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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-9432@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260418T102546Z
CREATED:20260418T102546Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260418T102546Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:amse seminar - Giacomo Calzolari
DTSTART:20230313T103000Z
DTEND:20230313T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:Pricing algorithms are increasingly replacing human decision ma
 king in real marketplaces. To inform the competition policy debate on possi
 ble consequences\, we run experiments with pricing algorithms powered by Ar
 tificial Intelligence in controlled environments (computer simulations).In 
 particular\, we study the interaction among a number of Q-learning algorith
 ms in the context of a workhorse oligopoly model of price competition with 
 Logit demand and constant marginal costs. We show that the algorithms consi
 stently learn to charge supra-competitive prices\, without communicating wi
 th each other. The high prices are sustained by classical collusive strateg
 ies with a finite punishment phase followed by a gradual return to cooperat
 ion. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand and to changes
  in the number of players.\\n\\nContact: Ewen Gallic : ewen.gallic[at]univ-
 amu.frAvner Seror : avner.seror[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: http
 s://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/giacomo-calzolari
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 21\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/giacomo-calzolari
CONTACT:Ewen Gallic : ewen.gallic[at]univ-amu.frAvner Seror : avner.seror[a
 t]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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