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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-11082@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T153145Z
CREATED:20260430T153145Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T153145Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Pau Milan
DTSTART:20240419T100000Z
DTEND:20240419T110000Z
DESCRIPTION:Risk-averse workers in a team exert effort to produce joint out
 put. Workers' incentives are connected via chains of productivity spillover
 s\, represented by a network of peer-effects. We study the problem of a pri
 ncipal offering wage contracts that simultaneously incentivize and insure a
 gents. We solve for the optimal linear contract for any network and show th
 at incentives are loaded more heavily on central workers. We summarize how 
 peer networks define firms' profits by linking profits to spectral properti
 es of the complementarity network. We show that when firms can't personaliz
 e contracts\, better connected workers extract rents. In this case\, a grou
 p composition result follows: large within-group differences in centrality 
 can decrease firms' profits.\\n\\nContact: Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fourn
 ier[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/
 evenements/pau-milan-1
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/pau-milan-1
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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