BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT UID:event-12744@amse-aixmarseille.fr DTSTAMP:20260414T231106Z CREATED:20260414T231106Z LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T231106Z STATUS:CONFIRMED SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:amse seminar - Silvia Vannutelli DTSTART:20260330T093000Z DTEND:20260330T104500Z DESCRIPTION:How does the quality of information affect the allocation of re gulatory enforcement? We study this question in the context of the Italian Court of Auditors\, a large bureaucracy that oversees municipal finances th rough a hierarchical structure. Local auditors gather information on munici palities and report to judges\, who decide whether to issue enforcement del iberations. We exploit a reform that randomized auditor assignments\, incre asing auditor independence without changing judicial rules. Combining novel administrative records with a machine-learning measure of predicted munici pal default\, we find that judicial enforcement increased overall\, with th e largest gains in high-risk municipalities. This targeting improvement ari ses through two channels. First\, auditors report more financial irregulari ties after random assignment\, especially in high-risk municipalities and w here pre-reform local ties were stronger. Second\, experienced judges use t hese improved signals to focus deliberations on high-risk cases\, highlight ing the complementarity between information quality and decision-makers' ex pertise.\\n\\nContact: Ségal Le Guern Herry : segal.le-guern-herry[at]uni v-amu.frMorgan Raux : morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: h ttps://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/silvia-vannutelli LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/silvia-vannutelli CONTACT:Ségal Le Guern Herry : \;segal.le-guern-herry[at]univ-amu.frMo rgan Raux : \;morgan.raux[at]univ-amu.fr TRANSP:OPAQUE END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR