BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-8760@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260416T172949Z
CREATED:20260416T172949Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260416T172949Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:job market seminar - Vincent Delabastita
DTSTART:20220113T103000Z
DTEND:20220113T114500Z
DESCRIPTION:Despite prominent examples of anti-competitive practices by emp
 loyers\, collusion has received limited attention in research on the source
 s of labor market power. We study collusive wage-setting behavior by 227 co
 al firms in Belgium from 1845-1913\, a setting in which collusive wage-sett
 ing was legally tolerated\, whereas worker collusion was forbidden. We prop
 ose an empirical framework to identify collusion in labor markets using pro
 duction\, cost\, and wage data. We find evidence for substantial collusion 
 against workers\, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence. Collusion wa
 s stable throughout Belgium’s Industrial Revolution from 1845 to 1900\, b
 ut increased sharply after the turn of the century. This surge in collusion
  coincided with the emergence of coal cartels.\\n\\nContact: Frédéric Der
 oïan: frederic.deroian[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://ams
 e-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/vincent-delabastita-0
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/vincent-delabastita-0
CONTACT:Frédéric Deroïan:&nbsp\;frederic.deroian[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR