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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-9810@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260415T205301Z
CREATED:20260415T205301Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260415T205301Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Anastasiia Antonova*\, Tizié Bene**
DTSTART:20230214T100000Z
DTEND:20230214T113000Z
DESCRIPTION:*In this project\, I explore the effect of state-dependent pric
 ing on cost inflation in a production network economy. To this end\, I exte
 nd a familiar inefficient production network model to include state-depende
 nt price rigidity based on imperfect information. My state-dependent price 
 rigidity model combines the sticky information and behavioral inattention f
 rameworks allowing analytical tractability similar to Calvo models. Theoret
 ically\, I show that the Philips curve residual depends on the degree of se
 ctoral state-dependence of price rigidity\, which means that the Philips cu
 rve residual based on non-state-dependent pricing might be misspecified. Em
 pirically\, I use model-based equilibrium equations and the combination of 
 sectoral price and wage data to measure price flexibility and the degree of
  state dependence in each sector. I find a significant degree of state depe
 ndence in sectors\, covering about 65% of the consumption basket. Then I us
 e my price flexibility and state-dependence estimates to compute model-impl
 ied Philips curve slope and residual over time and evaluate the quantitativ
 e importance of state-dependence.**This paper considers stable risk-sharing
  networks when formal insurance is available.  Agents' incomes are subjec
 t to idiosyncratic shocks which they try to mitigate by sharing monetary as
 sets equally with tied partners\, or/and by taking out formal insurance. Th
 e formation and maintenance of risk-sharing ties are costly and mimic pair
 wise altruism by allowing utility transfers between agents. I show that th
 e formal insurance demand of an agent decreases with the number of agents i
 n its component. Based on this result\, I show that when the price of for
 mal insurance is less than or equal to the actuarial price\, no risk-shari
 ng link is ever formed and the only stable network is the empty network. F
 or prices above the actuarial price\, agents begin to form risk-sharing li
 nks and non-empty networks can be stable. The structure of these non-empty
  networks depends on the price of formal insurance\, the cost of forming l
 inks and idiosyncratic risks.\\n\\nContact: Camille Hainnaux: camille.hain
 naux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Horta Saenz: daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJ
 ade Ponsard: jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.frNathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]uni
 v-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/ana
 stasiia-antonova-tizi%C3%A9-bene-0
LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en
 -Provence
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/anastasiia-antonova-tizi%C3%A9-bene-0
CONTACT:Camille Hainnaux:&nbsp\;camille.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.frDaniela Hort
 a Saenz: daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.frJade Ponsard: jade.ponsard[at]un
 iv-amu.frNathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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