BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-8969@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260416T152021Z
CREATED:20260416T152021Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260416T152021Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Fabrizio Ciotti*\, Patrick Allmis**
DTSTART:20220301T100000Z
DTEND:20220301T113000Z
DESCRIPTION:*In this paper\, we study the designs that an online platform c
 an implement to regulate the interactions among its users. We uncover a pos
 sible rationale for the design of a marketplace in which a default seller (
 i.e.\, prominent seller) is chosen by the platform and how this choice allo
 ws the platform to reduce\, and possibly remove\, a vertical negative exter
 nality. Designing a contest for assigning prominence leads to a reduction i
 n the retail prices and allows the platform to set a commission rate per-un
 it close to the monopoly one. Compared to direct prominence allocation desi
 gns\, letting sellers compete for prominence makes the intermediary and con
 sumers better-off. If there is enough vertical differentiation among seller
 s\, the high-quality seller may also benefit from competing for prominence\
 , while the low-quality seller is unambiguously worse off.**In our model\, 
 players contribute to two local public goods for which they have different 
 tastes and sponsor costly social connections to enjoy the provision of thei
 r neighbors. In any Nash equilibrium\, either there are two large contribut
 ors who might free ride on each other\, or several contributors whose neigh
 borhood of free riders does not overlap. As linking costs increase\, in the
  contribution maximizing equilibrium players link to large contributors clo
 ser to their own type\, i.e.\, homophily increases. Polarization increases 
 if links are cheap to begin with\, and decreases otherwise. Moreover\, if m
 oderate agents emerge as large contributors\, welfare increases while polar
 ization decreases in societies with low extremism.\\n\\nContact: Kenza Elas
 s : kenza.elass[at]univ-amu.frCamille Hainnaux : camille.hainnaux[at]univ-a
 mu.frDaniela Horta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJade Ponsard :
  jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarsei
 lle.fr/fr/evenements/fabrizio-ciotti-patrick-allmis
LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en
 -Provence
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/fabrizio-ciotti-patrick-allmis
CONTACT:Kenza Elass : kenza.elass[at]univ-amu.frCamille Hainnaux : camille.
 hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-am
 u.frJade Ponsard : jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR