Publications
We study a simple model in which two vertically differentiated firms compete in prices and mass advertising on an initially uninformed market. Consumers differ in their preference for quality. There is an upper bound on prices since consumers cannot spend more on the good than a fixed amount (say, their income). Depending on this income and on the ratio between the advertising cost and quality differential (relative advertising cost), either there is no equilibrium in pure strategies or there exists one of the following three types: (1) an interior equilibrium, where both firms have positive natural markets and charge prices lower than the consumer’s income; (2) a constrained interior equilibrium, where both firms have positive natural markets, and the high-quality firm charges the consumer’s income or (3) a corner equilibrium, where the low-quality firm has no natural market selling only to uninformed customers. We show that no corner equilibrium exists in which the high-quality firm would have a null natural market. At an equilibrium (whenever there exists one), the high-quality firm always advertises more, charges a higher price and makes a higher profit than the low-quality one. As the relative advertising cost goes to infinity, prices become equal and the advertising intensities converge to zero as well as the profits. Finally, the advertising intensities are, at least globally, increasing with the quality differential. Finally, in all cases, as the advertising parameter cost increases unboundedly, both prices converge increasingly towards the consumer’s income.
We expand the theory of politician quality in electoral democracies with citizen candidates by supposing that performance while in office sends a signal to the voters about the politician's valence. Individuals live two periods and decide to become candidates when young, trading off against type-specific private wages. The valence signal increases the reelection chances of high valence incumbents (screening mechanism of reelection), and thus their expected gain from running for office (self-selection mechanism). Since self-selection improves the average quality of challengers, voters become more demanding when evaluating the incumbent's performance. This complementarity between the self-selection and the screening mechanisms may lead to multiple equilibria. We show that more difficult and/or less variable political jobs increase the politicians' quality. Conversely, societies with more wage inequality have lower quality polities. We also show that incumbency advantage blurs the screening mechanism by giving incumbents an upper-hand in electoral competition and may wipe out the positive effect of the screening mechanism on the quality of the polity.
Objectives This study aims to establish an inventory of the teaching of Therapeutic Patient Education (TPE) in the initial training of French midwives. Method: A descriptive quantitative study was conducted in France. An online questionnaire comprising 27 questions was distributed to 35 French midwifery schools. Results: Out of 19 schools that responded to the survey, 11 taught TPE, 8 did not address it in training. This teaching is mainly transversal. The obstacles to the teaching of TPE are the current density of the program, the absence of a text regulating this teaching and the difficulties in circumscribing the field of TPE in relation to that of prevention, promotion and health education. The simulation is used in only one school. Discussion: This survey shows a willingness of educational teams to invest in the teaching of health education, including TPE. For this, it is a question of strengthening the training of teachers in order to clarify the areas of intervention of the midwife calling for health promotion, prevention and health education; to offer specific internships to students and to use simulation. Extending the duration of initial training is an opportunity to plan specific teaching and to discuss the place of the health service.
The Balassa-Samuelson effect is still an important phenomenon in the theory of economic development, as Balassa states, "As economic development is accompanied by greater inter-country differences in the productivity of tradable goods, differences in wages and service prices increase, and correspondingly so do differences in purchasing power parity and exchange rates." To the best of our knowledge, the Balassa-Samuelson effect has not been formally examined in the framework of optimal growth theory. By embedding the Balassa-Samuelson's original model in an optimal growth model setting, we investigate the validity of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in such a case and show that the Balassa-Samuelson effect follows from one of the properties of the optimal steady state.
In the follow-up to the 1926 political and monetary crisis in France, a new government led by Raymond Poincaré attempted to restore monetary stability by restructuring public debt. A sinking fund was missioned to withdraw short-term public bills from money markets. This policy disorganized the largest Parisian banks of the time, as they relied on these bills to manage their liquidity. Without developed domestic money markets, no other asset could absorb the excess liquidity freed by the withdrawal of these bills, and these leading banks faced a low-rate environment. In search of yield, they expanded their activities abroad a few months before the 1929 crash. These findings renew our understanding of the expansion of France's banking sector in the 1920s. In addition, they shed new light on the role of public debt in financial stability in an open economy.
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Using data on roughly half a million cases and 10,000 judges from Pakistan and India, Mehmood et al. estimate the impact of the Ramadan fasting ritual on criminal sentencing decisions. They find that fasting increases judicial leniency and reduces reversals of decisions in higher courts. We estimate the impact of the Ramadan fasting ritual on criminal sentencing decisions in Pakistan and India from half a century of daily data. We use random case assignment and exogenous variation in fasting intensity during Ramadan due to the rotating Islamic calendar and the geographical latitude of the district courts to document the large effects of Ramadan fasting on decision-making. Our sample comprises roughly a half million cases and 10,000 judges from Pakistan and India. Ritual intensity increases Muslim judges' acquittal rates, lowers their appeal and reversal rates, and does not come at the cost of increased recidivism or heightened outgroup bias. Overall, our results indicate that the Ramadan fasting ritual followed by a billion Muslims worldwide induces more lenient decisions.
Topical Issues in International Development and Economics - Cambridge Scholars Publishing
