BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-9155@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T130809Z
CREATED:20260430T130809Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T130809Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Kohmei Makihara*\, Florian Roeser**\, Guillaume Batai
 lle***
DTSTART:20220524T090000Z
DTEND:20220524T104500Z
DESCRIPTION:*This paper analyzes a local public goods game on network in wh
 ich agents can be of two types: standard maximizer\, or Kantian. A Kantian 
 behaves following the Kantian morality\, i.e. they assume that everyone con
 tributes the same amount as themselves. Under this setting\, we discuss how
  the aggregate contribution of public good changes when replacing one stand
 ard maximizer by a Kantian. Our study shows that\, contrary to previous res
 ults on public good games with Kantian agents\, introducing Kantian agents 
 in a network game does not necessarily have a positive effect on provision 
 of public goods\, i.e. there are some cases in which the aggregate contribu
 tion decreases when replacing a standard maximizer by a Kantian. However\, 
 we also provide sufficient condition such that replacing a standard maximis
 er by a Kantian player will have an increase of the aggregate contribution\
 , regardless of the number of each type of player in the game.**We analyze 
 the role of educational spending on growth and inequality in a dynamic R&D 
 growth model with endogenous education and automation. We assume low-skille
 d workers to be perfect substitutes to machines\, while high-skilled worker
 s are complements. Automation increases income inequality and the share of 
 college graduates over time. Without government spending on education\, an 
 increase in taxes to reduce inequality always dampens growth. Educational s
 pending is able to break this inequality-growth trade-off. Public education
 al spending increases the productivity of both low- and high-skilled worker
 s allowing for redistribution towards the low-skilled which reduces inequal
 ity. We calibrate the model using US data and provide the conditions on bas
 ic and higher education spending\, and on transfers\, such that higher grow
 th is compatible with lower inequality. We show that such a result can be a
 chieved either using taxes of labor\, a robot tax\, or a combination of the
  two.***This paper explores harvesting behaviors in a predator-prey system 
 where the economic value of a biomass unit is lower when moving-up to a hig
 her trophic level. Precisely\, the prey species is a more valuable product 
 for harvesters than the same prey transformed in predator after biomass con
 version.  We compare the optimal exploitation with an unregulated limited 
 access fishery. We show that the optimal harvesting of the predator species
  must happen with negative profit. The limited access fishery is characteri
 zed by lower prey stock\, higher predator stock and under-effort on both sp
 ecies compared to the social optimum. We propose a global tax on the harves
 t of each species to obtain the first best allocation. For the predator ind
 ustry\, the tax is always a subsidy with decreasing amount as the number of
  vessels owner grow. For the prey industry\, the tax is either positive\, e
 qual to zero or negative depending on the number of vessels owner. The opti
 mal top-down regulation is to subsidize or at least unlimited access to har
 vest in the predator sector to favor predator harvesting and to set exactly
  the right number of license in the prey industry. These results show that 
 in our context current public policies with the aim of controlling over-exp
 loitation (e.g Individual Transferable Quotas) profoundly degrade the econo
 mic efficiency of fisheries\, which may explain the failure of fisheries ma
 nagement tools.\\n\\nContact: Kenza Elass : kenza.elass[at]univ-amu.frCamil
 le Hainnaux : camille.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saenz : daniela.
 horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJade Ponsard : jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlu
 s d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/kohmei-makihar
 a-florian-roeser-guillaume-bataille
LOCATION:MEGA
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/kohmei-makihara-florian-roeser-guillaume-bataille
CONTACT:Kenza Elass : kenza.elass[at]univ-amu.frCamille Hainnaux : camille.
 hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-am
 u.frJade Ponsard : jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
