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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-8916@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T164254Z
CREATED:20260430T164254Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T164254Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:big data and econometrics seminar - Romain Ferrali
DTSTART:20220621T120000Z
DTEND:20220621T133000Z
DESCRIPTION:Under which conditions do anti-corruption policies effectively 
 reduce bureaucratic corruption? Previous studies find that anti-corruption 
 audits are effective in disciplining politicians\, but their impact on bure
 aucrats is unclear. We leverage 10 years of randomized audits and the caree
 rs of 275 thousand Brazilian municipal officials. We find that audits lead 
 to increased risks of dismissals and slower career progression. We further 
 show that dismissals tend to target more non-tenured\, less educated bureau
 crats\, suggesting that the program does not necessarily punish the most co
 rrupt bureaucrats\, but instead the ones that are easiest to punish.\\n\\nC
 ontact: Michel Lubrano: michel.lubrano[at]univ-amu.frPierre Michel: pierre
 .michel[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr
 /en/events/romain-ferrali-4
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 21\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/romain-ferrali-4
CONTACT:Michel Lubrano: michel.lubrano[at]univ-amu.frPierre Michel:&nbsp\;p
 ierre.michel[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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