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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-11462@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260417T072748Z
CREATED:20260417T072748Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260417T072748Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Dimitrios Xefteris
DTSTART:20250124T110000Z
DTEND:20250124T120000Z
DESCRIPTION:We study voting when committee members have different informati
 on quality. In such environments\, more complex rules can help voters bette
 r aggregate information by endogenously allocating more decision power to b
 etter informed members. Using laboratory experiments\, we compare two polar
  examples of voting rules in terms of complexity: majority voting (MV) and 
 continuous voting (CV). Our results show that CV outperforms MV on average\
 , although the difference is smaller than predicted\, and that CV has more 
 support than MV in treatments where it is expected to perform better. We al
 so find that voters with intermediate information overestimate the importan
 ce of their votes under CV. \\n\\nContact: Jiakun Zheng : jiakun.zheng[at
 ]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenem
 ents/dimitrios-xefteris
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 15\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/dimitrios-xefteris
CONTACT:Jiakun Zheng :&nbsp\;jiakun.zheng[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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