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UID:event-9147@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T130940Z
CREATED:20260430T130940Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T130940Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Bruno Ziliotto
DTSTART:20220428T100000Z
DTEND:20220428T110000Z
DESCRIPTION:In the classic Secretary problem\, a company has to select an e
 mployee among n applicants\, that are interviewed in random order. By rejec
 ting systemically about 36% of the first applicants\, and then picking anyo
 ne better than these rejected candidates\, the company ensures that the sel
 ected candidate is with at least 36% chance the best one. This seminal resu
 lt has given rise to a fruitful line of works on variations of the model. T
 he main question is to compare the situation where the company knows the le
 vels of the applicants before the interviews\, and the situation where it d
 oes not. This comparison is quantified by a prophet inequality.After reca
 lling the basics of prophet inequalities theory and its connections to po
 sted price mechanisms\, we will present new prophet inequalities in two set
 tings: one where the company knows the level distributions of the applicant
 \, and one where it does not. These results are based on several collaborat
 ions with J. Correa\, P. Dütting\, Felix Fischer and K. Schewior. \\n\\nC
 ontact: Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.frEvgeny Tsodikovich:
  evgeny.tsodikovich[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aix
 marseille.fr/en/events/bruno-ziliotto-0
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/bruno-ziliotto-0
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.frEvgeny Tsodikovich:
  evgeny.tsodikovich[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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