*This paper disentangles the role of parents' aspirations against labor market returns in explaining educational choices. We use a static directed job search model where individuals choose their level of education knowing their parents' aspirations, the current situation of the labor market, and their exogenous scholastic ability. We calibrate the model with OECD data in order to explain some results of PISA studies. We show that social immobility in education is partly explained by the labor market institutions through two channels. First, they change incentives of schooling for children. Second, they shape parents' aspirations. 

**The two last decades have witnessed significant progress in the understanding of how households form and take collectively their decision. An important aspect of the question is the extent to which households’ formations leads to assortative matching, views as to whether or not assortative mating is a good thing differ. Yet, to the very best of our knowledge, the socioeconomic impact of the assortative mating is by no means clear at all (neither empirically nor theoretically). In this paper, we attempt to investigate under what conditions household formation would lead to assortative matching and on whether household formation processes are inherently assortative? To do that, we propose a model of endogenous formation of households in a setting where a finite collection of men and women (in possibly differing numbers) with the same preference for a Beckerian household commodity and an individual private good must choose a (unique) mate of the opposite gender, or remain single. However, individuals (both men and women) differ in terms of their ability of converting one unit of time into the Beckerian composite commodity. We examine the positive properties of stable matchings in such a setting.