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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-10313@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260417T083104Z
CREATED:20260417T083104Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260417T083104Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Eco-lunch - Romain Ferrali
DTSTART:20240418T103000Z
DTEND:20240418T113000Z
DESCRIPTION:While previous studies have found that anti-corruption audits e
 ffectively discipline politicians\, the extent to which they discipline bur
 eaucrats is unclear. We provide a framework to analyze the impact of this p
 opular policy instrument on bureaucratic careers and use it to evaluate a w
 ell-known\, randomized audit program of Brazilian municipalities. We show t
 hat audits cause increases in career interruptions that are particularly pr
 onounced for likely patronage hires and in municipalities displaying interm
 ediate levels of corruption\, suggesting that audits are relatively effecti
 ve at punishing corrupt bureaucrats. Increased dismissals are concentrated 
 among mayors who cannot run for reelection\, suggesting that electoral acco
 untability mechanisms shown to discipline politicians do not trickle down t
 o bureaucrats\; rather\, mayors tend to clean their accounts before leaving
  office. Structural estimates indicate that the increased resignation rates
  observed after audits owe to reduced rent-seeking opportunities rather tha
 n increased risk of dismissal.\\n\\nContact: Nathalie Ferrière: nathalie.
 ferriere[at]sciencespo-aix.frFederico Trionfetti: federico.trionfetti[at]u
 niv-amu.fr\n\nPlus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/r
 omain-ferrali-6
LOCATION:MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry\, 424\, Chemin du Viaduc\, 13080 Aix-en
 -Provence
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/romain-ferrali-6
CONTACT:Nathalie Ferrière:&nbsp\;nathalie.ferriere[at]sciencespo-aix.frFed
 erico Trionfetti:&nbsp\;federico.trionfetti[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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