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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-8758@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260416T153454Z
CREATED:20260416T153454Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260416T153454Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:job market seminar - Felix Corell
DTSTART:20220111T103000Z
DTEND:20220111T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:Banks usually hold large amounts of domestic public debt which 
 makes them vulnerable to their own sovereign's default risk. At the same ti
 me\, governments often resort to costly public bailouts when their domestic
  banking sector is in trouble. We investigate how the interbank network str
 ucture and the distribution of sovereign debt holdings jointly affect the o
 ptimal bailout policy in the presence of this "doom loop". Rescuing banks w
 ith high domestic sovereign exposure is optimal if these banks are sufficie
 ntly central in the network\, even though that requires larger bailout expe
 nditures than rescuing low-exposure banks. Our findings imply that highly c
 entral banks can use exposure to their own government as a strategic tool t
 o increase the likelihood of being bailed out. Our model thus illustrates h
 ow the "doom loop" exacerbates the "too interconnected to fail" problem in 
 banking.\\n\\nContact: Frédéric Deroïan : frederic.deroian[at]univ-amu.
 fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/felix
 -corell
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/felix-corell
CONTACT:Frédéric Deroïan :&nbsp\;frederic.deroian[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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