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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-10780@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T140318Z
CREATED:20260430T140318Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T140318Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:phd seminar - Lola Soubeyrand*\, Claire Leroy**
DTSTART:20240507T090000Z
DTEND:20240507T103000Z
DESCRIPTION:*Most studies investigating risky decision-making in humans and
  animals typically focus on events with probabilities exceeding 10%. Our  
 study aims to investigate how we react to events that are both rare (probab
 ilities around 1%) and extreme in their consequences (positive\, Jackpot JP
  - or negative\, Black Swan BS). In a four-armed bandit task\, participants
  were exposed to stochastic gains and losses\, including exceptionally rare
  and extreme events (REE). Our prior research involving rats highlighted th
 eir sensitivity to REE\, with avoidance of extreme losses (BS) and attracti
 on to extreme gains (JP). In this study\, we introduce two tasks for humans
 \, differing in their entry method: one through training and the other thro
 ugh a partial description. Preliminary findings on pilot participants sugge
 st that the introduction of REE led participants to deviate from the tradit
 ional stochastic dominance of first order. Participants employed similar st
 rategies or reactions to cope with REEs in the two tasks. They avoided BS a
 nd seek JP\, with individual differences in the strength of these strategie
 s. Individuals that exhibited differences in decision-making phenotypes and
  sensitivity had also different exposures and reactions to rare and extreme
  events.**Imperfect take-up of social benefits has long been a major policy
  concern for modern welfare states. Few interventions have achieved a sizea
 ble increase in the take-up rate. In this paper\, I study the effects of a 
 large and salient welfare reform of the French EITC (“prime d’activité
 ”). Using exhaustive and granular administrative data\, I show that the r
 eform led to a remarkably large take-up response\, resulting in a 50% cut o
 f the non-take-up rate.  Leveraging the heterogeneous exposure to the bene
 fit increase\, I find that raising the net benefit of claiming had limited 
 effects\, with an estimated take-up elasticity of about 0.1. Instead\, I pr
 ovide evidence indicating that information frictions play a significant rol
 e\, with the majority of the surge in take-up attributed to heightened awar
 eness and visibility of the program following the reform's announcement. Ad
 ditionally\, to examine the targeting effects\, I analyze the characteristi
 cs of the marginal enrollee. Drawing on the empirical findings\, I develop 
 a theoretical framework to assess the welfare implications of the reform an
 d discuss how accounting for imperfect take-up affects the optimal design o
 f welfare programs.\\n\\nContact: Lucie Giorgi: lucie.giorgi[at]univ-amu.fr
 Ricardo Guzman: ricardo.guzman[at]univ-amu.frNatalia Labrador: natalia.lab
 rador-bernate[at]univ-amu.frNathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr\n\n
 Plus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/lola-soubeyrand
 -claire-leroy-0
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevar
 d Maurice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/lola-soubeyrand-claire-leroy-0
CONTACT:Lucie Giorgi: lucie.giorgi[at]univ-amu.frRicardo Guzman: ricardo.gu
 zman[at]univ-amu.frNatalia Labrador:&nbsp\;natalia.labrador-bernate[at]univ
 -amu.frNathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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