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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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UID:event-10818@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260418T082419Z
CREATED:20260418T082419Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260418T082419Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Francis Bloch
DTSTART:20240119T130000Z
DTEND:20240119T140000Z
DESCRIPTION:We study dynamic task allocation when there is a fixed bipartit
 e network associating workers to tasks. We analyze two approaches - central
 ized and decentralized. First\, we study the optimal policy of a planner wh
 ose objective is to minimize the expected time of completion of all tasks. 
 Second\, we analyse a game played by workers who independently choose their
  tasks and are rewarded each time they complete a task. We show that both t
 he planner’s and the worker’s problems are NP-hard and characterize net
 works for which the planner’s and workers’ policies are time-consistent
 . When policies are time-consistent the planner prefers the workers to star
 t with the hardest tasks\, whereas workers always prefer to start with easi
 er tasks. We show that the two policies only coincide when the bipartite ne
 twork satisfies a strong symmetry condition on the bipartite network. Diffe
 rential rewards can be used to implement the planner’s optimal task alloc
 ation and we show that non-contingent rewards\, which are independent of th
 e set of remaining tasks\, can be used as long as there is no task that a s
 ingle agent can complete.\\n\\nContact: Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[
 at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/even
 ements/francis-bloch
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 21\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/francis-bloch
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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