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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-10160@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260418T102656Z
CREATED:20260418T102656Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260418T102656Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:amse seminar - Aurélien Baillon
DTSTART:20230612T093000Z
DTEND:20230612T104500Z
DESCRIPTION:We introduce an incentive mechanism to elicit answers to binary
  questions that cannot be verified for accuracy. Agents choose whether to r
 eceive a costly private signal\, which leads them to endorse ``yes'' or ``n
 o'' as an answer. Then\, they either buy or sell an asset\, whose value is 
 determined by the endorsement rate of ``yes'' answers. We obtain a separati
 ng equilibrium\, where agents want signals and trade the asset as a functio
 n of their signal. Two experimental studies test the theoretical results. T
 he first shows that the mechanism motivates costly information acquisition.
  The second demonstrates feasibility in a natural setting.\\n\\nContact: Ew
 en Gallic : ewen.gallic[at]univ-amu.frAvner Seror : avner.seror[at]univ-amu
 .fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/aur%
 C3%A9lien-baillon
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/fr/evenements/aur%C3%A9lien-baillon
CONTACT:Ewen Gallic : ewen.gallic[at]univ-amu.frAvner Seror : avner.seror[a
 t]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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