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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:event-13077@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260504T134730Z
CREATED:20260504T134730Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260504T134730Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Eco-lunch - Amit Dekel
DTSTART:20260507T100000Z
DTEND:20260507T110000Z
DESCRIPTION:Two players split a pie. They do not follow a bargaining protoc
 ol and need not reach agreement. Instead\, each is free to attempt to seize
  control and impose her preferred partition. Which partitions will players 
 seek to impose? How hard will they fight to do so? We propose a model in wh
 ich preferences depend on counterfactual choices: a player's payoff from im
 posing a partition depends on her belief about the partition the other woul
 d have chosen had she been in control\; symmetrically\, her payoff from a p
 artition imposed by the other depends on her belief about her own counterfa
 ctual choice. Requiring these beliefs to be correct pins down players' inte
 nded partitions. Taking these as given\, players decide whether\, and how i
 ntensively\, to engage in conflict over control. The model provides a succi
 nct alternative to bargaining models and accommodates a wide range of natur
 al social preferences.\\n\\nContact: Houda Hafidi: houda.hafidi[at]sciences
 po-aix.frFederico Trionfetti: federico.trionfetti[at]univ-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'
 informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/amit-dekel
LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en
 -Provence
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/amit-dekel
CONTACT:Houda Hafidi: houda.hafidi[at]sciencespo-aix.frFederico Trionfetti:
  federico.trionfetti[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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