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PRODID:-//AMSE//Event Calendar//FR
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UID:event-10061@amse-aixmarseille.fr
DTSTAMP:20260430T125043Z
CREATED:20260430T125043Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T125043Z
STATUS:CONFIRMED
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economic theory seminar - Andrew Mackenzie
DTSTART:20230413T100000Z
DTEND:20230413T110000Z
DESCRIPTION:We consider a model of tract housing where buyers and sellers h
 ave (i) wealth constraints\, and (ii) unit demand over identical indivisibl
 e objects represented by a valuation. First\, we characterize the strong co
 re. Second\, we characterize the bilateral weak core\, or the weak core all
 ocations with no side-payments. Finally\, when buyer wealth constraints and
  valuations are private information and when transfers are discrete\, we in
 troduce two families of pendulum auctions\, both of which consist of obviou
 sly strategy-proof implementations of the bilateral weak core. The buyer-op
 timal pendulum auctions are preferred by the buyers but are inefficient whe
 n side-payments are possible\, while the efficient pendulum auctions are ef
 ficient.\\n\\nContact: Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr\n\n
 Plus d'informations: https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/andrew-mackenzi
 e-0
LOCATION:Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16\, AMU - AMSE\, 5-9 boulevard Maur
 ice Bourdet\, 13001 Marseille
URL;VALUE=URI:https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/events/andrew-mackenzie-0
CONTACT:Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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