household members (4-6), and against children by others (7-9).

C.2 Randomization inference *p*-values

Given the relatively small sample, we also provide randomization inference *p*-values for the treatment effects reported in the main tables. The *p*-values are calculated using the Stata command *randcmd* and are based on 2,000 replications. The following tables report the "randomization-t *p*-value" for each treatment and outcome (Young, 2018).

TABLE C.7: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT – RANDOMIZATION INFERENCE

	Any childcare	Full-day childcare
	(1)	(2)
Childcare	<0.001	<0.001
Cash	0.005	0.055
Childcare & cash	<0.001	<0.001

Notes: See Table 1 for a description of the dependent and control variables. The table reports the "randomization-t *p*-value" (Young, 2018).

TABLE C.8: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS – RANDOMIZATION INFERENCE

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Daycare	0.158	0.256	0.578	0.450	0.786	0.355	0.222	0.830	0.689
Cash	0.048	0.020	0.670	<0.001	0.001	0.098	0.058	0.001	0.010
Cash and daycare	0.001	0.002	0.199	<0.001	0.001	0.028	0.003	0.011	0.071

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. The table reports the "randomization-t *p*-value" (Young, 2018).

TABLE C.9: EFFECTS ON FATHERS – RANDOMIZATION INFERENCE

	Income			**Labor supply**					
	Self-emp.	Wage	Total	Self-emp.		Wage		Total	
	Profits		Income	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Daycare	0.444	0.232	0.089	0.306	0.503	0.012	0.100	0.197	0.410
Cash	0.264	0.258	0.369	0.986	0.763	0.083	0.257	0.275	0.188
Cash and daycare	0.533	0.908	0.537	0.308	0.180	0.216	0.466	0.137	0.112

Notes: See Table 3 for a description of the dependent and control variables. The table reports the "randomization-t *p*-value" (Young, 2018).

TABLE C.10: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND CONSUMPTION – RANDOMIZATION INFERENCE

	Total household income	Consumption per day		
		Total	Food	Non-food
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Daycare	0.022	0.074	0.759	0.017
Cash	0.654	0.014	0.201	0.005
Cash and daycare	0.482	0.002	0.415	0.001

Notes: See Table 4 for a description of the dependent and control variables. The table reports the "randomization-t *p*-value" (Young, 2018).

TABLE C.11: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT – RANDOMIZATION INFERENCE

		Breakdown into components			
	IDELA score	Emergent literacy	Emergent numeracy	Socio-emotional	Motor development
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Daycare	0.003	0.048	0.094	0.490	<0.001
Cash	0.118	0.271	0.216	0.940	0.075
Cash and daycare	0.007	0.011	0.112	0.544	0.001

Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the dependent and control variables. The table reports the "randomization-t *p*-value" (Young, 2018).

TABLE C.12: EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – RANDOMIZATION INFERENCE

	Against partner			**Against child (in hh)**			**Against child (others)**		
	Psych. (1)	Phy. (2)	Any (3)	Psych. (4)	Phy. (5)	Any (6)	Psych. (7)	Phy. (8)	Any (9)
Daycare	0.792	0.794	0.739	0.080	0.383	0.240	0.336	0.214	0.282
Cash	0.263	0.021	0.067	0.184	0.888	0.175	0.518	0.820	0.541
Cash and daycare	0.472	0.075	0.219	0.098	0.811	0.488	0.367	0.460	0.379

Notes: See Table 6 for a description of the dependent and control variables. The table reports the "randomization-t *p*-value" (Young, 2018).

D Pre-analysis plan

We registered a pre-analysis plan (PAP) with the American Economic Association's registry for randomized control trials (Bjorvatn et al., 2019). It has trial number 4490 and is available at this address: `https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4490`. The PAP details the power calculations, sampling, research design, baseline balance checks, outcome variables, heterogeneity, and correction for attrition.

We had pre-specified the analysis reported in Tables 1, 2, 5, A.8 to A.11 and A.14. The PAP also included a table similar to Table 2, but at the household level. This table was not included in the final version of the article but is available upon request. The other tables are the result of the feedback we received when presenting and circulating the paper, and of the review process.

According to the PAP, we would deal with attrition by estimating bounds the way it is done in Tables B.1, B.2, B.4, B.5, B.7, B.8, B.10, B.11, B.13, B.14, B.16 and B.17, and we would correct the p-values to take multiple hypothesis testing into account using the procedure of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). As a result of the review process, we correct the p-values using the procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006) instead of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), and we added the Lee bounds in Tables B.3, B.6, B.9, B.12, B.15 and B.18 (Lee, 2009).

E Description of outcome variables

E.1 Body of the paper

Any childcare: Dummy variable equal to one if the target child was enrolled in any childcare.

Full-day childcare: Dummy variable equal to one if the target child was enrolled in full-day childcare.

Income - Profits from self-employment: Total profits from any self-employment during the last month (in thousands of UGX). If the respondent did not know the precise amount, we asked them if it was below or above the 50^{th} percentile of profits from self-employment elicited during the last survey. Depending on the answer, we continued the same procedure with the 25^{th} (75^{th}) percentile, and repeated this once more (12.5^{th}, 37.5^{th}, 62.5, and 87.5^{th} percentile). The assigned value is the median within the respective profit bracket and treatment group.

Income - Wage: Total income from any wage employment during the last month (in thousands of UGX). If the respondent did not know the exact amount, it was imputed following the same procedure as for income from self-employment.

Income - Total: The sum of profits from self-employment and income from wage employment over the last month (in thousands of UGX).

Labor supply - $>$0: Dummy variable equal to one if the person was engaged in the respective form of employment for at least one hour during the last month.

Labor supply - Hours: Hours worked in the respective form of employment over the last month.

Single mother: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent did not have a partner living in the household at baseline.

Total household income: The sum of profits from self-employment and income from wage employment of all the household members (mother, father and others) over the last month (in thousands of UGX).

Consumption per day - Food: Household per capita consumption on food (in thousands of UGX). The recall period is the previous week (so it has been divided by seven).

Consumption per day - Non-food: The household's non-food expenditures: the rent of houses or apartments, water, electricity, clothing and shoes, petrol/diesel for vehicles, fuel/charcoal/firewood, cosmetics and toiletries, repairs and spare parts, salary for any hired staff for the house, medical expenses, transportation fares, airtime, entertainment, hair-dressing/beauty/barber, hotel/lodging, ceremonial expenses (in thousands of UGX). The recall period is the previous month (so it has been divided by 30).

Consumption per day - Total: The sum of the amount of money spent on food and non-food consumption per day (in thousands of UGX).

IDELA score: The IDELA (International Development and Early Learning Assessment) tool measures child development. It consists of 22 questions which are aggregated into four components: Emergent literacy (6), emergent numeracy (7), social-emotional skills (5), and motor development (4). The components are unweighted averages of the scores in the questions, and the total score is an unweighted average across the four components. All outcome variables are standardized.

Domestic violence against partner, psychological: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent experienced one of the following situations during the last 12 months: (i) saying or doing something to humiliate the mother in front of others; (ii) threatening to hurt or harm the mother or someone she cares about; (iii) insulting the mother or make her feel bad about herself.

Domestic violence against partner, physical: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent experienced one of the following situations during the last month: (i) push you, shake you, or throw something at you; (ii) slap you; (iii) twist your arm or pull your hair; (iv) punch you with his fist or with something that could hurt you; (v) kick you, drag you, or beat you up; (vi) try to choke you or burn you on purpose; (vii) threaten or attack you with a knife, gun or other weapon.

Domestic violence against partner, Any: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent experienced psychological or physical violence.

Domestic violence against child, physical: Dummy variable equal to one if the mother reports that the child experienced one of the following situations during the last 12 months: (i) shouting, yelling or screaming at the child; (ii) calling the child dumb, lazy or another name like that; (iii) taking away privileges.

Domestic violence against child, psychological: Dummy variable equal to one if the mother reports that the child experienced one of the following situations during the last month: (i) shaking the child; (ii) spanking, hitting or slapping the child on the bottom with bare hand; (iii) hitting the child on the bottom or elsewhere on the body with something like a belt, hairbrush, stick or other hard object; (iv) hitting or slapping the child on the face, head or ears; (v) hitting or slapping the child on the hand, arm, or leg; (vi) beating the child up, that is hit him/her over and over as hard as one could.

Domestic violence against child, Any: Dummy variable equal to one if the mother reports the child experienced psychological or physical violence.

E.2 Online Appendix

Household survey: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent could not be surveyed in the long-term household survey.

Child survey: Dummy variable equal to one if the target child did not participate in the long-term child survey.

Enrollment - All: The share of the target child's older siblings (age 5-18) who are enrolled in school. This is missing if the target child does not have older siblings at baseline.

Enrollment - Females: The share of the target child's older sisters (age 5-18) who are enrolled in school. This is missing if the target child does not have older sisters at baseline.

Enrollment - Male: The share of the target child's older brothers (age 5-18) who are enrolled in school. This is missing if the target child does not have older brothers at baseline.

Days missed - All: The average number of days of school missed by older siblings in the last trimester of 2019. This equals 90 if the older sibling is not enrolled in school, and is missing if there are no older siblings at baseline.

Days missed - Females: The average number of days of school missed by older sisters in the last trimester of 2019. This equals 90 if the older sister is not enrolled in school, and is missing if there are no older sisters at baseline.

Days missed - Males: The average number of days of school missed by older brothers in the last trimester of 2019. This equals 90 if the older brother is not enrolled in school, and is missing if there are no older brothers at baseline.

Revenues: Revenues from self-employment during the last month. If the respondent did not know the exact amount, it was imputed following the same procedure as for profits.

Assets - $>$0: Dummy variable equal to one if any business asset was bought during the last 12 months.

Assets - UGX: Value of business assets bought during the last 12 months (in thousand UGX).

Employees - $>$0: Dummy variable equal to one if the business had at least one employee. Employees include the co-owner, other household members, and paid workers, but exclude casual workers.

Employees - Number: Number of employees employed by the business.

New business: Dummy variable equal to one if at least one new business was created between the baseline and the long-term household survey.

Closed business: Dummy variable equal to one if at least one business closed down between the baseline and the long-term household survey.

Travel time: Time needed to travel to a business in minutes per day, over all businesses.

Operating time (total): Total operating hours of all businesses in the last month.

Younger sibling: Dummy variable equal to one if the target child had at least one younger sibling living in the same household at baseline.

Old: Dummy variable equal to one if the child was five years old at baseline (compared to three or four).

Boy: Dummy variable equal to one if the child is male (compared to female).

Happiness with life: Mother's self-reported happiness with life on a scale from zero to ten.

Life satisfaction: Mother's answer to the question "In your opinion, where are you on the ladder of life at the moment?", on a scale from zero to ten.

Perceived stress scale: Mother's stress level captured by Cohen's perceived stress scale (Cohen et al., 1983). This is constructed based on ten questions and ranges from zero to 40.